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DEDICATION
To my Mother and Father.

EPIGRAPH
Consciousness, Hermes reveals, is a great subject and very holy, no less
than an account of divinity itself.
The Latin Asclepius
Understanding our selves—our natures, capacities, and possibilities—is
the hardest thing in the world and yet endlessly fascinating because it
cannot be finally settled by empirical research. There are no facts to
decide, once and for all, whether the mind is part of the body, or whether it
is a spiritual substance, or an epiphenomenon of the brain. We still do not
know, in a scientific sense, what consciousness is.
A. A. Long, Greek Models of Mind and Self
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ABSTRACT
“GREETINGS, I AM AN IMMORTAL GOD!”: READING, IMAGINATION,
AND PERSONAL DIVINITY IN LATE ANTIQUITY, 2ND – 5TH CENTURIES CE
MAY 2019
MARK ROBLEE
B.A., WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
M.A., HOLY NAMES COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Carlin Barton
In City of God, Augustine entertains “personal divinity”—the idea that a person could
become an immortal god. Recent scholarship has focused on the social function of such
beliefs. The divine status of public figures such as emperors and martyrs has become a
trope widely understood in its social and institutional dimensions. I add to this
sociological understanding by inquiring into individual experience. How did a late
antique person become divine? How did she understand divinity and the limits of the
self? In City of God, Augustine assembles an archive that includes references to works by
Platonists Apuleius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, as well as Hermes Trismegistus (the
eponymous mystagogue portrayed in the Corpus Hermeticum). With ancient and modern
theories about reading and the imagination in mind—from Quintilian to Cognitive
Poetics—this dissertation interrogates the way reading (or hearing) texts about personal
divinity function as implicit “spiritual exercises” or imaginative technologies of selftransformation. My dissertation shows how the power of mental representations—

ix

imagined images of self and world that reside within the mind—affect experience and
construct “reality.”
Considering the role of imaginative reading and its transformative effects adds a
layer of complexity to how historians of religion and religious studies scholars interpret
texts about personal divinity, yielding greater compassion for how ancient peoples may
have understood themselves on their own terms. Furthermore, the heightened selfreflexivity that results from imaginative engagements with discourses on personal
divinity is part of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans that Otto ascribes to the divine
“Wholly Other.” The awe we experience at a thunder and lightning storm, for example, is
as much the awe of being able to feel or perceive the storm. The texts I interpret
explicitly provoke such awe. My research invites the modern reader into a numinous
world where human consciousness itself becomes “divine” through a complex process of
self-sacralization. Finally, this dissertation suggests that the writing of history informed
by a reflexive philosophy of history functions much like the “spiritual exercises” that
constitute my source texts. Writing history is a transformative practice that leads to selfknowledge in the present.

x

CAVEAT LECTOR
History dissertations do not usually come with caveats. But, this is not a
commonsense dissertation about “commonsense history.”1 Allow me to explain. This is a
dissertation about imaginary beings. That is, I shall be discussing things that are invisible.
This makes them no less real but they require imagination in order to “see” them. Things
like souls, gods, and people in the past. Thoughts and ideas, like gods, souls, and people
in the past, are invisible. And, they are no less real. You can “see” them in your mind.
They can (invisibly) occur to you. And, you can acquire new thoughts and ideas by
listening to or, in this case, reading them. Gods, souls, and people in the past will take
form as you read my words and the words of the thinkers—ancient and modern—that I
shall present to you in this work. If there were a god of the imagination, I would invoke
him or her now. Perhaps it is Hermes.
Hermes was the guide of souls and messenger of the gods.2 He traveled between
visible and invisible worlds. Indeed, he made the invisible, visible—bringing “existence
out of the nonexistent,” knowing “the things hidden beneath heaven and earth.”3 All the
writers examined in this dissertation, including Augustine, are trying much as I am to
figure out what divinity is and its relationship to humanity. All of these ancient thinkers
were working out questions and problems dealing with what it means to be a conscious
creature. For them, Hermes stood as guide to explore these questions that concern the
boundary between the visible world of embodiment and the invisible worlds of thought
1

See section below on R.G. Collingwood in “Historical Practice” for an explanation of
“common sense” history.
2

See Antoine Faivre, The Eternal Hermes: From Greek God to Alchemical Magus, trans.
Joscelyn Godwin (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1995).
PGM 8.1 – 52. This Papyri Graecae Magicae spell is addressed to Thoth who in late
antiquity was the Egyptian Hermes.
3
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and idea that humans hold within them and give shape to through the stories they tell
about them. This is not just a metaphor.4 Augustine spills a good deal of ink on Hermes
Trismegistus and the writings attributed to him. And it is no coincidence that Apuleius
went to great pains in court to counter charges of practicing magia in part because he had
in his possession a small black wooden statue of Hermes, remarkably common as such
objects were.5 Iamblichus refers to the “books of Hermes” and the “way of Hermes” in
his writings.6 Eunapius tells us that Porphyry was “in the chain of Hermes.”7 The words
of the Hermetic corpus often seem to echo in Plotinus.8
Hermes (it should be noted) also gives his name to the act of interpretation,
hermeneutics, and to subjects that are “hermetic,” meaning they are difficult to

Suggesting historians consider adopting an “unexpected” voice and style in the writing
of history, Catherine Chin writes eloquently about the use of metaphor, short sentences,
and “unrealities”: “As historians, we are sometimes afraid of unrealities, of whatever
does not propose a close relationship between our worlds and the past events we are
describing. Yet marking distance between words and events is what, paradoxically,
brings the events more clearly to mind… Awareness of the imaginative work that writing
does for us, in our own time, and in our own bodies, allows us to reconsider the
constitutive nature of somatically-engaged fantasy for our own task of historical worldbuilding. We write history for ourselves… If we were to accept the somatic, and
aesthetic, qualities of historical production with the same level of seriousness that we
grant to argumentative prose, we might use these qualities to create late antiquities that
are themselves newly compelling.” “Pro nobis fabula narrator: Late Antiquity as Art and
Fantasy,” Marginalia Review of Books, 16 September, 2015:
http://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/late-antiquity-and-the-new-humanities-an-openforum/
4

5

See Apuleius, Apologia 63.

6

Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 8.1, 8.4, 8.5.

7

Eunapius, Vita Sophistarum 457.

8

Cf. CH 16.7 with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.17.28-38; CH 11.20 with Plotinus, Ennead 5.12.
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understand, obscure, veiled.9 He tells us, as in my first epigraph, that divinity is a great
topic. In fact, it is so expansively great in scope that upon closer examination we find that
no one knows quite exactly what it is. (A.A. Long says the same for “consciousness” in
the second epigraph). We take it for granted that we know what it is to the extent that we
exist within a worldview that has already defined it for us. If we are people of
“Abrahamic-descended” traditions of belief, we will think in terms of “God”; if we are
Graeco-Roman philosophers, that concept takes quite a few other shapes; if we are
scientists in the modern sense, still another. The topic of divinity, itself, is “sacred,” “set
apart” from the Latin, sacer (an issue I will address at length in chapter 2).
Hermes was also the patron of travelers. The unusual structure of this dissertation
may require some orientation. An introduction will provide you with important
preliminary discussions of problems, methods, and terms. But, in order to discover what
is at the center of this dissertation, we will have to walk around, as it were. Readers will
enter the discussion from a number of different approaches—“Ways of Hermes”—each
intended to provide a complementary entryway into a difficult and confusing topic:
Divinity. You will know that you have reached the “center,” when you stumble upon the
words of the Muse in a “Poetic Postlude” which more or less encapsulates the spirit of the
work. For a more detailed map, I refer you to the dissertation outline (“Ways of Hermes”)
below.
Hermes was also a trickster and a thief. I suggest that there are three ways to
engage with this project: 1) To view it as an intellectual history—a history of ideas and

9

Plato, Cratylus 408A: “Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὁ Ἑρμῆς, καὶ τὸ
ἑρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον 408καὶ τὸ κλοπικόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ τὸ
ἀγοραστικόν, περὶ λόγου” (I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech,
and signifies that he is the interpreter, or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that
sort of thing has a great deal to do with language. English trans. Jowett).
xiii

of mentalities—concerning reading, imagination, and personal divinity; 2) As a way to
enter a thought-world of people in the past and attempt to see through their eyes; 3) To
use it as a measure of your own thinking about such topics as divinity and the self—
indeed, about the “past”—and as a means of understanding your own invisible world of
thought. If my extensive use of supporting secondary sources appears to obscure what is
my contribution to scholarship, know that my argument is not stolen but rather you have
been tricked. Like a good Late Antique mosaic, no one piece alone stands for the vision
that appears before you.
It was a custom of the ancients to place a garland on the herm stone by the road as
they set out upon a difficult journey or passed a boundary into unknown territory.10 Let
this caveat be so. You, dear reader, as Hermes assured us in the epigraph above, are about
to enter an account of consciousness. Historical? Yes. But very much alive in the present
where the past is accounted for.
Mark Roblee
Plum Island, MA
March 15, 2018

10

Hermae (ἑρμαῖ) are “statues composed of a head, usually that of the god Hermes,
placed on a quadrangular pillar, the height of which corresponds to the stature of the
human body (ἡ τετράγωνος ἐργασία, Thuc. 6.27; τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τετράγωνον, Paus. 4.33.4).
… One of the most important features in the mythology of Hermes is his presiding over
the common intercourse of life, traffic, journeys, roads, boundaries, and so forth, and
there can be no doubt that it was chiefly in such relations as these that he was intended to
be represented by the Hermae of the Greeks and by the Termini of the Romans, when the
latter were identified with the Hermae. It is therefore natural that we should look for the
existence of this symbol in the very earliest times in which the use of boundary-marks
was required; and in such times the symbols would be of the simplest character, a heap of
stones or an unhewn block of marble.” In William Smith, William Wayte, and G. E.
Marindin, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (London: J. Murray, 1890-91).
xiv

A NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS
As a courtesy to general readers, Latin and ancient Greek authors, titles, and
translations are in English in the main body of the text. Please note the following
exceptions: Corpus Hermeticum (for work attributed to Hermes Trismegistus), Papyri
Graecae Magicae (for the collection of Egyptian spells known in English as The Magical
Greek Papyri) and Metamorphoses (the original title of Apuleius’ The Golden Ass).
Ancient authors and original titles are given in full in Latin or ancient Greek
transliteration in parentheses. Quoted passage numbers will appear parenthetically
without author and title after the first mention in an extended, exclusive discussion. The
original language is given in the notes accompanied by English translations if not
supplied in the main text. The English translator is cited in the notes. See “Primary
Sources” in the bibliography for full citation information including modern scholarly
edition. My own translations are specified in the notes and my emendations appear in
brackets in the text where and when they occur. In some cases, I have given slightly more
of the original in the notes for clarity, context, and interest. On occasion, the original
Latin and ancient Greek are not supplied in notes when glossed parenthetically in the text
in sufficient part. Some references to Latin or ancient Greek passages are given in the
notes with citation only when not quoted in text or immediately relevant to the
discussion. Important words and phrases occur in the text in Latin, transliterated ancient
Greek (without accents or other diacritical marks), Middle Egyptian, Arabic, or Hebrew
as the case may be. Original Syriac, Coptic, and Middle Egyptian are given in English
translation only. Some Middle Egyptian words are displayed using standard specialized
transliteration fonts. One Arabic translation in English is accompanied by Arabic
transliteration without the original in the notes, one Hebrew title appears in transliteration

xv

in the notes. I have chosen not to use author and title abbreviations in the notes with the
following exceptions: Corpus Hermeticum = CH; Papyri Graecae Magicae = PGM;
“Mithras Liturgy” = ML. Abbreviations for Christian sources in the bibliography are
listed there.

xvi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ix
CAVEAT LECTOR ........................................................................................................... xi
A NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS .......................................................................................xv
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
CHAPTER
1. NEOPLATONISM & THE “VEHICLE OF THE SOUL” (MAP IS TERRITORY) ...48
2. MAKING SACRED SELVES IN THE CORPUS HERMETICUM .............................69
3. DIVINATION IS DIVINIZATION: ORACLES IN LATE ANTIQUE EGYPT .........98
4. THE PHILOSOPHER IN LATE ANTIQUE ALEXANDRIA ...................................124
5. ISIS, THE CULTUS OF THE SELF, AND THE GENIUS OF APULEIUS ..............138
CONCLUSION: THE WAY IN IS THE WAY OUT .....................................................164
POETIC POSTLUDE ......................................................................................................177
APPENDICES
A: AUGUSTINE THE READER ....................................................................................180
B: AUGSTINE AGAINST THE PAGANS ....................................................................183
C: THE ALTAR OF VICTORY REVISITED ................................................................188
D: THE WORLD OF LATE ANTIQUITY .....................................................................191
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................211

xvii

INTRODUCTION
Historical Practice
“What historians do worst…is reflect on epistemology.”
Peter Novick, That Noble Dream1
A word at the outset about my influences and historical practice should help the
reader navigate the following case studies with an open mind. My focus in this
dissertation is concerned with ideas and mentalities. This is an intellectual history about
reading, imagination, and personal divinity in late antiquity. The choice to focus on ideas
and the individual reader’s reception does not constitute an objection to social history but
rather it serves as an aid to understanding the social more fully. Indeed, intellectual
history is a part of social history. That is, intellectual life happens in a social context.
Broadly speaking, intellectual history is “the study of intellectuals, ideas, and intellectual
patterns over time.”2 I would like to think that I am doing the work of the intellectual
historian here; but, I seek to do more than document the change of ideas and concerns of
people in the past over time, even to do more than explore the context in which these

1

Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American
Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 15. Quoted in
Elizabeth A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 77. Mark Salber Phillips gives an
example of a lack of reflection on historical distance: “The very ubiquity of distance,
however, has tended to render it invisible, and over time certain canonized ideas about
the proper forms of distance have become so much a feature of our historiographical
tradition that we are hardly aware of their influence.” “Distance and Historical
Representation,” History Workshop Journal no. 57 (2004): 125. Thanks to Marla Miller
for recommending this source.
2

Peter E. Gordon, “What is Intellectual History? A frankly partisan introduction to a
frequently misunderstood field,” (Harvard University, Cambridge MA: 2012):
http://scholar.harvard.edu/pgordon. Used with permission.

1

ideas presented themselves and were discussed. My interest lies in understanding as
much as explanation.3 According to Peter E. Gordon, the intellectual historian’s interest
in “reconstructive understanding as against strict evaluation…has at least two notable
consequences for the practice of intellectual history”: “First, it enables intellectual
historians to draw sometimes surprising and creative connections between different sorts
of texts. Second, it allows them to think about intellectual ‘meaning’ in a rather capacious
or open-ended fashion.”4
Robert Darnton claims that intellectual history cannot be considered a “whole”:
“It has no governing problématique. Its practitioners share no sense of common subjects,
methods, and conceptual strategies. At one extreme they analyze the systems of
philosophers; at the other they examine the rituals of illiterates.”5 Darnton delineates four
kinds of intellectual history practice: “the history of ideas (the study of systematic
thought, usually in philosophical treatises), intellectual history proper (the study of
informal thought, climates of opinion, and literary movements), the social history of ideas
(the study of ideologies and idea diffusion), and cultural history (the study of culture in

3

See discussion of Collingwood’s engagement with Dilthey and continental philosophy
below and Karsten R. Stueber, “Understanding Versus Explanation? How to Think about
the Distinction between the Human and the Natural Sciences,” Inquiry 55:1 (2012): 1732. Stueber provides a nice summary of the debate with nuanced commentary about
whether the human and natural sciences are commensurable in subject and mode of study
or not.
4

Gordon, “What is Intellectual History?,” 2013.

5

Robert Darnton, “Intellectual and Cultural History,” in The Past Before Us:
Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, ed. Michael G. Kammen (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1980), 337.

2

the anthropological sense, including world views and collective mentalités).”6 In this
dissertation, my emphasis is on the latter.
A.O. Lovejoy’s history of ideas, with its search for “unit-ideas” and “mind,” was
an approach to intellectual history that rose sharply in the post-war era and seemed to
crash just as suddenly with the advent of social history in the 1950s and 60s. In his
reassessment of Lovejoy’s contribution to the more recent direction of intellectual
history, Anthony Grafton notes how “for the last ten years…younger scholars, especially
graduate students, had been scrambling over the gunwales of the good ship History of
Ideas, abandoning the effort to converse abstractly with the mighty dead.”7 However,
after a dazzling object lesson in the history of 20th century intellectual and cultural
history, Grafton concludes that, after all:
Lovejoy built extremely well—better, possibly, than he knew. The crossroads he
laid out and paved remains a central and attractive meeting point for many
disciplines. And the history of ideas—in the general sense of a study of texts,
images, and theories that seeks to balance responsibility and precision in the
formal treatment and analysis of its objects with an equally measured effort to
connect them to a particular historical world—has proved resilient, even
expansive, through multiple transformations of the disciplinary fields at whose
borders it resides.8

6

Darnton, “Intellectual and Cultural History,” 337.

7

Anthony Grafton, “The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950 - 2000 and
Beyond,” Journal of the History of Ideas. 3 (2006): 3. David Harlan writes about “recent
developments in literary criticism and the philosophy of language make it possible for
intellectual historians to return to an earlier understanding of their discipline: intellectual
history as a conversation with the dead about things we value.” “Reply to David
Hollinger,” American Historical Review 94 (1985): 625. Quoted in David Boucher, “In
Defense of Collingwood: Perspectives from Philosophy and the History of Ideas,” in
R.G. Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment: Studies in Folktale, Cultural
Criticism, and Anthropology, eds. David Boucher, Wendy James, and Philip Smallwood
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), xcvii.
8

Grafton, “The History of Ideas,” 30.

3

The flight from history of ideas (and intellectual history in general) to social history that
Grafton describes was not the end of historians’ attempts to engage with ideas. Elizabeth
Clark observes the swing of the pendulum in the other direction:
By the late 1970s…a challenge to [social history’s] dominance began to emerge
in the form of a new cultural history equipped with a theoretical apparatus whose
concepts—“mentalité, episteme, paradigm, hermeneutics, semiotics, hegemony,
deconstruction, and thick descriptions”—might well bewilder many social and
economic historians. These theoretical currents, however, have not merely
reinvigorated intellectual history, but have contributed to its “dizzying” success,
as the writings of Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, Roger Chartier, and
Dominick LaCapra (among others) testify. Intellectual history in this new mode
provides a welcome home for late ancient Christian studies, as for premodern
studies more generally.9
There are consequences to historical knowledge when we do not reflect on
epistemology. Historians need to distinguish between “the reality of the past” which is
“the historian’s object of study,” historiography, “which is the historian’s written
discourse about this object,” and the philosophy of history, “which is the study of the
possible relations obtaining between this object and this discourse.”10 In my research, I
have hoped to avoid an approach to writing history that takes “epistemological positions
without reflection or argument,” what Jerzy Topolski terms “spontaneous epistemological
realism.”11 Expanding on my discussion of intellectual history, I will equally engage with
the history of mentalities, microhistory, and the philosophy of the historian and
archaeologist, R.G. Collingwood.

9

Clark, History, Theory, Text, 106.

10

Hayden White, Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 3.
11

Jerzy Topolski, “Historians Look at Historical Truth,” in Epistemology and History, ed.
Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 406. Quoted in Clark, History,
Theory, Text, 17. Clark writes: “By spontaneous Topolski means that historians generally
assume their epistemological positions without reflection or argument.” (205, n. 78).

4

Histoire des Mentalités
The history of mentalities was developed by the later Annalistes who were
dissatisfied with the explanatory power of quantitative approaches to history of the
previous generations. Jacques Le Goff describes the notion of “mentality” as a kind of
“historical beyond”: “Its function, as a concept, is to satisfy the historian’s desire to ‘go
further’, and it leads to a point of contact with the other human sciences.”12 History of
mentalities turned to emotions or affect with a keen interest in the role of epistemology in
the writing of history.13 A study of mentalities was intended to provide a meeting point
for the tensions between “the individual and the collective, the long-term and the
everyday, the unconscious and the intentional, the structural and the conjectural, the
marginal and the general.”14 Le Goff complains that feudalism, for example, cannot be
understood adequately by only looking at economic, political, and institutional structures
in the past. Ideas, attitudes, and beliefs also had a role to play for elites and common
people in the feudal period.15 The historian of mentalities must borrow understandings of
human experience from the tool kits of the anthropologist, sociologist, and psychologist.
Such historians are interested in the “mental worlds” of ordinary people as are the
philosophers who interpret textual (and material) evidence with the understanding that
“mental worlds” can be reconstructed even when not explicit. Le Goff describes it as a
Jacques Le Goff, “Mentalities: a History of Ambiguities” in Constructing the Past:
Essays in Historical Methodology, eds. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Mason de
Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge University Press 1985), 167.
12

13

Clark, History, Theory, Text, 69-70.

14

Le Goff, “Mentalities,” 169.

15

Le Goff, “Mentalities,” 167.

5

kind of “archaeopsychology.”16 This approach attempts to avoid the criticism of “floating
ideas” leveled against history of ideas by analyzing mentalities with an eye to “where and
by what means such mentalities were produced.”17 Whereas, Darnton, who regards the
history of mentalities as a kind of cultural history, criticizes the overly broad strokes
sometimes found in studies of mentalities: “They tend to load the term with notions of
représentations collectives derived from Durkheim and the outillage mental that Lucien
Febvre picked up from the psychology of his day.”18 In contrast, Le Goff suggests that
the imprecision, ambiguity, or even vagueness that a history of mentalities sometimes
presents, is, in fact, part of its usefulness. Jan Assmann sees the history of mentalities as a
history of meaning that “discusses history as a cultural form in which the course of events
forms the backdrop and the discourses generating and reflecting meaning occupy the
front of the stage.”19 His focus is on “the fundamental attitudes generally referred to as
‘mentality,’ attitudes that are implicit in texts, images, and the events of history without
being explicitly expounded or commented upon.”20 Mentalities are not ordered structures
that determine predictable expressions. They highlight the presence of inner worlds of
historical actors and offer a view into the “inside” of events, (a term that we shall take up
again during our discussion of Collingwood below.)
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1968).
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trans. Andrew Jenkins (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), viii-ix.
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Microhistory
Like Histoire des Mentalités, microhistory evolved out of the dissatisfaction of
the third generation of Annalistes with “what they deemed a mechanistic or deterministic
form of history-writing that emphasized statistics, generalizations, [and] quantitative
formulation.”21 Microhistory ostensibly looks to particular events, communities, or
individuals in order to suggest larger scale social and cultural trends. Bridging the
concerns of intellectual, cultural, and social historians, microhistorians strive to capture
“lived experience” from the “bottom up” in an attempt to present an inclusive social
history. Notable practitioners include Natalie Zemon Davis, Robert Darnton, Laurel
Thatcher Ulrich, and Carlo Ginzburg.22 Coming out of the intellectual climate of the
1970’s in Bologna, like history of mentalities, microhistory was a response to the Annales
School with its focus on the longue durée and quantitative social science. Microhistory
“returns to interpreting utterance and beliefs, to describing brief dramatic events, and to
envisioning a past characterized more by abrupt changes than by deep structural
continuities.”23 The broader historiographical trend of microhistory which, according to
John Brewer, it is a part, “emanates from two major debates within the social sciences
and politics. One is concerned with the nature of everyday life under modern capitalism,
the other with the vexed issue of the relations between free will and determinism – the
21
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question of the efficacy of human agency.”24 Toggling perspectives of scale,
microhistorians examine the relationship between social structure and agency, between
the culture of the elites and the culture of the masses in order to discover the conditions
under which agency seems to exert itself. Agency is excluded in any discussion of
microhistorians purely revolving around structural constraints within society. By contrast,
social microhistorians such as Giovanni Levi see all social interaction as “the result of an
individual’s constant negotiation, manipulation, choices and decisions in the face of a
normative reality which, though pervasive, nevertheless offers many possibilities for
personal interpretations and freedoms.”25 The ideology of self-sacralization explored in
this study certainly qualifies as a manipulation of normative reality with freedom in (and
of) mind. Microhistory challenges a reductionist and determinist view of history.
However, microhistorical theory and its methods invite a number of criticisms.
Perhaps the most obvious one is in regard to selectivity and significance: “By what
criteria are names to be picked out and how representative of broader social trends and
collective mentalities are the subjects’ activities and thoughts? What can the few tell
about the many, especially when the process of selection is neither random nor
statistically rigorous? And how can historians concerned with trifles avoid producing
trivial history?”26 Still, even if the sample individual, group, or event are isolated and
idiosyncratic, we can learn something about the relationship between the margin and the
center, the deviant and the norm, and the power relationship between actors in a society.
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Collingwood
British philosopher, historian, and archaeologist, Robin George Collingwood
(1889-1943) seems to have anticipated many of the concerns of contemporary intellectual
historians, especially the historians of mentalities. He is favorably known for his
articulation of historical imagination, what he termed “a priori imagination,” and his
keen observation of the role of historians’ “present situatedness” in their inquiry.27 Less
favorably received, however, are his ideas about the intellectual foundation of history
(“All history is the history of thought”), the persistence of the past in the present, the
necessity of “re-enacting” the thoughts of people in the past, and his anti-positivism. All
of these ideas, whether championed or criticized, have influenced the way I am writing
history.
Collingwood equates inference with “a priori imagination,” a tool that allows the
historian to fill in gaps between what the evidence provides. He gives the example of
Caesar crossing the Rubicon: “I described constructive history as interpolating, between
the statements borrowed from our authorities, other statements implied by them. Thus our
authorities tell us that on one day Caesar was in Rome and on a later day in Gaul; they
tell us nothing about his journey from one place to the other, but we interpolate this with
a perfectly good conscience.”28 Constructive historical imagination, Collingwood is
careful to point out, must be grounded in evidence, a specific time and place, and must be
consistent with the known facts surrounding it.
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On the “present situatedness” of the historian, Collingwood suggests that
historical interpretations depend not only on evidence available at the time of
interpretation but also on the “attitude of mind from which the historian approaches it”:
“In the person of the historian, the mind of his age ‘measures itself against’ the past, and
shows what its own interests are, its own views and ideals of life, by the way in which it
interprets that past.” 29 This “present situatedness” penetrates as well into the mind of the
historian who must come “to grips with his own personality, by reconstructing the past in
ways determined by the forces at work in that personality.”30 Thus, “[t]he individuality
of a man or an age, which determines the way in which the individual conceives itself
and the world and determines its practical attitude to life, determines also the individual’s
attitude to the past.”31
The notion that historiography reflects present society has become commonplace.
For example, in his review of Alan Cameron’s The Last Pagans of Rome, Peter Brown
puts in this light the older narrative of the altar of victory controversy:
It is not for nothing that the scenario of a desperate last stand of paganism was
propounded with especial fervor in the years that immediately followed the end of
World War II. Such an account echoed the fears of a postwar world. For scholars
in Europe and America who had recently emerged from thirty years of violence
and ideological intolerance, only to confront the new, spreading shadow of the
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cold war, the conflict between a liberal paganism and an intolerant Christianity
seemed like a foreshadowing of the nightmares of their own times.32
Constructive imagination is also necessary for historians because, unlike those
“scientists” who study natural phenomena, historians study events that are not
perceptible. Yet, Collingwood points out, the evidence of the past is indirect:
The historian cannot answer questions about the past unless he has evidence about
it. His evidence, if he ‘has’ it, must be something existing here and now in the
present world. If there were a past event which had left no trace of any kind in the
present world, it would be a past event for which now there was no evidence, and
nobody—no historian; I say nothing of other, perhaps more highly gifted
persons—could know anything about it.33
To illustrate how the past is not dead but still living in the present, he gives the example
of Latin. If the reading of Latin had not survived the Middle Ages, no historian would be
able to write medieval history: “The past simply as past is wholly unknowable…it is the
past as residually preserved in the present that is alone knowable.”34 He offers a more
abstract model explaining that history is more about process than event:
[Processes] are things which do not begin and end but turn into one another; and
that if a process P1 turns into a process P2, there is no dividing line at which P1
stops and P2 begins; P1 never stops, it goes on in the changed form P2, and P2
never begins, it has previously been going on in the earlier form P1. There are in
history no beginnings and no endings. History books begin and end, but the
events they describe do not. If P1 has left traces of itself in P2 so that an historian
living in P2 can discover by interpretation of evidence that what is now P2 was
once P1, it follows that the ‘traces’ of P1 in the present are not, so to speak, the
corpse of a dead P1 but rather the real P1 itself, living and active though
incapsulated within the other form of itself P2. And P2 is not opaque, it is
transparent, so that P1 shines through it and their colours combine into one.35
32
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If all history is the history of thought, as Collingwood contends, then historical
knowledge is “knowledge of what the mind has done in the past.”36 How then can the
historian understand the thoughts of the past?37
To answer this question, Collingwood gives Plato as an example. To know what
Plato thought, the historian of philosophy must think Plato’s thoughts for herself.
Historical understanding is “re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind.”38
This is another way that the past lives in the present. Historical knowledge exists in the
present.39 The “re-doing” of past thought perpetuates past acts in the present: “To the
historian, the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but
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experiences to be lived through in his own man; they are objective, or known to him, only
because they are also subjective, or activities of his own.”40 The historian must be
“capable of entering into the minds of the person whose history he is studying.”41 Reenactment of thought is historical knowledge as opposed to what Benedetto Croce called
“mere chronicle” or what Collingwood terms derisively, “scissors and paste” history.42
Collingwood’s philosophy of history (and mind) suggests an accessibility to
ancient thought that is appealing to historians of mentalities:
[Metaphysics is] no futile attempt at knowing what lies beyond the limits of
experience, but is primarily at any given time an attempt to discover what the
people of that time believe about the world’s general ‘nature,’ such beliefs being
the presuppositions of all their ‘physics’, that is, their inquiries into its detail.
Secondarily, it is the attempt to discover the corresponding presuppositions of
other peoples and other times, and to follow the historical process by which one
set of presuppositions has turned into another.43
Collingwood’s anti-positivism set him at odds with historians (and philosophers)
who believed that a historical science, using the principles and methods of the natural
sciences, could fulfill the Rankean dream of discovering “wie es eigentlich gewesen”
(“what actually happened”). Collingwood finds the study of human beings (apart from
their biology) to be incommensurable with the study of the natural world. He writes:
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A positivistic view of history (by which I mean one that endeavors to assimilate
its principles and methods to those of the natural sciences) should answer the
question “how then is historical truth to be reached?” by saying “we must
eliminate the subjective element, as a source of distortion, and arrive at an
historical view of the facts from the point of view of a generalized
consciousness”…But this, although it is the proper method in natural science, is
impossible in history.44
For Collingwood, the subjective element that the natural sciences sought to eliminate,
was indeed, necessary for the production of historical knowledge.45 The constructive
imagination and the historical (and psychological) context of the historian that flavor the
questions, methods, and interpretations are tools for inquiry that are not to be discarded.
The processes of nature are events, while the processes of history are composed of
actions which have an “inner side” consisting of thought. Collingwood uses the
metaphors “outer” and “inner” to represent the relationship between thought and its
expression through action.46
Ultimately, the purpose of studying history is, for Collingwood, self-knowledge
and knowledge of humanity. Thus, historical practice is a process of self-creation.47 But,
it is an “open” project (unlike the “closed” history of the textbook practiced by “scissors
and paste” historians): “[H]istorical knowledge has perpetually to be revised and re44
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created by new generations and new students, and can never be transferred from one
mind, ready-made, to another.”48
In addition to their nominal focus on “intellect” and the “mental,” intellectual
historians and cultural historians of mentalities were also interested in affect, emotions,
sensibilities, manners, and taste long before the recent upsurge in history of emotion
projects across the globe.49 The humanities project of studying the widest range of human
thought, experience, and creativity takes us far out of the realm of the political, economic,
and institutional “facts” as Collingwood’s “scissors and paste” historians would
understand them. Averil Cameron reflects on new directions for historians of late
antiquity which owe something to epistemologically sensitive historians such as
Collingwood and intellectual and cultural historians of the “linguistic turn”:
The recognition that history is only partly about ‘the facts,’ and very much about
how we see the past, what we can learn from the past, and how the past is shown
to us by its survivals, can be a liberating force. It frees us to use our own
imaginations and to inquire into the imagination and the memory of our subjects.
It presents us with emotion, imagination, and memory as possible and proper
subjects of our inquiries. It opens up the history of late antiquity so that it can
become a vast field of experimentation. Above all, it liberates our own
understanding and speaks to our creative strengths.50
A recent study on imagination in late antiquity and the Middle Ages by Giselle de Nie
explores the position of philosopher Gaston Bachelard that “imagination reveals our
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experienced reality.”51 De Nie stresses the utility and necessity of a history of emotions
that includes imagination: “[I]dentifying the dynamic affective patterns…implicit in
particular texts and images can uncover up to now unnoticed, important dimensions of
experience and meaning.”52 Indeed, imagination, understood as a cognitive process in
human consciousness and a key component in the activity of reading—perhaps, a
thinking process as much as a feeling process—plays a central role in this dissertation.

Humanities
What are the humanities? The humanities comprise those fields of knowledge and
learning concerned with human thought, experience, and creativity...
encompass[ing] all areas of research and learning that ask fundamental questions
about the way individuals and societies live, think, interact, and express
themselves… but [whose] subject matter concerns those aspects of the human
condition that are not necessarily quantifiable or open to experiment.53
As an intellectual history about reading, imagination, and personal divinity in late
antiquity, this dissertation is a humanities project. The central question is: how did a late
antique person become divine? This question assumes that at least some late antique
people thought they could become divine and that those people had something substantial
in mind when they used the term “divine.” While this dissertation analyzes and interprets
texts written by people in the past about their thought, experience, and creativity relating
to “becoming divine,” it makes no claim to quantify “personal divinity” (or any human
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experience for that matter).54 As for opening up the prospect of “becoming divine” to
experimentation, well, I will leave that—as my writers did—to the reader’s
discretion…and imagination.

Personal Divinity
My study asks fundamental questions about human thought, experience, and
creativity from the point of view of the individual, in particular, a late antique “ideal
reader” (or hearer) who imaginatively engaged with texts about personal divinity.55 This
engagement was guided by paideia; that is, by an understanding of rhetoric and
philosophy acquired through education (see chapter 1). The late antique people I am
concerned with here were writers and readers of philosophy, particularly the work of
Plato and his late antique commentators and works that appear to have been influenced
by the notion that there is more to the world than what appears to the senses, that there is
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an invisible reality behind the world of appearances. For these late antique people, this
invisible world is what they characterized as the divine.56 This hidden divine reality was
the source of all being and it was being itself. It was independent of the earthly cycles of
life and death and accessible to humans because human consciousness was naturally
divine: it was made of the same invisible “stuff” and also independent of the cycles of life
and death.
A deathless consciousness that could access the divine was called “mind” (nous)
or “soul” (psyche, anima, pneuma). The Homeric idea that “soul” is what makes a body
move and live is carried through to Plato—“What is it that, when present in a body,
makes it living? –A soul” (Phaedo 105c).57 Indeed, for Plato (Alcibiades I 130c)58 and for
Cicero (De Republica 6.24)59 the soul was the person, the soul defined the human
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an immortal spirit moves the frail body.” Keyes, trans. (Tu vero enitere et sic habeto, non
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cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura, quae digito demonstrari potest. deum te igitur
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being.60 More than animating the body, the psyche and anima took on cognitive
functions.61 For the Platonists, it housed “insight and thought” in reflection of the divine
so that the soul was a personal divinity, a daimon (Plato, Alcibiades 1 133b).62 On the one

et moderatur et movet id corpus, cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps
deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus
animus sempiternus movet.)
60
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hand, the divine was said to be beyond description and, on the other, it was described as
intelligent, a kind of “god” that permeated the world of appearances. Although the
constitution of gods in antiquity varied widely over time and place, the conception that
developed among the thinkers I am describing tended toward the concept of god (theos)
as invisible, intelligent, immortal power.63
The late antique peoples who thought they could personally access that invisible
world, achieve a deathless state, and continue to exist as intelligent beings beyond the life
of their body, claimed personal divinity.64 They claimed to become gods.65 Known as

be material?” Wiesen, trans. (cum in animo cogitantis aspicitur atque iudicatur, nec ipsa
corpus est. Non est ergo nec terra nec aqua, nec aer nec ignis, qui bus quattuor
corporibus, quae dicuntur quattuor elementa, mundum corporeum videmus esse
compactu. Porro si noster animus corpus non est, quo modo Deus creator animi corpus
est?)
63

For Homer, being godlike was to be the best by far in one or more aspects: strength,
beauty, wit, glory. Gods have the “power to do things” (θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύνανται)
(Homer, Odyssey 10.306). But, immortality becomes the defining features of godliness in
the philosophical tradition. Clement recalls Thales’ definition as “what has neither
beginning (ἀρχήν) nor end (τέλος)” (Clement, Stromata 5.96.4). When Socrates was
asked, “What is God?,” he similarly replied, “What is immortal and everlasting”
(ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιον) (Stobeus, Florilegium 1.29a). For Aristotle, immortality is the
activity of god (θεοῦ δ᾽ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία) (Aristotle, De Caelo 2.3, 286a9). See David
M. Litwa, We Are Being Transformed Deification in Paul's Soteriology (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2012) for an excellent survey of godliness in Greco-Roman antiquity, esp. 43-45.
64

Personal divinity, I suggest, was the personal (psyche) identification and participation
in the invisible, intelligent power of the divine Mind (Nous), an emanating feature of the
Neoplatonic One (to hen).
65

The term “theurgy” (“divine work”) was used by some of the writers I will be
discussing (Augustine, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius, the two Julians of the
Chaldean Oracles) and for many modern scholars, myself included, it satisfactorily
encompasses the aims of the writers and readers of the Corpus Hermeticum, the Papyri
Graecae Magicae, and, I argue, in prototypical form in Apuleius. Theurgy is a flexible
label. However, I prefer the term “personal divinity” because it avoids the problem cases
of restricted use. Garth Fowden has argued convincingly that Neoplatonic theurgy and
Hermeticism occupy the same sphere of concern by virtue of their shared beliefs and
practices. That standard work has been Yochanan, Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and
Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire. Translated by
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Platonici and theurgici to Augustine, modern scholars call them Neoplatonists,
Hermetists, and theurgists.66

Michel Tardieu. Paris: Institut d'Études augustiniennes, 2011, recently released in a third
edition including many corrections, clarifications, and an essay and bibliography from
1891 – 2011 by Tardieu. See Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical
Approach to the Late Pagan Mind, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
Following Fowden, Sarah Iles Johnston writes: “[I]n modern use, the term theurgist
usually does not include some other figures who shared important beliefs with Proclus,
Iamblichus, and the Juliani, including a soteriology based in Platonic metaphysics and an
interest in animation rituals: I mean those whom we typically call the Hermetists, that is,
those who composed and studied the philosophical and ritual texts that we subsume under
the titles Corpus Hermeticum or Hermetica. Sharply dividing the theurgists from the
Hermeticists falsely represents ancient reality, as Garth Fowden shows; for the milieu we
will be considering here, ‘theurgy’ and ‘Hermeticism’ were two names for essentially the
same constellation of beliefs and practices.” Sarah Iles Johnston, “Animating Statues: A
Case Study in Ritual,” Arethusa 41 (2008): 450-451; Also see Claire Fanger, Invoking
Angels: Theurgic Ideas and Practices, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries (University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 15-27. More recently, Ilinca TanaseanuDöbler, shows how Hermetic texts “can be subsumed under this label e.g. by Iamblichus,
who explicitly chooses to draw this connection … Late authors such as Proclus or
Damascius are more specific and reserve the term ‘theurgist’ for the Chaldean tradition,
distinguishing it from Orphic lore. … From the beginning of its Neoplatonic career,
theurgy was not only connected with other rituals, but also with various terms which
were used sometimes synonymously with it, sometimes to denote related and
overlapping, though not distinct fields. Thus, while ‘hieratic’ is synonymous to ‘theurgy’
in Iamblichus, it is used in a wider sense by Proclus, for who ‘hieratic’ includes the
Chaldean theurgists as a prominent instance, but can also refer to priests in general, or to
the legendary wisdom of Egyptian priests in the Timaeus. …. ‘Telestic’ is another label
for rituals that can be stretched at will ; it gradually enters the discourse about theurgy
and slowly overlaps with the latter.” Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity:
The Invention of a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 278279.
66

For concise introductions to prominent members of the Neoplatonic school, see
Dominic J. O’Meara, Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), chapter 2; Pauliina Remes, Neoplatonism (Stocksfield:
Acumen, 2008), 19 – 33. For social context, see Garth Fowden, “The Pagan Holy Man in
Late Antique Society,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 102 (1982): 33-59; Richard Lim,
Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995; Edward Jay Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and
Alexandria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).Apuleius is categorized by
modern scholars as a “Middle Platonist,” in the tradition of Plutarch. He also, for some,
will fall slightly outside of our period of late antiquity, being more representative of the
“high Empire” of the Antonines.
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Individuals67
In Peter Brown’s groundbreaking work on the “holy man” in late antiquity, rather
than asking if late antique people believed that a person could become divine, he
suggested we consider what they got out of believing so “on the ground.” In other words,
what function did the idea of personal divinity play in the organization of society? This
question revolutionized scholarship, allowing the problem of belief and access to the
minds of people in the past to be “bracketed.” Scholarship in the last forty years has
focused on the social function of beliefs and practices related to personal divinity.68 The
“divine” status of public figures in late antiquity such as emperors, martyrs, and monks
has become a trope now widely understood in its social and institutional dimensions.69 In

67

“What does individualization mean? First and foremost it includes the notion of detraditionalization. Individual action is less and less determined by traditional norms
handed down by family and the larger social context. Options open up, choices are made.
On the part of the individual, this development is reflected in changes in ‘individuation’,
the parallel process of gradual full integration into society and the development of selfreflection and a of a notion of individual identity. Socialization, the biographical process
of being integrated into ever larger social contexts (not necessarily in any formal manner)
by the individual’s appropriation of social roles and traditions—and the development of
individual identity go hand in hand.” Jörg Rüpke, “Individualization and Individuation”
in The Individual in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean, ed. by Jörg Rüpke
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7.
68

Peter Brown, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity,” Journal of
Roman Studies 61 (1971): 80-101.
69

While much of the scholarship on self-deification in this period has emphasized
“ruler-cults” such as S. R. F. Price, Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in
Asia Minor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Ittai Gradel, Emperor
Worship and Roman Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Duncan Fishwick, The
Imperial cult in the Latin West: Studies in the Ruler Cult of the Western Provinces of
the Roman Empire (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987); Sabine MacCormack, Art and ceremony
in late antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); and, in the Egyptian
context, Wildung, Dietrich. Egyptian Saints: Deification in Pharaonic Egypt (New
York: New York University Press, 1977), in contrast, my research examines selfdeification of individuals who did not represent themselves as wishing to become
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this dissertation, I add to this social-functionalist understanding of personal divinity by
inquiring more deeply into areas of personal meaning and individual experience. I am
interested in the thoughts and emotions—the mentalities—even more, the imaginations—
of late antique writers, readers, and hearers for whom personal divinity was seen as an
option on their horizons.
In approaching the works of these writers, I recognize that human endeavors are
complicated and contradictory, that the various thoughts and practices relating to personal
divinity, for example, could be both socially and personally constructed in meaningful
and functional ways without being reducible one to the other. That is, the idea of personal
divinity can fulfill different social and personal functions at the same time. Anthony
Cohen has criticized the tendency of social scientists to privilege the social aggregate at
the expense of individual variation:
Traditionally the self and the individual have been treated as micro-versions of
larger social entities by the social sciences in general, and by anthropology in
particular….[T]his practice has resulted in the misunderstanding of social
aggregates precisely because the individual has been ignored as a constituent
element. By acknowledging the individual's self awareness as author of their own
social conduct and of the social forms in which they participate, this informs
social and cultural processes rather than the individual being passively modeled
by them.70
I also recognize that the divine status attributed to a ruler with social power and the
personal divinity of a reader of esoteric texts are quite different things. For example, an
emperor’s claim to divinity may serve to legitimize his authority while a philosopher’s
claim, which certainly legitimizes authority within an intellectual circle or textual

members of the ruling elite.
70

Anthony P. Cohen, Self Consciousness: An Alternative Anthropology of Identity
(London: Routledge, 1994), 114-115.
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community, might also have the purpose of inspiring students to follow suit…not a
desirable outcome for an emperor at all!71
The degree to which we may access the interiors of individual minds in the past
(never mind of those present) is fraught to say the least. The problem of the extent to
which we can “penetrate the secrets of the heart,” as Dodds put it, is a difficult one.72
Richard Lim rightly draws our attention to the scarcity of sources outside of elite circles,
of “ipsissima verba that should be taken as a form of ‘personal expression’ [allowing]
one to get ‘as close as possible to the individuals themselves.’”73 So, it is not without
caution that I will attempt to unpack the subjective phenomena of personal divinity. With
Carlin Barton, I subscribe to the idea that “[w]e have no access to minds other than our
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Richard Lim has pointed out the decline of public dialectical disputation in late
antiquity with the rise of the “pagan holy man.” See my chapter 4 and Richard Lim,
Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995), esp. ch. 2 and Garth Fowden, “The Pagan Holy Man in Late
Antique Society.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 102 (1982): 33-59.
72

E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety; Some Aspects of Religious
Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge: University Press, 1965),
83.
73

Richard Lim, “Reviewed Work(s): People, Personal Expression, and Social Relations
in Late Antiquity by Ralph W. Mathisen,” Speculum 80, no. 3 (2005): 925. On the
challenge of studying emotions in the past, Alexandra Verbovsek writes: “Current
research [on rituals and emotions] focuses in particular on the genesis, codification, and
functions of emotions. One of the most significant questions relates to the role of
emotions in social and cultural processes. To date we on not know exactly how feelings,
their presentations, and interpretation are constituted, so it is still an open question of
whether emotions are predominantly guided by cultural influence and what the causes for
emotion priorities and characteristics in different chronological, regional and ethnic
contexts are. How can we know what, why, and where we need to feel? And how can we
be sure about the individual and social consequences of our feelings? Is the cultural
knowledge of emotions standardized, does it depend on social class and status, or is it
individual and flexible?” “The Correlation of Rituals, Emotions, and Literature in
Ancient Egypt,” in Ritual Dynamics in the Ancient Mediterranean. Agency, Emotion,
Gender, Representation, ed. Angelos Chaniotis (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011),
237.
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own except insofar as we impute to them shared qualities.”74 The difficulties in accessing
experience75 should not cause us to ignore its profound shaping influence nor prevent us
from using humanistic approaches to “get at” the individual. Further, I believe that
British historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood (1889 – 1943) offers a solution to
this difficulty in his insistence that the past lives in the present mind of the historian (see
“Collingwood” above and Conclusion).

Reading Mysteries
The activity of reading is front and center in this dissertation. Neoplatonic and
Hermetic literature was intended to transform those who engaged with it through the
“mystery of reading” which, as Arthur Versluis puts it, allows us to “travel ever more
deeply in the worldview of the authors, perhaps even experience…moments of insight
during which we suddenly see ourselves and the world around us in a new light.”76 This
notion was not unfamiliar to Augustine who explored how words, images, and mental
representations “play a fundamental role in mediating perceptions of reality.”77 Brian
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Carlin A. Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 5. For Ernst Gellner social functional
approaches to ancient minds “enable us to attribute meaning to assertions which might
otherwise be found to lack it.” “Concepts and Society,” in Sociological Theory and
Philosophical Analysis, eds. D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1970),
115 – 149. Quoted in Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of
Religions (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 298. Smith comments: “Gellner restores the capacity
for thought, for rationality and rationalization to the primitive and, by so doing, restores
their recognizable humanity,” 298.
75

See note 544.
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Arthur Versluis, Restoring Paradise Western Esotericism: Literature, Art, and
Consciousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 4-5.
77

Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of
Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1.
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Stock describes Augustine’s theory of reading as a kind of ritual intended to bring the
reader into an experience of personal divinity:
The act of reading is then a critical step upwards in a mental ascent: it
is…a rite of initiation, in which the reader crosses the threshold from the
outside to the inside world. This upward and inward movement takes place
when the appropriate text is transformed into an object of contemplation.
Lectio becomes meditatio.78
Likewise, Sarah Ahbel-Rappe suggests that the ideal reader of texts about personal
divinity actively “take part in a theurgic ritual.”79 Richard Reitzenstein’s characterization
of these kinds of ancient texts as Lese-Mysterium, that is (in Brian Copenhaver’s words)
“texts meant to have cultic effects without actual cultic practice,” highlights the
importance of reading.80
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Stock, Augustine the Reader, 1-2.
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Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: non-discursive thinking in the texts of
Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius (United States of America: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2000), 173.
80

Brian Copenhaver, Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin
Asclepius in a New English Translation, with Notes and Introduction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), lii. See Richard Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen
Mysterienreligionen nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen (Leipzig 1927), 51-52,
64. Reitzenstein’s assertion that Hermetic communities did not exist has been rejected
by many scholars since the discovery of Coptic Hermetic ritual texts from Nag
Hammadi that parallel the Greek texts and serve as evidence for a textual community.
Garth Fowden writes: “Admittedly our philosophical texts imply an actual historical
milieu that was dedicated to the spiritual life. Instruction and initiation were group
experiences, even when at the highest levels, they involved only the spiritual guide and
a solitary pupil; and those who participated in these encounters instinctively expressed
their solidarity and joy through prayer and hymnody, and in such comradely gestures as
embraces and the sharing of food.” Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 149.
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Compassion
My emphasis on the creative role of imaginative reading as a “spiritual
exercise”—with theurgic aims (see chapter 1 below)—adds a layer of complexity to how
scholars and amateurs read texts about personal divinity, yielding I hope, a better
appreciation for how ancient peoples may have understood themselves and their worlds
on their own terms. Reading texts on their own terms restores something of the original
potency they had for ancient writers, readers, and hearers. Reminding us that “historical
and ethnographic records attest to considerable ontological diversity across human
experience,” Greg Anderson suggests that “conventional historicist models, categories,
and protocols require us to analyze non-modern lifeworlds as if all were experience
within one and the same real world….”81 Such a disciplinary practice “effectively
modernizes the very fabrics of non-modern being, thereby denying past peoples the
power to determine the truths of their own experience.”82 Avoiding the conventional
historicist models Anderson speaks of, scholars like Janet Coleman and Mary Carruthers
have admirably represented premodern mentalities through their discussion of memoria, a
word that meant more than “memory” means to moderns.83
Although it is commonplace now to think that “becoming divine” could only be a
kind of self-deception, this dissertation offers the modern reader access to late antique
texts and mentalities that now seems foreign to many. My approach challenges the
81

Greg Anderson, “Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past: The Case for an Ontological
Turn,” American Historical Review 120, no. 3 (2015): 789.
82

Anderson, “Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past,” 789.
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Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval
Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
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tendency to explain away beliefs and experiences that seem unscientific to many moderns
who reduce them to their utilitarian social function in order to make them palatable.84
This dissertation stands as a corrective for what I see as unnecessary excess in the socialfunctional approach to human experience. By recovering this historical mentality, I hope,
at least to provoke us to re-imagine a world that values many sources of human
knowledge and many ways of being human.

Technologies of Self
Michel Foucault’s concept of the “technology of self” arose out of his
engagement with Plato’s discussion of how one should “care for the self.”85 Foucault
describes the “technology of self” as a conscious, intentional shaping of one’s own body,
mind, or behavior that leads to some notion of “happiness, perfection, or immortality.”86
Likewise, Pierre Hadot suggests that technologies of self foster constructive introspection
and lead to a transformed self-possession and independence:
What Foucault calls “practices of the self” do indeed correspond, for the
Platonists as well as for the Stoics, to a movement of conversion toward the self.
One frees oneself from exteriority, from personal attachment to exterior objects,
and from the pleasures they may provide. One observes oneself, to determine
whether one has made progress in this exercise. One seeks to be one’s own
master, to possess oneself, and find one’s happiness in freedom and inner
84

“Modern aesthetic preferences are irrelevant to works’ value as evidence. The fact that
scholars often find the epic vitae bizarre, distasteful, or inexplicable indicates that we
should pay attention…By focusing on the problematic and the neglected, we gain new
perspectives.” Anna Lisa Taylor, Epic Lives and Monasticism in the Middle Ages, 800 1050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 19.
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My trans. Apologia 86c: “ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη.”
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Michel Foucault, Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton.
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1988), 19. Foucault’s later thinking about technologies of self
emphasized their use in expressing agency over governmentality.
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independence. I concur on all these points. I do think, however, that this
movement of interiorization is inseparably linked to another movement, whereby
one rises to a higher psychic level, at which one encounters another kind of
exteriorization, another relationship with “the exterior.” This is a new way of
being-in-the-world, which consists in becoming aware of oneself as a part of
nature, and a portion of universal reason. At this point, one no longer lives in the
usual, conventional human world, but in the world of nature. As we have seen
above, one is then practicing “physics” as a spiritual exercise.87
I have come to understand the act of reading, hearing, and performing texts about
personal divinity in terms of the “spiritual exercise”—that is, as a kind of thought
experiment or mental practice intended to produce a change in self-concept or state of
being—essentially, a self-fashioning—that brings one into a new relationship with the
cosmos, a relationship understood as being beyond what is normally accessible through
the senses. What I think makes them “spiritual” exercises is that they entertain subtle
things, like the air or the breath of life (spiritus), things that are invisible or intangible—
almost seen—and therefore require imagination in order to be “seen” or “felt.”88 For
example, the sphere that Plotinus invites his reader to imagine (described more fully in
chapters 1 and 2) gives the sense that the mind is larger than the cosmos, that it exceeds
the limits of a physical body. This “sense” happens in an imaginary inner “space,” what
we can describe as an interior map of an inner landscape, invisible to others except
perhaps in how the exercise effects the choices and actions of the reader. These spiritual
exercises are imaginative exercises.
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Pierre Hadot and Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises
from Socrates to Foucault (Oxford; New York: Blackwell, 1995), 211.
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“The Greek psyche also means breath, as does the Latin anima. One of the early
Milesian philosophers, Anaximenes, believed that the air is god, and he drew an analogy
between the air, which sustains the universe, and the human soul: ‘As our soul, being air,
holds us together, so do breath and air (pneuma, aēr) surround the whole universe’ (fr.
2).” Corrigan, “Body and Soul,” 367.
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According to Neoplatonist scholar Sara Ahbel-Rappe, imaginative spiritual
exercises—whether explicit or implicit—consist of an “active but directed use of the
imagination, and [a] sustained presence of this imaginative construction as a method of
changing habitual modes of thought or self-awareness.”89 Self-deification, I will argue,
can be usefully understood as a “technology of self.” These internal events—discourses
played upon the stage of interiority intended to produce a change in self-concept, state of
being, and relationship to the cosmos—impact the subject significantly constituting what
I refer to as an “imaginative technology of self-transformation.”
Spiritual or imaginative exercises in texts can be explicit or implicit. That is, they
can be explicitly prescribed using the hortatory subjunctive or the imperative mood as in
Plotinus’s well known sphere exercise: “Let there be, then, in the soul an imagination of a
sphere…” (Ennead 5.9.8).90 Or, imaginative exercises can be suggested implicitly
through imagery and concepts within the narrative of the text that serve to shape interior
topography without calling attention to itself, using vivid language to draw a map of the
self and its world in an interior imagined space of the mind. Implicit spiritual exercises
generate inner experiences just as explicit ones do. Acts of reading (or hearing) are often
explicit spiritual exercises but they are always implicit spiritual exercises.91 Reading as
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Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 79.
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Armstrong, trans. “Ἔστω οὖν ἐν τῆι ψυχῆι φωτεινή τις φαντασία σφαίρας ἔχουσα πάντα
ἐν αὐτῆι.”
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Catherine Bell (following J.Z. Smith) has noted how potentially any human activity
can be separated out as “ritual.” See Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New
York/Oxford, 1992).
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an exercise produces what Patricia Cox Miller refers to as a kind of “mental theater” or
what Zeke Mazur has called “inner ritual.”92
Augustine gives an excellent example of the rhetorical technique: “Look, here am
I, watching Cyprian; I’m crazy about Cyprian….I’m watching him, I’m delighted by him,
as far as I can I embrace him with the arms of my mind” (Sermones 301A.7).93
Augustine’s idea of the three kinds of vision supports this idea: “’[O]ne kind of vision
occurs through the eyes, by which the soul perceives corporeal objects by means of the
body; the second kind of vision occurs in the imagination, where the soul sees likenesses
of corporeal things that are absent; in the third kind, vision occurs ‘through an intuition of
the mind’, where ‘the soul understands those realities that are neither bodies nor the
likenesses of bodies.’”94 Regarding the use of allegory in Christian late antiquity, Denys
Turner locates the “broad distinction between ‘literal’ and ‘spiritual’ senses” in Origen’s
On First Principles in the early fourth century, in Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine in
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Patricia Cox Miller, The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient
Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 87; Zeke Mazur,
“Unio Magica: Part II: Plotinus, theurgy, and the question of ritual,” Dionysius 22
(2004): 43. The theoretical basis for the idea that the gaze was performative whether seen
outwardly or inwardly is ubiquitous in antiquity from Aristotle to Augustine. See Miller
2009, 89 and also Carlin Barton, “Being in the Eyes: Shame and Sight in Ancient Rome”
in The Roman Gaze: Vision, Power, and the Body, ed. Frederick David, (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 216 – 235.
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Hill, trans. “Ecce ego specto Cyprianum, amo Cyprianum....Specto, delector, quantum
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Patricia Cox Miller, “Relics, Rhetoric and Mental Spectacles in Late Antique
Christianity,” in Seeing the Invisible in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, eds.
Giselle de Nie, Karl F. Morrison, and Marco Mostert (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers,
2005), 33. Miller’s translation is based on several translated sections of De gen. ad lit. in
Taylor, 185-186, 213. Text in August. De gen. ad lit. 12.6.15; 12.7.16; 12.24.50.
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the early fifth, and in Gregory the Great‘s Dialogues in the late sixth century.95 Gregory
argued that “the meaning invested in things was to be deciphered by analogical
reasoning, linking orders of reality—the physical and the moral.…”96 This is Miller’s
point: “[I]t makes no difference whether the image is true to reality or not; what matters
is that ‘it is useful for some other purpose,’—[a transformative] knowledge.”97
Imaginative exercises as technologies of self-transformation embedded in texts
about personal divinity heighten reflexivity, an extreme form of self-consciousness that
isolates the subject as object to be manipulated, worked on, transformed. In my project, I
show how each text in this constellation of discourses about personal divinity offers
imaginative exercises, constructing a highly sacralized or divine self-concept through
interior map-making and topographies of self.

Performativity
Words do things.98 For the speaker and the hearer. For the writer and the reader. If
I say (or you read), “The sky is blue,” you would probably remember or reconstruct a
brilliant blue sky in your mind’s eye. If I say (or you read), “I am flying in the blue sky,”
you might imagine this as well. As unlikely as it is that you would ever see me flapping
about in a clear blue sky, it is likely that you could imagine it. Your imagining would be
95

Denys Turner, “Allegory in Christian late antiquity,” in The Cambridge companion to
allegory, eds. Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 71-72.
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William D. McCready, Signs of sanctity: miracles in the thought of Gregory the Great
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989), 5.
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On the concept of “performative utterance,” see J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with
Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
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different than my imagining or the imagining of the person sitting next to you. At least
somewhat. But, positing such a scene, I cannot imagine it for you. I cannot enter the
interior world of your experience and draw my avian self on an expanse of your blue.
You have to do it. It may be my descriptive words that suggest. But, it is you taking them
in, internalizing them, and putting them together into an inward understanding. I contend
that in seeing this scene in your mind’s eye—me flying in the wild blue yonder—you are,
having assembled it, re-enacting it. Uttering is performative. Language’s “performativity”
is what Judith Butler calls “the power of discourse to materialize its effects,”99 a power
realized through imaginative reading. Seeing too is performative. And, surely, seeing
with the mind’s eye, that is, imagining, is performative.

Scope of the Divine
In City of God, Books 8 – 10, Augustine of Hippo100 attempts to refute certain late
antique ideas and practices pertaining to personal divinity. In doing so, he assembles the
archive for this dissertation including works by second-century North African Latin
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Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York:
Routledge, 1993), 187.
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Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) was born in Thagaste, the North African Roman
province of Numidia (now Algeria) and died in Hippo Regius in the same province. For
manuscript tradition of City of God, see Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God: A
Reader’s Guide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 275 – 276. Scholarship on Augustine’s
vast corpus is long and wide. See bibliography in Brown’s biography below. Important
biographical works include: Henri Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture
antique (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1983); Henry Chadwick, Augustine of Hippo: A Life
(Oxford; New York : Oxford University Press, 2009); Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo;
A Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; James Joseph O’Donnell,
Augustine: A New Biography (New York: Ecco, 2005); Robin Lane Fox, Augustine:
Conversions to Confessions (New York: Basic Books, 2015).
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writer, Apuleius101; the third-century Roman-Egyptian Neoplatonist, Plotinus102; his
student and biographer, Porphyry103; Iamblichus104, the Syrian philosopher known for his
interest in ritual; as well as works attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, the eponymous
mystagogue portrayed in the so-called Corpus Hermeticum.105
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Apuleius of Madura (c. 124 – c. 170). Roman North African (now Algeria) rhetor and
philosopher, part of the Late Antique revival of Platonism. Studied and travelled in
Athens, Italy, Egypt. For biography, background, writings, see S. J. Harrison, Apuleius: A
Latin Sophist (Oxford University Press, 2000), 1 – 38. For manuscript tradition and
bibliography on De deo Socratis, see C. P. Jones, and Apuleius. Apologia; Florida; De
Deo Socratis. Loeb Classical Library: 534 (Cambridge, MA; London, England: Harvard
University Press, 2017), vii - xxxii; For Metamorphoses, see Apuleius, Metamorphoses.
Edited and translated by John Arthur Hanson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1989), vii – xvii.
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Plotinus (c. 204/5 – 270). Likely born in Egypt, studied in Alexandria, travelled to
Persia and India. Primary source of biographical information contained in Porphyry’s
Vita Plotini. Considered the founder of Neoplatonism, he formed a school in Rome in the
household of Gemina where he taught men and women, politicians and scholars. Like
Augustine, scholarship on Plotinus is vast. For manuscript tradition and references to
commentaries and bibliographic works, see Plotinus, Enneads. Edited and translated A.
H. Armstrong. 7 volumes. Loeb Classical Library 440 – 445, 468 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1969 – 1988), xxviii – xxxiii.
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Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234 – c. 305). Born Phoenicia (now Lebanon), studied in Athens
and Rome. Student of Plotinus, fellow student (and early teacher) of Iamblichus.
Compiler of Enneads. For biographical information, see Robert M. Berchman, Porphyry
Against the Christians (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
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Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 245 – c. 325). Born in Syria, studied with Porphyry in Rome
or Sicily. Known especially for his use of theurgy (ritual) and Egyptianizing disputation
with Porphyry (De Mysteriis). See Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The
Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1995): Afonasin, E. V., John M. Dillon, and John F. Finamore, eds. Iamblichus and the
Foundations of Late Platonism. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
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Hermetica refers to second through fifth-century Graeco-Egyptian philosophical texts
attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, compiled by Byzantine and Renaissance scholars,
including the Papyri Graecae Magicae, portions of the Nag Hammadi Codices, and some
Armenian texts. Hermetic texts are mentioned by Tertullian (early 3rd c.), Lactantius
(3rd/4th c.), Cyril of Alexandrian (5th c.), Clement of Alexandria (5th c.), Augustine (5th c.),
and Michael Psellos (11th c.). Reintroduced (in part) to Europe by Ficino as the Corpus
Hermeticum in Latin translation (1471). Recent translations and commentary include
Mead, Festugière and Nock (Budé), Mahé, Scott, Copenhaver, and Litwa. For
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This is not a dissertation about Augustine or City of God but rather about some of
the sources Augustine read that constitute the archive for this study. But, it is important to
understand Augustine’s debate with the “pagan” 106 philosophers in Books 8 – 10. The
archive is not random, Augustine assembles it for the purpose of refuting pagan
philosophers and pointing them toward Christianity, the “true philosophy” in his view. He
objected to the Platonic understanding of the relationship between the person and divinity
which lead to practices, to the extent that he understood them, of worshipping “demons”
and of “making gods” (i.e. statues) (Augustine, De civitate Dei 8.23).107 As we shall see,
the Late Antique writers and readers at hand were more concerned with getting to know
introduction to historical context, manuscript traditionary, and commentaries, See
Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a New English
Translation, with Notes and Introduction. Edited and translated by Brian P. Copenhaver
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xiii – lix. The related Papyri Graecae
Magicae are Graeco-Roman Egypt papyri, spells, formulae, hymns and rituals, composed
between the second century BCE and fifth century CE. For manuscript tradition,
historiography, and historical context, see Greek Magical Papyri in Translation,
Including the Demotic Spells. Edited and translated by Hans Dieter Betz (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992), xli – liii. For manuscript tradition, historiography,
and historical context, see Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, Including the Demotic
Spells (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), xli – liii.
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“Pagan,” although commonly used by modern scholars to describe traditional, nonChristian people in late antiquity, was a polemical terms used by Christian writers with a
certain amount of disdain. The full title of City of God is City of God Against the Pagans
(De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos). As an alternative, some modern scholars (after the
Emperor Julian) have used the term “Hellenes” to describe non-Christians in this period,
particularly elite, literate ones. See discussion in Dylan M. Burns, Apocalypse of the alien
god: Platonism and the exile of Sethian Gnosticism (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2014).
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“To unite, therefore, these invisible spirits to visible objects of bodily substance by
some strange technique, so that the result is something like animated bodies, idols
dedicated and subject to these spirits, this, Hermes says, is ‘making gods,’ and this great
and miraculous power, he adds, of making gods has been given to men.” Wiesen, trans.
(Hos ergo spiritus invisibiles per artem quandam visibilibus rebus corporalis materiae
copulare, ut sint quasi animata corpora illis spiritibus dicata et subdita simulacra, hoc
esse dicit deos facere eamque magnam et mirabilem deos faciendi aecepisse homines
potestatem).
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their personal daimon and becoming a god. In fact, making gods (or becoming a god
oneself) was not an uncommon thing in the ancient world.108 Indeed, Augustine’s god
“makes gods of his worshippers” as well (De civitate Dei 10.1).109
Divinity in the Graeco-Roman world was a relative categorization.110 The world
was full of “gods” of all kinds that humans made (and unmade) every day.111 A god could
be a stone, an Emperor, an abstraction. The rituals of god-making and the prescriptions of
god recognition varied over time from place to place. The Stoics, for example, believed
that the whole universe was made of a “divine” material so everything in it was, by
definition, “divine” including humans and their material soul stuff.112 Cicero’s comment
on the Roman custom of deification captures the ancient psychology of making gods:
“[In many cases] some exceptionally potent force is itself designated by the title of god”
(De natura deorum 2.23.61).113 The transcendent and ineffable “god” of the Platonists
had little to do with the Emperor as a “god” or “Terminus,” the Roman god of
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I will confine my remarks to a small subset of how the term god was used in antiquity,
focusing on the Greco-Roman intellectual traditions without considering the Jewish, early
Christian, and Zoroastrian concepts.
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Wiesen, trans. “deus facitque suos cultores deos.” Cf. biblical references to “sons of
god.” Notably, Psalm 82:6: “I said, you are gods; you are all sons of the Most High.”
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Litwa, Transformed, 39.
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To focus on beliefs about the gods is, in some to sense, “already ‘Christianizing’ the
material. Litwa, Transformed, 39.
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This is not all that different from the Platonic position except that the Stoics conceived
of the invisible power as having a subtle material substance while the Platonists viewed
their divinity as being other than material.
113

The psychological and social process that makes a “god” a “god” might best be
understood as a process of sacralization (see discussions in chapters 2 and 5).
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boundaries,114 except in the sense that these “gods” were made by humans who named
them as such, who “set them apart,” sacralized them, rendered them sacer (see chapter 2)
as some exceptionally potent force.115 In this study, I am re-examining Augustine’s
archive to understand how the “Platonists”—Apuleius, Hermes Trismegistus, Plotinus,
Porphyry, and Iamblichus—conceived of the relationship between the human and the
divine and how in their system of thought a person could become divine. At the same
time, I will suggest ways for modern people to understand how this might be
accomplished in ways that, I hope, do justice to their worldviews.
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See Siculus Flaccus, De Agrorum Conditionibus et Constitutionibus Limitum: “When
the Romans set up boundary stones (termini), they stood them erect on firm ground, close
to the place where they had dug the hole in which they were about to fix them, and they
adorned/crowned (coronabant) the stones with ointment and fillets and garlands
(coronae). Above the hold in which a stone was to be set a sacrifice was made
(sacrificium factum) and a victim was immolated and set ablaze with flaming torches; its
blood was allowed to run down into the hold, and incense and fruit (or grain, fruges)
were thrown into the hole as well. So also honeycombs and wine and other things, which
it was customary to dedicate to the god Terminus (Termini sacrum fieri) were added.
When the whole sacred meal had been burned by the fire (consumptisque omnibus
dapibus), the stone was let down upon the still warm remains of the sacrifice and settled
firmly and with great care. Pieces of stone were laid about it and tamped won hard,
whereby it might be still more firmly fixed. This sacrifice was made by the owners
(domini) of the property between which a boundary ran.” Thulin trans. (Cum enim
terminus disponerent, ipso quiden lapides in solidam terram restos conlocabant proxime
ea loca in quibus fossis fractis defixuri eos errant, et unguento velaminibusque et coronis
eos coronabant. In fossis autem (in) quibus eos posituri errant, sacrificio facto hostiaque
immolate adque incense facibus ardentibus, in fossa cooperti sanguinem instillabant,
eoque tura consuetudo est Termini sacrum fieri, in fossis adiciebant. Consumptisque igne
omnibus dapidus super calentes reliquias lapides conlocabant adque ita diligenti cura
confimabant. Adiectis etiam quibusdam saxorum fragminibus circum calcabant, quo
firmius starent. Tale ergo sacrificium domini, inter quos fines firimebantur, faciebant). I
thank Carlin Barton for this reference.
115

In the first century CE, Aetius provides a taxonomy of gods: manifest gods (the sun,
moon, etc.); harmful gods (Erinyes, Ares); beneficent gods (Zeus, Demeter); abstractions
(Victory, Luck); deified passions (Eros, Aphrodite); the gods of mythology; and gods
who were once men (Hercules, Dionysus). See Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta
2.1009. Apuleius presents a similar scheme in De Deo Socratis.
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Excursus on Religio
I will briefly address the problem of “religion,” since for most modern readers,
the term dangles dangerously above my project. Most moderns likely to read this
dissertation would think that the topic of personal divinity in late antiquity is a “religious”
topic. However, as Carlin Barton has shown, “religion” in the modern sense, hadn’t quite
been invented yet. Religio, the Latin word most scholars have translated “religion,” had
begun to shift in meaning and discursive use by the time Augustine was writing City of
God. It was, even in Augustine’s time, a term very much in flux. In City of God, Book
10.1, he struggles to find a word that accurately describes the theory and practice of
Christianity as he envisions it. “Religion” isn’t it. Augustine writes:
For this is the worship that we owe to divinity or, if we must speak more
explicitly, to deity. Since there is need for a single word to describe this I shall
slip in a Greek word where necessary to convey my meaning. To be sure,
wherever latreia occurs in the holy scriptures, our translators have rendered it
‘service.”….Consequently, if we were simply to use the Latin word cultus, this
seems to mean service not reserved for God alone.…Moreover, the very term
religio too, although it would seem to indicate more precisely not any worship of
God—and this is the reason why our translators have used it to render the Greek
word threskeia—yet in the Latin usage, and that not of the ignorant but of the
most cultured also, we say that religio is to be observed in dealing with human
relationships, affinities and ties of every sort….Pietas, too, which the Greeks call
eusebeia, is usually understood in its strict sense to refer to the worship of God.
Yet this word is also used of obligations dutifully performed towards parents”
(Augustine, De civitate Dei 10.1) 116
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Wiesen, trans. “Hic est enim diuinitati uel, si expressius dicendum est, deitati debitus
cultus, propter quem uno uerbo significandum, quoniam mihi satis idoneum non occurrit
Latinum, Graeco ubi necesse est insinuo quid uelim dicere. λατρείαν quippe nostri,
ubicumque sanctarum scripturarum positum est, interpretati sunt seruitutem….Proinde si
tantummodo cultus ipse dicatur, non soli Deo deberi uidetur….Nam et ipsa religio
quamuis distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare uideatur (unde isto nomine
interpretati sunt nostri eam, quae Graece θρησκεία dicitur: tamen quia Latina loquendi
consuetudine, non inperitorum, uerum etiam doctissimorum, et cognationibus humanis
atque adfinitatibus et quibusque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio….Pietas
quoque proprie Dei cultus intellegi solet, quam Graeci ευσεβειαν uocant. Haec tamen et
erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur.”
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It would be inadvisable for me to take on the massive and thorny issue of mapping
“religion” in this study, especially given the fact that my advisor, Carlin Barton, has done
it in her recent book.117 I will sidestep the question of the relationship between “religion”
and “magic,” whether or not “theurgy” should be classified as “magic” or “religion,” and,
while I’m at it, I will ignore the problem of identifying “religious” overtones in the
Neoplatonic, Hermetic, and Apuleian texts at hand. A number of studies have already
been done that give due credit to the complexities involved.118
Furthermore, following Barton’s advice, I scrupulously avoid the term “religion”
(and for that matter, “magic”) in this dissertation almost entirely unless I am quoting
another scholar whose use serves my own. There is good reason for this because thinking
in terms of “religion” tends to color the fresh attention we might give to our sources. In
any case, these can be more or less classified as ideologies and should not either be taken
to refer to discrete areas of activity or concern (whatever they may mean) apart from any
other sphere. Everything was “religious” or “magical” to the point of meaninglessness
unless viewed from the modern point of view on such matters which has neatly detached
and abstracted the behaviors we might be tempted to label as such.
However, I would like to present one modern definition of “religion” that I find
useful, but which shall remain far in the background of my study or at least buried in the
notes. It is from William James who defines “religion” as: “The feelings, acts and
experiences of individual men (sic) in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves
117

Carlin A. Barton and Daniel Boyarin, Imagine No Religion: How Modern
Abstractions Hide Ancient Realities (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2016).
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Surveyed by James B. Rives, “Graeco-Roman Religion in the Roman Empire: Old
Assumptions and New Approaches,” Currents in Biblical Research 8, no. 2 (2010): 240299; H.S. Versnel, “Reflections on the Relationship Magic-Religion,” Numen 38, no. 2
(1991): 177-197.
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to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”119 What I appreciate about
this statement is the focus on individuals, solitude, and the relativity of the “divine.” The
divine is personal. This characterization resonates with my own interest in the same and
somehow connects to the “ideal reader” I am conceptualizing in this study which borrows
heavily from reader-reception theory and ancient rhetorical theory (see chapter 1).
Indeed, the concern with the inner thoughts and experiences of individuals relates to how
I understand, via Collingwood, history writing itself as a “spiritual exercise” and a
transformative philosophical practice, a topic I will take up in more detail in my
conclusion to the dissertation.

“Ways of Hermes”: A Trail Map for the Dissertation
Chapter 1, “Neoplatonism and the ‘Vehicle of the Soul’ (Map IS Territory)”
takes us deeper into the Platonism that so influenced Augustine. In this chapter, I discuss
imagination in the Neoplatonic context. The “vehicle of the soul” (ochêma pneuma) was
a Neoplatonic technology for attaining personal divinity. This luminous soul vehicle was
also understood to be the seat of phantasia (“imagination”) and the “organ” by which
sensual and divine perceptions were apprehended. For the Neoplatonist, active
imagination itself was the vehicle for the soul—or even, the soul itself—much like
Blake’s “divine body of man.” Ancient and modern theories of rhetoric and reading
119

William James, The varieties of religious experience.: a study in human nature : being
the Gifford lectures on natural religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902 (New York:
Modern Library, 1929), 31 – 32. Martin Jay (2005) places James’ interest in “experience”
in the context of a larger phenomenological movement around 1900 that posited
“religious experience” as a sui generis category, a position that has been criticized for
“essentialism” by many scholars since the “linguistic turn.” Ann Taves has qualified the
Jamesian approach by looking at “religious experience,” rather as “experiences deemed
religious.” Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building-Block Approach to the Study
of Religion and Other Special Things (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3, 4,
8, 14.
40

including Quintilian, Longinus, reader-reception theory and cognitive poetics taken with
the Neoplatonic understanding of phantasia as a cognitive function help us understand
how the language of the Neoplatonists could induce a heightened self-reflexivity that,
when “inwardly turned,” results in a sense of self as divine.
Chapter 2, “Making Sacred Selves in the Corpus Hermeticum” responds to
Augustine’s attacks on Hermes Trismegistus, the Graeco-Egyptian mystagogue of late
antiquity, for “making gods” or idol worship. It provides a “redescription” of theos in the
Hermetic texts. However, the Graeco-Egyptian Hermetists were more concerned
with making themselves into gods: "This is the final good for those who have received
knowledge: to be made god" (Corpus Hermeticum 1.26)120 For Hermetists, apotheosis
(“deification”) was part of a hermeneutics of self-knowledge or a "technology of self."
The Hermetica offered a method of self-transformation that allowed one, in Hadot's
words, to become “one's own master, to possess oneself, and to find one's happiness in
freedom and inner independence.”121 I will argue that what scholars have characterized as
an “inward turn” in late antique literature—perhaps most famously articulated by
Plotinus (eis to eiso; epistrephein pros to eiso) 122—is a turn toward self-sacaralization
largely informed by Neoplatonic psychology and anthropology. This chapter explores
reading and imagination in Hermetic texts as “spiritual exercises” and argues that making
gods (or reading about them) is a form of self-deification.
Chapter 3, “Divination is Divinization: Oracles in Late Antique Egypt,” which
responds to Augustine’s quarrel with Hermes Trismegistus, looks at pharaonic Egyptian
120

See chapter 2 for original Greek.
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Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a way of life: spiritual exercises from Socrates to
Foucault, trans. Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford; New York: Blackwell, 1995), 211.
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Plotinus, Enneads 1.6.8.4; 5.8.11.12; 6.9.7.18.
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“traces” in late antique Graeco-Roman Egyptian divination techniques that relate to
personal divinity. Whether performed publicly as a part of state cult or privately for elite
(or non-elite) clients, divination in Egypt often suggested the possibility of personal
divinity for those involved. To bring this possibility of personal divinity into greater
relief, this chapter will interpret two divination practices, the late antique Egypt “Mithras
Liturgy” and the ancient Egyptian pḥ-nṯr oracle. I will make the case that self-deification
as expressed in late antique Graeco-Egyptian cultic, magical and philosophic literature
was not the exclusive domain of Hellenized philosophical elites such as Plotinus, but
rather, part of a more general cultural milieu of traditional Egyptian temple thought and
cultic practice.
Chapter 4, “The Philosopher in Late Antique Alexandria.” portrays the
Neoplatonic classroom in Alexandria and the characters that populated the institutional
histories. The purpose of this section is to provide historical and social context for the
types of writers I am discussing in this dissertation and to get a sense of the (textual)
communities that, in some cases we know, gathered around them. It is also intended to
bring life to the people behind the ideas.
Chapter 5, “Isis, the Cultus of self, and the Genius of Apuleius,” responds to
Augustine’s attack on Apuleius’s demonology. This chapter explores the construction of
sacred identity in Apuleius’s second-century Latin novel, Metamorphoses, in view of his
Platonic work, The god of Socrates. In a close reading that draws from recent studies in
cultural anthropology and religious studies, I explore the construction of sacred identity
with special attention to imagination as a “technology of self” and the nuances of “chosen
subjection.” In this chapter, I develop a theory of interiority and inwardness that is
explicit in The god of Socrates and implicit in Metamorphoses.
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In the conclusion to the dissertation, I elaborate on the role of embodiment in
personal divinity and how my study fosters compassion for ancient mentalities.
Extending key concepts developed by Durkheim and Otto, I will present a theory of the
sacred that has emerged from my work with these sources, and finally, drawing on
Collingwood, suggest how the writing of history, informed by a reflexive philosophy of
history functions much like the “spiritual exercises” that constitute my source texts.
Writing history is a transformative practice that leads to self-knowledge in the present.
Following this is the “Poetic Postlude” referred to above and four appendices including a
short essay on Augustine’s education, additional details about his quarrel with the
Platonists, a return to the Alar of Victory controversy invoked in the “Historical Prelude”
(below), and finally, a broad historiographical essay about late antiquity as a field of
study with an emphasis on Anglophone scholarship.
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Historical Prelude
Many were shocked when a disgruntled former Roman commander, now Visigoth
king, famously sacked the “eternal city” in 410.123 The old guard placed the blame on
Christianity, the new cult steadily rising in might since Constantine (272 – 337).124
Eighteen years earlier, Roman Christians removed the Altar of Victory from the Roman
Senate along with funding for the traditional state cults. The aristocrat Symmachus’s plea
(335 – 402) to return the altar in the name of tolerance for ancient custom —“It is not by
one way alone that we can arrive at so sublime a mystery” (Symmachus, Relatio 13):125—
fell on Valentinian II’s deaf ears (371 – 392), muffled by Ambrose (340 – 397), the
powerful Bishop of Milan.126 In 384, two years after the Altar of Victory was removed, a
young Manichaean, Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) moved from Carthage to Milan after
receiving an invitation from that same Symmachus on behalf of the imperial court in
Milan to serve as a professor of rhetoric, a move that also brought Augustine in contact
with his future confessor, Ambrose. In 387, Augustine returned to his native Africa, a
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Alaric I (370/375-410). Averil Cameron questions the extent of the “sack”: “There is
archaeological confirmation of burning in some areas, and there was no doubt much
individual suffering, but there was no widespread destruction and the Goths were bought
off after three days; they may never have intended an invasion” in Gillian Clark, “City of
Books: Augustine and the World as Text” in The Early Christian Book, eds. William E.
Klingshirn and Linda Safran (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
2007), 123; See also Neil Christie, “Lost Glories” Rome at the End of the Empire,” in
Ancient Rome: The Archaeology of the Eternal City, ed. Jon Coulston and Hazel Dodge
(Oxford, 2000), 306-32, note 22.
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Edict of Milan (313), which decreed tolerance for Christian practice, with the Edict of
Thessalonica (380) during the joint reign of Theodosius I, Gratian, and Valentinian II
when Christianity was made the official state cult.
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Symmachus, Relationes 13: “uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande
secretum.”
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Valentian’s mother, the Empress Justina and Theodosius I, whose influence over the
child emperor was immense, likely take more credit for the refusal.
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Christian. If blood on the curial altar had insured the protection of Rome for 800 years, as
some believed (Augustine argued that it hadn’t) that policy expired in 410.
In 412, shortly after the attack on Rome, Augustine wrote a letter to Volusian, a
Roman “pagan” official living in Africa Proconsularis (Numidia) about his plans to write
City of God, the magnum opus he would complete over the next thirteen years. 127 The
City of God is Augustine’s response to those who blamed the sack of Rome on the
abandonment of the traditional gods and their temples in favor of an imperial
Christianity. Near the end of his life in 427, Augustine would again see frontier foederati
“Vandalizing” Roman cities, even besieging the gates of his own Hippo Regius. During
this time, he wrote The Retractions, emending his body of work before his death in 430.
Recalling the sack of Rome in 410, Augustine reflects on the response that initially
motivated the City of God: “The worshippers of many false gods, whom we call by the
customary name pagans, attempting to attribute its destruction to the Christian religione,
began to blaspheme the true god more sharply and bitterly than usual” (Augustine,
Retractiones 69.1).128
In twenty-two books, City of God, “ranges over the moral and philosophical
heritage of Graeco-Roman culture, the history of the world and of God’s people within it,
the purpose and limitations of human society, and the distinctive teachings of Christian
theology.”129 Augustine referred to it as “this huge book” (Augustine, De civitate Dei
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I will retain Augustine’s use of the term “pagan” in parts of this dissertation in
reference to adherents and practitioners of tradition classical cult and culture when seen
through Augustine’s eyes.
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Bogan, trans. “cuius euersionem deorum faslorum multorumque cultores, quos usitato
nomine paganos uocamus, in Christianam religionem referre conantes solito acerbius et
amarius deum uerum blasphemare uel errors libros de ciutate dei scriber institui.”
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Clark, “City of Books,” 118.
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22.30).130 The first ten books refute Roman ideas about the gods, five books devoted to
popular cult and five to the philosophers. The remaining twelve develop the idea of the
two cities, the earthly city and a “heavenly” one. In Book 3, Augustine lists scores of
calamities that befell the ancient Romans centuries before the sacking of Rome: “[T]heir
gods did not prevent the occurrence of those evils which they alone fear, even when they
worshipped them unhampered” (3.1).131 In a striking passage, he hammers his readers
repeatedly: “Where were they (i.e. the “pagan” gods) when…? Where were they
when…?,”132 each time listing yet another historical tragedy taken from Livy, displaying
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In a letter to Firmus written in 426/7, Augustine offers advice to copyists. Epistula
1*a, 1: “There are twenty-two books which are rather too bulky to be bound tougher into
one volume. If you wish for two volumes, they must be divided up so that one volume
has ten books and the other, twelve. In the first ten, the vanities of the impious have been
refuted and in the other twelve, our religion has been described and defended although,
where it was more opportune, I have undertaken the defense in the first ten, as well as the
refutation in the last twelve.” Eno, trans. (Nes sunt XXII quos in unum corpus redigere
multum est; et si duos uis codices fieri, ita diuidendi sunt, ut decem libros habeat, unus,
alius duodecim. Decem quippe illis uanitates refutatae sunt impiorum, reliquis autem
demonstrata atque defensa est nostra religio, quamuis et in illis hoc factum sit ubi
opportunius fuit, et in istis illud.)
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his mastery of Latin literature.133 Jason Moralee remarks: “Augustine rarely missed the
chance to ridicule Roman claims that [they were] especially graced by the gods. In his
City of God, Augustine wonders whether the gods of Troy, who were entrusted with
Rome’s protection, were elsewhere when the siege started but returned just in the nick of
time, drawing on the widely accepted view that absent gods and goddesses were unable
to protect their own temples.”134 The Roman gods, it turns out, were not much help with
or without the Altar of Victory but nor was the Christian god to the dismay of the
Christians. Augustine’s point is that all earthly cities will get sacked, save the “city of
God.” This dissertation is concerned with Augustine’s refutation of the philosophers,
particularly his ambivalent engagement with the Platonists in Books 8 - 10. Augustine
sought a refuge for the woes of the world, much like the philosophers, a safe haven he
found in what he considered the “true philosophy” in Christian teachings. But the
problem of “salvation”—ultimately, liberation from death—was one his Platonici and
theurgici were equally familiar with.
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CHAPTER 1
NEOPLATONISM AND THE “VEHICLE OF THE SOUL”:
MAP IS TERRITORY135

Neoplatonism is a term used by scholars since the nineteenth century to describe a
philosophical movement in the late Roman Empire between the third and sixth centuries
that interpreted Plato but also drew from Aristotle, the Stoics, the Chaldean Oracles, and
responded to Christianity. While there are important differences between the various
Neoplatonists, they share a number of assumptions observed by Pauliina Remes, two of
which I will mention here: 1) a commitment to an ineffable first principle, the One (hen),
the source of all being and becoming and the idea that the Divine Mind (nous) can be
known and 2) the idea that philosophy was a “way of life” that leads to becoming “godlike,” what I am calling “personal divinity.”136 Aaron Hughes adds an important third
assumption:
[M]any of the authors we today deem Neoplatonists seemed to have shared an
assumption that the reader of a philosophical text must be an active participant.
The meaning of the text can only be understood when the reader clarifies his or
her own situation in the light of the text….A Neoplatonic reading, therefore, must
be an active reading because one reads not so much for the message but for the
experience.137
The “vehicle of the soul” (ochêma pneuma) was a Neoplatonic technology for
attaining personal divinity. This soul vehicle was also understood to be the seat of
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imagination (phantasia) and the “organ” by which both sensual and “divine” (or nonsensual) perceptions were apprehended and experienced. It was a mode of perception and
kind of consciousness that navigated the invisible world by making it visible. For the
Neoplatonist, the active imagination itself was the vehicle for the soul—or the soul
itself—much like William Blake’s “divine body of man.”138 With ancient and modern
theories about reading and the imagination in mind—from Quintilian139 to Cognitive
Poetics—this chapter interrogates the way reading (or hearing) texts, particularly those
that discuss ideas about personal divinity, function as “spiritual exercises” that serve to
cultivate personal divinity. In the Neoplatonic context, divinity is a quality of the “One,”
the ultimate source of being and becoming for the Neoplatonists, sometimes called
“Beauty,” (kalon) “God” (theos), or, after Plato, the “Good” (agathon). Divinity, in this
context, might more easily be understood simply as “invisible, intelligent, immortal
power.” Personal divinity, I suggest, was the identification and participation in the
invisible, intelligent power of the divine Mind (Nous), an emanating feature of the One.
Reading (or hearing) Neoplatonic texts as spiritual exercises was an imaginative
engagement by philosophers with ideas about divinity that offered a method—through
the vehicle of the soul—of achieving personal divinity.
Famously attempting to harmonize Aristotle with Plato (a point that will become
critical to the exercise I offer at the end of the chapter), the Neoplatonists’ concept of the
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vehicle of the soul links the “star-chariots” in Plato (Timaeus 41d-e)140 with the “starry
pneuma” of Aristotle (De generatione animalium 736b 35-9).141 E.R. Dodds describes the
ochêma pneuma as “an inner envelope of the soul, which is less material than the fleshly
body and survives its dissolution, yet has not the pure immateriality of mind.”142 The
vehicle of the soul became a feature on the Neoplatonic map of the soul’s journey.
Despite the important technical differences between how it was theorized by individual
Neoplatonists and despite its complicated evolution from earlier thinkers such as Galen
and Poseidonius (nicely summarized by John Dillon),143 the vehicle of the soul generally
fulfills three functions. Quoting John Finamore: “[I]t houses the rational soul [i.e.
“mind”) in its descent from the noetic realm to the realm of generation; it acts as the
organ of sense-perception and imagination; and, through theurgic rites, it can be purified
and lifted above, [as] a vehicle for the rational soul’s return through the cosmos to the
gods.”144
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Although the vehicle of the soul was discussed explicitly by Porphyry,
Iamblichus, and Proclus, there is a suggestion of such a body in Plotinus, where he
discusses the descent of the soul: “…when the soul leaves the noetic realm, it goes ‘first
into heaven and receives there a body through which it continues into more earthy
bodies” (Plotinus, Ennead 4.3.15.1-3).145 Unlike Porphyry, Iamblichus thinks that the
vehicle of the soul is immortal. The difference between Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’
position on the vehicle can be summarized as follows: “[F]or Porphyry the vehicle is
created from portions of the bodies of the visible gods and perishes when these portions
are sloughed off, whereas for Iamblichus it is ethereal and created whole by the
Demiurge, and not subject to destruction or dissolution of any kind.”146 For the
Neoplatonists, the soul vehicle was also key to realizing personal divinity. Gregory Shaw
shows how “[t]he doctrine of the ‘soul vehicle’ in the Platonic tradition is essential for
understanding the manner in which the later Platonists visualized immortality…the
perfection of this aetheric and luminous body effected the soul’s immortalization.”147 The
key term here is “visualized.” When readers visualized a vehicle, they mentally inhabited
the means by which they could extend conscious existence beyond the limits of the
physical body.
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The Seat of Phantasia
Turning to the vehicle’s function as an organ of sense perception, the vehicle of
the soul was understood as the seat of phantasia, the image-making faculty of
consciousness. Synesius, a Christian Neoplatonist (373 – 414) and student of Hypatia (d.
415), later identified the luminous body of the soul with the imagination itself.148 Robert
Berchman describes how the Neoplatonic imagination, in the best sense, functions:
The imagination (phantasia) receives the products of thought (logoi) and
perception (aesthesis). These products are then passed on to the reasoning faculty
for processing. Imagination is, accordingly, based on something far more
profound than an awareness of physical conditions. It carries a meaning close to
the idea of consciousness. This means that the imagination is a power of
perceptive awareness that transcends sensation. Significantly, it refers to that
mental faculty which provides knowledge of the intelligibles above and within the
soul.149
Indeed, apprehension of an invisible divine power required imagination. But make
no mistake: the discussion of imagination in the texts is more often critical than not.
Gerard Watson notes that the Neoplatonists were suspicious of the imagination for its
tendency to amplify passions such as anger and desire, but they also accepted “the
(Aristotelian) understanding of [the imagination] as a middle between sense and intellect,
and even [welcomed] it as a possible help to a glimpse of a higher world.”150 Operating
between sense and intellect, Neoplatonic imagination partakes of both sense and intellect
as a cognitive function, “close to the idea of consciousness.”
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Despite the cautions expressed above, the view that the imagination
“penetrates…what the mind cannot conceive,” to quote Kevin Corrigan, persists in
Neoplatonic thought.151 While on the one hand phantasia is a highly technical term with
positive and negative connotations in the texts, it can loosely be understood as
imagination. Imagination and thought work together. Again, Corrigan: “As a borderland
between the material world and the purely immaterial world of the intellect, this space of
the imagination offers a transitional domain that the mind can come to inhabit. This
visionary space does not contain external object nor illusions nor hallucinations. Rather,
it is above all a realm of self-illumination….”152 Imagination, therefore, served to elevate
consciousness beyond its normal capacities. Indeed, one might ask how imagination and
consciousness are different at all.
Imagination in this period does not have the connotation of something that is “just
made up” or “untrue” as it does in the modern sense.153 For the Neoplatonists on the
other hand, imagination was a cognitive faculty that gave shape to sense perceptions so
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that the mind could make judgments. It also gave shape to the “higher” soul’s
apprehension of the gods and the Forms in the intelligible realms. Gregory Shaw notes:
“On the horizontal level phantasia was merely the play of the discursive mind, but if
properly purified and trained, the vertical dimension that sustained it could be
awakened.”154 In Sara Ahbel-Rappe’s words: “Plotinus relies upon a series of thought
experiments embedded within the text, whose purpose is to foster the potential for selfawareness and so orient the student upon a path of self-knowledge.”155The purification
and training was achieved through “spiritual exercises” or imaginative technologies of
self-transformation that led to an exalted self-perception and access to knowledge.
Often it seems the Neoplatonists tended to patrol the border between intellect and
imagination. The Neoplatonists often divide up cognitive features into “higher” and
“lower” because of their suspicion of imagination, a point taken up by Crystal Addey
who offers an important critique of the modern (and ancient) tendency to dichotomize
ways of knowing, privileging certain kinds of knowledge over others.156 Despite this
tendency, the Neoplatonists return again and again to a notion of imagination that is a
kind of cognition in its own right. Intellect required imagination. Can one imagine
thinking without it? Plotinus addresses this relationship: [T]he image-making
power…show[s] the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension
and persistence and memory of it. Therefore, even though the soul is always moved to
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intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the image-making power that we
apprehend it” (Plotinus, Ennead 4.3.30.10-16)157 On the one hand, the “higher” mind on
Plotinus’ map is always already in contemplation, although unknown to itself. Only
through imagination does it realize it is doing so. On the other hand, Plotinus’ discussion
betrays the irony of the Neoplatonic attempt to downgrade imagination to a “lower”
status.
Aaron Hughes explains the import of the imagination to the Neoplatonic
philosophical project of visualizing and identifying with invisible divine power:
[Imagination] is the faculty that is ultimately responsible for the creation of
images or symbols that capture certain perspectives of the divine’s ineffability.
The imagination now becomes the primary vehicle whereby the individual grasps
that which exists without matter…. As a result, the imagination ultimately
becomes responsible for giving the transcendental an appropriate phenomenality.
But this is not simply a translation of something ineffable into a communicable
form. Rather, the imagination’s gaze is the main component of the experience.158
Divine union or co-activity with the mind of god—which was the Neoplatonic aim—
must be imagined as a possibility to begin with, if it is to be a possibility. Imagination is
not simply a vehicle, it is the soul, it is what the soul does, or, more to the point: the soul
is what it does. The more we look, the more the vehicle of the soul as active imagination
begins to look like the soul. The imaginative function is more than a feature on a map, it
is the territory itself. Despite all their caution, the soul’s vehicle remains a technology of
self-transformation for the Neoplatonist, a pathway for personal divinity, a way to
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participate in and identify with the divine, what Neoplatonists mapped out as the unseen
and ineffable source of being in its intellective capacity.

Spiritual Exercises and Rhetoric
To better understand the imaginative gaze, let us consider an under-examined
aspect of how the Neoplatonic texts, when read or heard, function as “spiritual exercises.”
The appeal to imagination as a rhetorical strategy learned in the late ancient schools of
rhetoric—combined with the Neoplatonic understanding of imagination’s role in the map
of the soul—helps us appreciate how these texts function as imaginative technologies of
self-transformation that constructed an experience of personal divinity for their audience.
The Neoplatonists were men and women of paideia.159 Edward Watts discusses how the
philosophers had “separated themselves from the average [person] by their knowledge of
and appreciation for the worlds, ideas, and texts of classical antiquity.”160 In the late
antique Roman world, education for the aspiring elite “consisted of study at a school of
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letters” where basic literacy was taught.161 Those with means continued with a
grammarian, learning the grammatical rules, acquiring an introductory knowledge of the
canon. Some ventured further working through the progymnasmata where composition
was practiced.
The next phase was the school of rhetoric where literary allusions (and their moral
and historical significance) and oratorical strategies were taught. The final destination for
a few was the school of philosophy.162 The course of study pursued under teachers of
rhetoric and philosophy was costly, lengthy, and rigorous: “Indeed, of the fifty-seven
students of Libanius whose term of study is known, fully thirty-five dropped out by the
end of their second year.”163 Porphyry studied with Plotinus in his school of philosophy
and it seems Iamblichus studied for a time under Porphyry. The lineage of students and
teachers is represented in Eunapius’ The Lives of the Philosophers and Damascius’
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Philosophical History. 164 We know something of Plotinus’ later education. Porphyry
recounts thirty years after his teacher’s death:
In his twenty-eighth year Plotinus became eager to study philosophy and it was
recommended that he go to the most renowned teachers in Alexandria at that time.
He came away from their lectures so full of sadness that he communicated his
experiences to a friend. That friend, who understood the desire of his heart, sent
him to Ammonius, who he had not yet tried. Plotinus, upon going and hearing
him speak one time, told his friend, ‘This is the man I was seeking’ (Vita Plotini
3, 7-13).165
While we don’t know the details of the philosophers’ earlier grammatical and rhetorical
educations, we can assume that in order to enter a school of philosophy, they would have
become learned in the rhetorical strategies of ekphrasis and enargeia that were taught in
rhetoric handbooks of Aristotle and Quintilian.166 Ekphrasis and enargeia refer to the use
of vivid language to affect the mind of the reader or listener and persuade them by
appealing to the imagination.167
Ruth Webb explores how the use of vivid language in oratory and writing to
describe an object or scene brings it to life in the imagination. Ekphrasis and enargeia are
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used as “a means of arousing the emotions and as a figure of speech which has the
particularly vital role of ensuring that the listener is swayed by the speaker’s case.”168
Patricia Cox Miller characterizes ekphrasis and enargeia using Hayden White’s terms:
“They are figuratively real—that is, they are narrative pictorial strategies that seduce the
reader in to forgetting that these are images in texts.”169 Our best source for
understanding ekphrasis and enargeia is Quintilian who explains how the orator “should
achieve enargeia through the use of mental images.”170 He writes:
What the Greeks call phantasiai (we shall call them ‘visiones’, if you will) are the
means by which images of absent things are represented to the mind in such a
way that we seem to see them with our eyes and to be in their presence. Whoever
has mastery of them will have a powerful effect on the emotions. Some people
say that this type of man who can imagine in himself things, words and deeds well
and in accordance with truth is ‘good at imagining’ (Institutio Oratoria 6.2.2930).171
“[A]wareness of visualization as an important element of both reading or listening to
others’ work and creating one’s own” was central to a rhetorical education.172 Indeed, the
hope was that orators (and writers) could “predict and control such a seemingly
individual and subjective process.”173 The rhetorically trained Neoplatonic philosophers
likely deployed ekphrasis and enargeia with the aim of persuading their students and
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readers. Bringing the faculty of imagination to life by offering vivid language and
imaginative exercises is more than image-making, it is, in the Neoplatonic context, soulmaking. Such imaginative “activation” of the soul made it possible for the Neoplatonist
to apprehend and participate in the invisible divine power constitutive of the Neoplatonic
god, the One (hen) and its Mind (nous).

Cognitive Poetics
Modern theories of the imagination and reading also help us understand how the
Neoplatonic discourses on personal divinity function as imaginative technologies of selftransformation. Cognitive poetics (and its predecessors, reader-response and readerreception theory)174 offer an approach with roots in ancient theories of reading and
rhetoric that, like ekphrasis and enargeia, are concerned with the effect of language on
the imagination of the reader.175 In his study of reading in the medieval period, Duncan
Robertson draws from the reader-response criticism of Stanley Fish and Wolfgang Iser.176
Setting forth the basic premise of the approach, he writes: “The partnership between the
reader and the text is where the reader ‘participates both in the production and the
comprehension of the work’s intention.’”177 Pamela Bright’s study of reader-reception
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theory in Augustine describes how “[t]he world of reading creates and encourages
contemplative ‘spaces’ for the reader’s imagination; it is at once a contemplative world
and a world charged with energy and engagement.”178
Adding fresh insight from cognitive science to the humanities, Hugo Lundhaug
explores personal divinity in the Christian and Gnostic contexts. Lundhaug presents an
“interpretation from the perspective of how the human mind makes sense of a text by
means of the creation and integration of multiple mental representations. Acknowledging
the universal underlying mechanics of thought may…enable us to analyse the intellectual
products and patterns of thought of peoples and cultures far removed from our own with
an adequate degree of methodological clarity….”179 To be sure, any text will incite a
multiplicity of “reader-responses,” informed by and negotiated according to personal,
Text and reader no long confront each other as object and subject, but instead the
‘division’ takes place within the reader himself. In thinking the thoughts of another, his
own individuality temporarily recedes into the background, since it is supplanted by these
alien thoughts, which now become the theme on which his attention is focused. As we
read, there occurs an artificial division of our personality, because we take as a theme for
ourselves something that we are not. Consequently, when reading we operate on different
levels. For although we may be thinking—it will merely remain a more or less powerful
virtual force. Thus, in reading there these two levels—the alien ‘me’ and the real, virtual
‘me’—which are never completely cut off from each other. Indeed, we can only make
someone else’s thoughts into an absorbing theme for ourselves, provided the virtual
background (the real ‘me’) will take on a different form, according to the theme of the
text concerned. This is inevitable, if only for the fact that the relationship between alien
theme and virtual background is what makes it possible for the unfamiliar to be
understood” in Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach,”
in Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane P.
Tomkins (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). 67.
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social, historical, and material contexts.180 Lundhaug echoes Margaret Freeman who
cautions us that “literary texts are the products of cognizing minds and their
interpretations the products of other cognizing minds in the context of the physical and
sociocultural worlds in which they have been created and read.”181 We should remember
that the effectiveness of ekphrasis and enargeia relied to some degree on a system of
shared knowledge in a social context and that the “cognizing mind” has both individual
and social aspects. Individual experience is not necessarily a product of social experience
even as it may be informed by it.

The Sacred and the Sublime
Earlier I described personal divinity in the Neoplatonic map of the soul as a
“sacred status.” More needs to be said about the process of self-sacralization where
human consciousness becomes “divine.” Through an analysis of linguistic and ritual
context, Roman historian Carlin Barton has developed a new understanding of the social
and psychological dyanmics of the “sacrificial system” (see chapter 2 for detailed
discussion). Barton writes: “Forces, powers, functions needed to be isolated, defined,
carved out of nature and harnessed in order for the charges on them to be either
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augmented and reinforced or debilitated and dispersed…. Absolutely anything or anyone
could be sacralized or desecrated….”182
Building upon Barton’s insights, I argue that the “inward turn” in Late Antique
Neoplatonic texts is a turn toward sacralization of self-reflexivity itself.183 Imaginative
engagements with personal divinity heightened self-reflexivity. By becoming “aware of
awareness,” reflexivity is “set apart” (sacralized, rendered sacer). Such reflexivity took
philosophers to the heart of a strange, sometimes overwhelming, recognition of the fact
of existence where self becomes the mysterium tremendum et fascinans that Otto ascribes
to the divine “Wholly Other.”184 This point is key to the whole project of personal
divinity.
Robert Doran would agree. He describes a “structure of experience” theorized by
first-century rhetorician Longinus as “sublimity” (hypsos, literally “elevated”).185
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The author and date of Peri hypsos are uncertain although the current consensus
attributes it to a first-century Pseudo-Longinus. See Robert Doran, The Theory of the
Sublime from Longinus to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 29-31.
The influence of Longinus on early modern writers and the “subjective turn” of modern
aesthetics are clear. While the fact that Longinus is unattested in other ancient sources
until the tenth century makes him appear unique, it is unlikely that his thought appeared
independently of an intellectual community. Other ancient authors such as Caecilius,
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Philo of Alexandria take up related themes using similar
language. Longinus was concerned, like Quintilian, with the effect of language on the
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According to Longinus, the use of “sublimity” as a rhetorical strategy produces “the
paradoxical experience of being at once overwhelmed and exalted….”186 Like ekphrasis
and enargeia, hypsos is intended to affect the mind of reader (or hearer). “Elevating”
language was used to instill a feeling of grandeur (megethos) or high-mindedness
(megalophrosyne) that characterized sublimity (hypsos). In his rhetoric handbook, On the
Sublime, Longinus writes:
For grandeur produces ecstasy (ekstasis) rather than persuasion in the hearer; and
the combination of wonder (thaumasion) and astonishment (ekplexis) always
proves superior to the merely persuasive and pleasant. This is because persuasion
is on the whole something we can control, whereas amazement (ekplexis) and
wonder (thaumasion) exert invincible power and force and get the better of every
hearer (Longinus, Peri Hypsos 1.4).187
This “invincible power and force” elevates the mind above its normal state, literally
“standing outside” (ekstasis).188 The use of “elevating” rhetoric by describing the actions
of heroes or volcanoes, Longinus argues, “lifts us toward the mighty mind
(megalophrosynes) of god” (Peri Hypsos 36.1).189 Sublimity, through its combination of
wonder and astonishment, produces a state that is both overwhelming and exalting—a
heightened self-reflexivity, a mysterium tremendum et fascinans within and directed
inwardly toward the self. Neoplatonic texts deliberately provoked self-sacralizing awe.
mind of both orator and audience, and, like the Neoplatonists, on the “divinity” of those
who approached the sublime.
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“Do this at home”
In order to highlight the central role imaginative reading as a technology of selftransformation plays in my argument, I want to offer the reader an exercise of the
imagination that will help illustrate the Late Antique mentality I seek to uncover. A
dissertation about “spiritual exercises” should do no less. To follow is a Neoplatonic map
of the soul’s journey. Let’s say you are a Neoplatonic philosopher. Within you and
beyond you, there is an invisible, ineffable source of being, the One, the All. It is, in
Damascius’ words, an “unknowable darkness” (Damascius, De Principiis 17.125.4).190
Then, there is the Nous, conceived of as the “Divine Mind,” which, after creating the
Forms and the gods, emanates psyche or the individual soul. Your thinking and imagining
soul, which is immaterial, has a vehicle. It’s your imagination. Now, your soul wants to
be god-like, like Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover,” the work of the Nous is to be engaged in
an imaginative exercise of cosmic proportions, to “reflect on itself” (Metaphysica 1074b,
34-5).191 When you engage in thought, which requires imagination, you mirror this divine
self-reflexive Nous.192 But, how do you go “through the looking glass”? How do you
raise yourself to the level of the divine? You need purification. If, like Plotinus, you
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purify yourself by always working on your “inner statue” (Ennead 1.6.9)193, chipping
away all that is not what you really are or if, like Iamblichus, you achieve a “restoration
of [your] own essence” through prayer and theurgic ritual reconnection with the gods (De
Anima 43).194 Then, when you imaginatively contemplate Nous, you become “the object
of your knowing” (Plotinus, Ennead 5.4.2)195—an Aristotelian notion that the
Neoplatonists adapted freely to achieve their aim.196 Indeed, knowledge was always selfknowledge. Is this just a word game for the mind? I don’t think so. What the Neoplatonist
philosopher sought required transformative experience. That’s where heightened
reflexivity and the sacralization of the self come in. In moments of heightened selfawareness—as, say, in a thunder and lightning storm, when you become in awe of its
power and then, reflecting on the awesomeness of your capacity to be in awe, you realize
you are part of the power of the storm. You become a highly-charged, set-apart, self,
aware of its sacred status. This is a moment of attaining personal divinity. Like the
experience of personal divinity sought after by the Neoplatonists, Longinus courted

193

1.
194

A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 260Finamore and Dillon, trans. “ἀπόδοσις τῆς οόκείας οὀσίας.”

195

Armstrong, trans. “Intellect itself is its objects, granted that it does not get their forms
from somewhere (for where could it get them from?). But it is here with its objects and
the same as and one with them: the knowledge of things without matter is its objects.”
(αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ μὴ εἴδη αὐτῶν κομίζεται. πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλ᾿ ἐνταῦθα μετὰ
τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἕν· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ πράγματα).
196

See Aristotle’s “identity theory” of knowledge in Aristotle, De Anima, 3.7, 431a and
8, 431 b (Hett, trans.). Pauliina Remes comments: “In Metaphysics, God is said to think
of itself, of intelligibility, and thereby becoming that intelligibility… Plotinus’ synthesis
is to treat only the perfect knower, nous, and its objects as identical, but this ideal thinker
resides in every human soul.” Pauliina Remes, “Inwardness and Infinity of Selfhood:
From Plotinus to Augustine,” in Ancient Philosophy of the Self, eds. Pauliina Remes and
Juha Sihvola. (Dordrecht: Spring, 2008), 158.

66

rhetorical moments (kairos) of reflexive intensity where “…a well-timed flash of
sublimity shatters everything like a bolt of lightning (skeptou)” (Longinus, Peri Hypsos
1.4). 197 The “shattered” reader (or hearer) became elevated to a new state of awareness
and self-knowledge conceived as divine.
Conclusion: Ways of Knowing
Historian Monica Black, following Dipesh Chakrabarty,198 wants to go “a step
beyond the kind of ethnographic empathy that has become an established part of the
practice of many historians…to find a way of proceeding in…inquiries into human
experience and culture that permits the existence, agency, and reality of the unseen.”199
So do I. The Neoplatonists permitted the reality of the unseen. They imagined it. Whether
speaking about Neoplatonism, Hermetism, or other similar movements, accounting for
imaginative engagements with texts about personal divinity—and the resultant
heightened self-reflexivity—complicates how scholars interpret esoteric maps of the soul.
Like Carolyn Dinshaw, “I acknowledge that there are different knowledge cultures,
different ways of knowing and sources of knowledge, and different purposes and goals,
and I join in the critique, therefore, of expert knowledge production.” 200
For me, “what is crucial in historical study is to give us and our students a
heightened capacity to appreciate the multiplicity and complexity of human experience,
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past and present, and to come to some understanding of the various processes by which
one symbolic order comes to be prized over another or erased altogether.”201 The
Neoplatonic commitment to an “invisible power” accessible through the imagination may
be an “erasure” we can now re-imagine or understand in new ways. In her discussion of
imagination in late antiquity, Patricia Cox Miller (after Bachelard) suggests that “images
(and the imagining process) do not passively reproduce ‘reality’: they actively create
it.”202 This strikes at the heart of why the Neoplatonists could not really do without
imagination. If imagination was the vehicle for the soul, it also was its reality. In a map of
the soul, where imagination is the soul, the map is the territory.
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CHAPTER 2
MAKING SACRED SELVES IN THE CORPUS HERMETICUM
This chapter redescribes the “sacred” in Late Antique Hermeticism in terms of
individual experience rather than social function. “Redescription” is “a form of
explanation that privileges difference and involves comparison and translation, category
formation and rectification, definition and theory.”203 Using the sections from the Greek
Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius that Augustine cites in Books 8 and 9 in City
of God, I will demonstrate how the Hermetic literature can be read as a method of selfsacralization or personal divinity. This chapter is divided in two parts, treating the Greek
and Latin Hermetic tractates in turn. Let us first consider some of the problems associated
with the Hermetic literature.

Hermetica
The Hermetica are a collection of Graeco-Egyptian texts produced between the
early first and late third centuries CE between the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and
Diocletian.204 They are attributed to (or at least center upon) Hermes Trismegistus, a
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Although beyond the scope of this chapter, it would be interesting to explore how
Neoplatonism, the Hermetica, and early Christian literature respond to the “Crisis of the
Third Century,” a time of great political, military, economic, and social instability for the
Roman Empire. Stephen Greenblatt, writing about the complex tension between
individual agency and the constraints of social structures, comments: “This tension
cannot be resolved in any abstract theoretical way, for in given historical circumstances
structures of power seek to mobilize some individuals and immobilize others. And it is
important to note that moments in which individuals feel most completely in control may,
under careful scrutiny, prove to be moments of the most intense structural determination,
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“mystagogical figure who represents a blending of the Egyptian god Thoth…with the
Greek god Hermes.”205 Early Christian writers such as Lactantius and Augustine cite the
Hermetica extensively.206 Hermetic writings are referred to by the Neoplatonists Plotinus,
Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Damascius.207 The Hermetica—or Corpus Hermeticum as
Renaissance Neoplatonist translator Marcilio Ficino titled them, include a group of
seventeen tractates in Greek as well as the Asclepius, a Latin version of an original Greek
text, various fragments from the fifth-century Stobaeus, a few texts excerpts from the
Nag Hammadi Codex, and many of the “Theban cache” that has come to be known as the
Papyri Graecae Magicae. A portion of the Theban collection includes demotic (late
phase Egyptian) material as well which has been excluded from most scholarly studies
until recently.208 A concern with cosmology and the relationship between the individual
and divine characterizes most of the texts although many of the texts offer practical
strategies in ritual format (“spells”) for negotiating the concerns of day-to-day life such
love, healing, protection and revenge.
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Scholars since André-Jean Festugière have divided the Hermetica into “technical”
and “philosophical” texts. The term “technical” refers to the use of symbolic actions and
materials along with performative utterances. The “philosophical” texts seem closer to
what one would expect from Platonic writers. The philosophical texts generally posit, to
use Brian P. Copenhaver’s words, “a theory of salvation through knowledge or
gnosis.”209 Peter Kingsley comments:
There is a tendency nowadays to replace the distinction between ‘philosophical’
Hermetica and ‘magical’ or alchemical ones, which was used by an older
generation of scholars, with a distinction between the ‘theoretical’ and the
‘technical’. This is a step forward, because it lays less weight on an imagined
dichotomy between the rational and irrational. And yet it is still not quite
adequate. We can call these ‘philosophical’ texts theoretical, if we want. But that
is only because we choose to stay at the level of theory. Viewed in their own
context, they shared an intensely practical purpose. They were meant to engage
not just the mind and intellect but – often through the power of example – one’s
whole life and being.210
Copenhaver has rightly pointed out the lack of any “clear, rigid distinctions” in the
ancient world between “lofty” teachings about the “fate of the soul” and texts and
practices that strike some “as a merely instrumental device of humbler intent” because of
their interest in the practicalities of daily life.211 Copenhaver suggests that the technical
texts are equally concerned with salvation as “the resolution of man’s fate where it finds
him.”212
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Ronald Cox describes Hermetic salvation as “self-recognition” (gnothi seauton)213
which puts the Hermetic project in a Platonic milieu. Garth Fowden has also challenged
the dichotomy between “philosophical” and “technical” texts and suggests that if we are
to understand the Hermetica as the product of a practicing community on the ground,
these two kinds of texts need to be considered in tandem: “Hermetism can only be
properly understood if the technical and philosophical books are seen as enshrining
related aspects of Man’s attempt to understand himself, the world around him, and God—
in fact, as a practical spiritual ‘way.’”214
The Papyri Graecae Magicae divination ritual known as the “Mithras Liturgy”
(examined in chapter 3) is a central point of comparison for Garth Fowden with the
“philosophical” Corpus Hermeticum: “The technical Hermetica, developing stage by
stage the doctrine of sympathy [e.g. “As above, so below”] in its application to man both
body and spirit, thus provide a propaideia to the philosophical Hermetica, whose peculiar
preoccupations and style they occasionally approach.”215 The doctrine of sympathy
would find its highest expression in the Egyptianizing, theurgical, hermetic,
Neoplatonism of Iamblichus who described his approach as a continuation of the “way of
Hermes.”216
Since the 1980s, most scholars concede that “hermetic manuscripts, technical as
well as philosophical, reflect the influence of genuine Egyptian prayers, texts, and modes
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of transmission…”217 For example, the translation of the title of Corpus Hermeticum 1,
“Poimandres,” is now accepted as an Egyptian rendering of “mind of Re” instead of the
Greek, “shepherd.”218 Furthermore, the suggested social context depicted in the text
points to Egyptian sources: “The teacher at the centre of the tractates is not a philosopher
engaged in intellectual debate with his disciples in the Graeco-Roman manner. He is
more like a priest imparting ancient wisdom within the precincts of a great temple.”219
The idea that a teacher could also be like a ritual expert shall become more important as
we explore the Egyptian approach to personal divinity as an imaginative technology of
self-transformation, taken up in chapter 3.

The Making of the Sacred
In order to understand the self-sacralizing aspect of the Corpus Hermeticum, let
us first consider the dynamics of the “sacrificial system” as developed by Carlin Barton.
Barton’s investigation into the emotional life of ancient Romans has explored honor,
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shame, violence, the gaze, and gender, among other things.220 Her focus on emotions is
far from sentimental. Emotions, she demonstrates, are also ideas that shape cultural
ideology and practice. Echoing anthropologist Edward Hall, Barton assumes that
‘[c]ulture hides much more than it reveals, and strangely enough what it hides, it hides
most effectively from its own participants.”221 Indeed, considering the complicated nature
of human emotions—which cannot often be separated from thoughts—Barton offers a
fresh view of the skeleton of culture. Her vision of cultural and social life is that of an
archaeologist. She brings a sensitivity to layered modes of thought and an emotional
stratigraphy that continue to influence new layers built upon them.
Barton’s work engages “the sacred” or, as she puts it, “the sacrificial system.” Her
examination of the “sacrificial system” does not rely on any conventional or assumed
concept of “religion.” Rather, through an analysis of linguistic and ritual context, Barton
has developed a new understanding of the social and psychological dyanmics of
sacrificare (from sacer, “set apart,” and sacere, “to make sacred”) outside of the sphere
of “religion” as modern scholars have understood it:
The Roman sacrificial system was an elaborate physics of binding, capturing,
taming and domesticating energy with the purpose of enhancing and
concentrating it, in order, finally, to direct that energy back into the community.
Conversely, the sacrifical system was a way of binding and capturing, taming and
domesticating energy with the purpose of ‘de-sacralizing,’ i.e., desecrating and
diminishing that energy in order, finally, to exclude or eliminate, ‘execute’ or
‘exterminate’ it from the community…Forces, powers, functions needed to be
220
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isolated, defined, carved out of nature (like the walls of Romulean Rome) and
harnessed in order for the charges on them to be either augmented and reinforced
or debilitated and dispersed….Charges could be almost infinitely raised or
lowered or simultaneously raised by some and lowered by others. Absolutely
anything or anyone could be sacralized or desecrated….222
For Barton, what scholars have tended to describe as “sacred” for the Romans was not
distinct from “the secular”: “What might be outside the sacred frame in one perspective
could be within the frame of an other.” 223 The line between sacred and secular will blur
for those who follow Carlin’s line of inquiry into the foreign emotional country of the
Romans.
Recent research by Carlon Barton and Daniel Boyarin recover the ambiguity of
“religio,” “deus,” “threskeia,” “theos,” terms that have been “set apart, sacralized, and
calcified” by “almost eighteen hundred years of linguistic development.”224 They argue:
“the flexible, undefined, and less formalized powers and play of emotions exercised in
the Latin religio...will be suppressed in an increasingly defined, disciplined, regimented
system of governent legitimated by reference to a notion of an ultimate authorizing
power.”225 This new work challenges how many of us look at “the sacred” in antiquity
and its pressumed co-conspirator, “religion.”
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Sacrificing God
Building on Barton’s understanding of the ancient Roman sacrificial system and
Barton and Boyarin’s critique of “religion,” I offer comments on the archive Augustine
assembles in City of God, Books 8-10 where he engages Apuleius’ The god of Socrates,
works attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, as well as the late Platonism of Plotinus,
Porphyry, and Iamblichus. These works share a concern with an inner self, its
relationship to “god” (more on this term in a moment), and the prospect of apotheosis,
becoming a “god,” what I am calling in this chapter “making a sacred self,” understood
as personal divinity. Augustine has been credited with the invention of the inner self but
discussions that express a strong sense of interiority certainly predate him and his archive
above reflects this “inward turn.”226 Apuleius’s concern with the inner daemon, the
importance of inner vision in the Hermetic tractates, and the “innerworldliness”227 of the
Neoplatonists call Augustine’s credit into question.
For our purposes, I will be looking at selected fragments from the Hermetica, a
collection of dialogues between Hellenized Egyptian deities that display the syncretic
spirit of late antique Alexandria in its cast of characters and intellectual influences.

226
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Rather than focusing on the transition that religio underwent as a strategy for state
formation, as Barton does, I will focus on the person apart from the state. The Hermetic
approach to sacralization was not, as in the Ciceronian-turn of religio, a “necessary
means to the end of social order.”228 It was a personal approach set apart from—albeit,
co-existing with—the concerns of social life.
In approaching the Hermetic texts, this chapter asks: What can we see when we
remove “God”—with all its “religious” connotations—from the equation? Rather than
translating the Greek word theos using the Germanic word “God,” let us look at how the
Hermetic texts define (or set apart?) theos in order to, like Barton and Boyarin,
“conceptualize it anew and speak [of a culture] without invoking the anachronistic
concept of religion.”229 While a longer study would chart the use of theos starting with
the pre-Socratics, even in a short chapter, we can begin to “take off the scrim of religion”
as Barton puts it; that is, to take off the overlays of translation, reception, and
commentary beginning with the Church Fathers and into the last century.
By removing “God” from the equation, from a context where it may not really
belong, we can see how “the sacred,” that is, the sacrificial system formulated by Barton,
operates outside of a “religionizing” understanding of the ancient world. In the selected
Hermetic fragments below, I will be looking at how the texts define, set-apart, and
sacralize theos and then how (and, importantly, why) the Hermetic reader identifies with
this highly charged idea to become theos, sacralizing the self. In particular, I will be
focusing on Greek passages that describe theos as invisible, requiring inner vision and
imagination in order to be seen and known. The “invisible world is materialized in
228
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images, that is to say, in figurative language or world-pictures that are crucial for
knowledge, since what is considered to be ‘real’ is a function of the pictorial
imagination”230 The Hermetic way of seeing this invisible theos demonstrates an
imaginative technology of self-transformation through reading as a spiritual exercise.

Defining Theos
Theos first appears inwardly to Hermes as a thought, “an enormous being
completely unbound in size,” saying, “I know what you want, and I am with you
everywhere.” (Corpus Hermeticum 1.1).231 Yet, its enormity is bound by that fact that it
occurs as a thought in Hermes’ mind. Inwardly imagined as thought unbound, theos is
bounded by the imagination. Theos is set apart as an imagined thought. The
unboundedness of theos might at first conjure up a transcendent reality but its
boundedness as a thought occurring within the mind suggests that theos is an immanent,
embodied, inner reality. In this same passage, theos is set apart as an intimate, inner
feature of Hermes, knowing his thoughts and feelings, ever present, similar to Apuleius’
inner daemon in The god of Socrates: “that particular type of divinity, identical with the
mind of each and every person” (De deo Socrates 15.3)232 that watches “everything with
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close attention” (16.6).233 Indeed, we soon learn, theos is Hermes’ mind. Theos tells
him, “I am…mind, your theos,” explaining, “your mind is theos” (Corpus Hermeticum
1.6).234 Apprehending Mind with the mind leaves the witness “trembling, terrified, out of
[her] wits” (1.8)235
Theos cannot be seen by the “uninitiated” (ἀμύητος), literally “those who do not
shut their eyes” (Corpus Hermeticum 5.1).236 Like Plotinus’s imperative in The Enneads
to “shut your eyes and change to and wake another way of seeing, which everyone has
but few use…” (Ennead 1.6.8).237 the Hermetist must imagine theos inwardly in order to
see and understand theos. Hermetic seeing occurs through the “eyes of the mind” (Corpus
Hermeticum 5.2).238 To see the invisible theos with the mind’s eye is to see what “seems
invisible to the multitude” as “entirely visible” (5.1).239 Hermetic seeing is making the
invisible inwardly visible. Theos seems invisible to the “multitude” because they look for
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it through bodily eyes instead of the eyes of the mind, through outer vision rather than
inner vision.
A difficult passage in Corpus Hermeticum navigates the nuances of inner and
outer seeing for the Hermetists: “Everything that has appeared [to the bodily eyes]
(phainomenon) has come into being because at some point it appeared [to bodily eyes]
(ephane). But the invisible (aphanes) is always [invisible], it does not need to come to be
seen [outwardly]” (5.1)240 Invisible things, things that do not appear outwardly, are seen
inwardly. The passage continues: “The very entity that makes this visibility [of theos, the
mind] does not make itself visible; what makes [sense perception] apparent is not itself
apparent; what presents images of everything (i.e. imagination) is not present to sense
perception.”241 “Only thought (noesis), because it…is invisible, sees the invisible…your
mind’s eye will see it” (5.2).242 “Can you see thought and hold it in your hands?”
(5.2).243 The “entity that makes visibility” is theos the mind, the mind’s eye. Theos is not
an external transcendent entity but an internal immanent entity equated with the
imagining mind itself. This “entity” is the imagining mind: “(Theos) is the mind’s eye”
(13.17).244 The Hermetist acknowledges the role of inner vision, of imaginative
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thought—which is itself invisible—in processing images and assigning meaning to those
images, as theos. The Corpus Hermeticum, in Sarah Ahbel-Rappe’s words, “[points] the
reader toward a conception of interiority in which the experience of imaginative
production” sets apart the “the imagination as the object.”245 Or, to put it another way in
Pauliina Remes words, imagination “makes the mind which receives perceptions aware
of both the external object of perception and the mind itself.”246 Self-reflexive thinking,
imagining, and seeing is acting as theos. Turning inward (eis to eiso; Plotinus, Ennead
1.6.8.4) like Aristotle’s self-reflexive theos who thinks about thinking (noesis noeseos;
Metaphysica 1074b, 34-5), the Hermetic self, turns the gaze to the mind’s eye—
imagining imagination—becoming theos.247
The late antique theory of phantasia (imagination) also helps us parse the
ambiguities of inner and outer vision in this era. Phantasia was understood in two ways:
it was the image-making faculty of consciousness, an organ of sense perception that
presented images to the mind but it also created images independent of sense perception.
Because of this dual meaning, Robert Berchman argues that phantasia is “based on
something far more profound than an awareness of physical conditions. It carries a
meaning close to the idea of consciousness… [Phantasia] is a power of perceptive
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awareness that transcends sensation.”248 Hermetic imagination shaped sense perception
but it could also “see” what could not be sensed.

An Imaginative Technology of Self-Transformation
Reading or hearing the Hermetic texts was a “spiritual exercise.”249 But, texts that
offered exercises in self-development (askesis) were deployed in late antiquity by a
number of traditions including the Stoics, the Neoplatonists, and the Hermetists. In
spiritual exercises, thought “takes itself as its own subject-matter, and seeks to modify
itself…[Unlike the word “spiritual”] the word ‘thought’ [Hadot continues] does not
indicate clearly enough that imagination and sensibility play a very important role in
these exercises.”250 Indeed, spiritual exercises rely on imagination—the ability to
visualize things unavailable to the senses. “Spiritual” exercises help the reader (or hearer)
experience things that are invisible or intangible and therefore require imagination in
order to be “seen” or known.
Imaginative exercises in the Hermetic texts can be explicit, often signaled by the
use of imperative, subjunctive, or optative moods: “Make yourself grow to immeasurable
immensity…” (Corpus Hermeticum 11.20) or “Command your soul to travel to India…”
(11.19).251 In explicit exercises the student in the dialogue and the reader are actively lead
248
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through a series of images, ideas, and emotional and (imagined) physical states in order
to experience a new ability and sense of self. But, self-transforming exercises can also be
implicit using vivid language to suggest an image, scenario, or experience without telling
the reader to actively enter into it. For example: “In the deep there was boundless
darkness and water and fine intelligent spirit, all existing by divine power (dynamei theia)
in chaos” (3.1).252 The reader sees the darkness and water, the power and chaos as inner
images and processes. In explicit and implicit exercises, the Hermetic reader, similar to
Hugo Lundhaug’s early Christians, makes sense of the text “by means of the creation and
integration of multiple mental representations.”253

Making a Sacred Self
The self-sacralizing result of this imaginative technology of self-transformation
takes place when the student transfers the power of seeing and understanding from the
physical eyes to the eyes of the mind. Theos is seen with inner vision and is constitutive
of inner vision. Such a transformation is illustrated in statements such as the following
where the transformed reader explicitly identifies as theos: “I no longer picture things
252

Copenhaver, trans. “ἧν γὰρ σκότος ἄπειρον ἐν ἀβύσσῳ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα λεπτὸν
νοερόν, δυνάμει θείᾳ ὄντα ἐν χάει.”
253

Lundhaug, Cognitive Poetics, 64; Reader-reception theorist, George Poulet, vividly
describes the transformative power of thinking and reading exercises: “I feel sure that as
soon as I think something, that something becomes in some indefinable way my own.
Whatever I think is a part of my mental world. And yet here I am thinking a thought
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with the sight of my eyes…I am in heaven, in earth, in water, in air; I am in animals and
plants; in the womb, before the womb, after the womb; everywhere” (Corpus
Hermeticum 13.11).254
Seeing self as theos in heaven, earth, animals, and plants suggests that theos has
an external reality permeating all things. But that external reality depends on inner vision,
theos is projected onto the sensible world as the mind’s eye externalized. Even in the
Hermetic tractates that portray an “outer” sense of theos (that is, as an invisible, creative,
ordering force that manifests in and as nature), the reading process makes the imagination
of this force an inner perception.255 The emphasis of the exercise of Hermetic seeing
offered by the texts always returns the reader to the eyes of mind. Patricia Cox Miller
captures the Hermetic way of seeing in her study of late antique imagination observing
(after Bachelard) that “images (and the imagining process) do not passively reproduce
‘reality’: they actively create it.”256 Becoming theos transforms the inner self257 and
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Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (London, Penguin Books, 2000), 101.
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world in our mens.” Antoine Faivre, Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition: Studies in
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“Imagination produces effects so real that they can ‘mold’ the imagining subject.”
Corbin, Alone, 180. British Idealist A.S. Pringle-Pattison describes the relationship
between self and the world it inhabits: “The self exists only through the world and vice
versa, that we might say with equal truth the self is the world and the world is the
self…So the self and the world are only two sides of the same reality; they are the same
intelligible world looked at from two opposite points of view. But, finally, it must not be
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world the Hermetist inhabits.258 Even when theos seems external to the reader—in
passages that depict theos as “the Craftsman” (demiurgos) of an ordered cosmos (Corpus
Hermeticum 5.8, passim)259— such an external depiction must be imagined internally in
the mind of the reader. The transcendent theos is always immanent. Indeed, following
Gregory Shaw, the Hermetic sacred self creates the world it inhabits as a demiurgic
mind.260 Theos possesses the power of imagination, by imagining the universe, theos
created it.261 When the Hermetist thinks about theos as an unbounded kind of thought, as
including everything the mind’s eye could imagine, including the mind’s eye itself, the
thinker becomes “the object of… [its] knowing” (Plotinus, Ennead 5.4.2)262—an
Aristotelian notion263—adopted enthusiastically by the Neoplatonists and present in the

forgotten that it is only from the point of view of the self or subject that the identity can
be grasped; this, therefore, is the ultimate point of view which unifies the whole…The
transcendental self, as the implicate of all experience, is, for a theory of knowledge,
simply the necessary point of view from which the universe can be unified, that is, from
which it become an universe.” “Philosophy as Criticism of Categories,” in Essays in
Philosophical Criticism, eds. A.S. Pringle-Pattison and R. B. Haldane Viscount Haldane
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1883), 38.
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“Yet the development of phantasiai as something in the middle between the subject
and the objects in the world can be seen as one step among many in the gradual
movement towards the idea of an individual soul which interprets the world in a manner
particular to just him or her – an inner realm proper to one individual.” Remes,
“Inwardness,” 166. My emphasis.
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Pauliina Remes brings nuance to Plotinus’ use of Aristotle’s “identity theory” of
knowledge and the divinely reflexive νόεσις νοήσεως νόησις: “Knowledge is, rather, a
peculiar form of self-intellection or self-thinking…The answer to the criticism that the
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Corpus Hermeticum: “That which is known by thinking is equal to the thought” (2.5).264
(To my knowledge, this Hermetic parallel to Aristotle’s “identity theory” of knowledge
has not been pointed out by scholars until now).
Understanding the invisible nature of theos and the need for inner vision in order
to see and know theos, the Hermetic student equates her own inner vision with that of
theos: “Thus, unless you make yourself equal to theos, you cannot understand theos; like
is understood by like” (Corpus Hermeticum 11.20).265 To understand theos, Mind
implores Hermes to actively imagine theos: “So you must think of a god in this way, as
having everything—the cosmos, itself, [the] universe—like thoughts within itself.”
(11.20).266 Theos contains all things, including itself, including the mind’s eye, in itself
as thoughts…especially the thoughts of the one thinking about theos. Once that
understanding is achieved, the very apparent (phanerotatos) world is seen with new eyes
as theos, having the attributes of theos. Through the exercise of reading, theos is
simultaneously imagined in and as the thoughts of the reader: “I see the universe and I
see myself in mind” (13.13).267

self of the self-intellection of this sort is not special or personal enough to be a self, and
that its self-reflexivity would hardly qualify as knowledge of a self, becomes both yes
and no. Intellect’s self-knowledge does not yield any personal or individual information.
What it reveals in addition to the objects of knowledge is subjectivity.” Remes, Pauliina.
Plotinus on Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157-158, 170, 173. See
Plotinus, Ennead 4.4.2.3 – 11.
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Barton writes that for the Romans “[t]he charge within a person, the sacred thing
within a person, was equivalent to the honor in which she or he was held. Animus, spirit
or will, was its source.”268 For the inward-turning Hermetists, honor in the eyes of
another no longer mattered, the animus sidestepped social relations. The Hermetists could
be self-consciously theological (theologesomen; 17). They did not consider theos “an
ultimate authorizing power” that legitimized authority, but a notion of self that authorizes
the individual; not a “transcendental reality,” but an immanent, embodied one, a spacious,
creative inner being of the imagining self read as theos, set apart, made sacred.

The Latin Asclepius
In Book 8 of the City of God, after a friendly tribute to Platonism as the
philosophy that prefigured Christianity, Augustine of Hippo rails against fellow North
African, Apuleius, the second-century rhetor and late Platonist, and also against Hermes
Trismegistus, the eponymous “author” of the third century Graeco-Egyptian
Hermetica.269 Commenting on The god of Socrates, Augustine accuses Apuleius of
demon worship (cultu daemonum) and practicing the art of magic (magicae artes).
Quoting extensively from a section of the Hermetic Latin Asclepius for evidence, he
charges Hermes with making statues into gods (deos facere). As a writer in the Christian
tradition, it is no surprise that Augustine would object strenuously to suggested practices
268

Carlin Barton, “Honor and Sacredness in the Roman and Christian Worlds,” in
Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion, ed. Margaret Cormack
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 24-5.
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Although the so-called Hermetica are anonymous, I will follow Augustine’s
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involving demons or idol worship. It is surprising, however, given his Neoplatonic bent,
that he would fail to note the concern with inner divinity in the works of Apuleius and
Hermes, which, incidentally, might well have been included together in the same codex
on Augustine’s bookshelf.270 Augustine’s reading of the Asclepius is painfully selective,
though that of a master apologist. The point of the Asclepius, and of The god of Socrates
for that matter, as Francis Clooney observes, is about “the need to cultivate the higher
self and to exercise one’s freedom in choosing a life of wisdom….[This] should be
acceptable to Augustine, but still he passes over it in silence.”271 Indeed, the GraecoEgyptian Hermetists were more concerned with making themselves into gods: “This is
the final good for those who have received knowledge: to be made god” (Corpus
Hermeticum 1.25).272
In a close reading of the Latin Asclepius, I will interrogate the relationship
between the imagination and the construction of self in relation to the divine. I would like
to offer a reading of Asclepius with a certain understanding of imagination in mind, that
is, how imagination functions as a technology of self. Drawing attention to the
inseparability of “the self” and “the sacred,” I will suggest that imagination is more than a
function of what theurgic Neoplatonists refer to as the “vehicle of the soul” (ochema
pneuma) but rather it is the vehicle itself (see chapter 1).
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Performing Deus
In a performative utterance that we can only imagine, Hermes describes a unified
cosmos in which soul and matter are stirred so “the whole might seem to be one and that
all might seem to be from one” (Asclepius 2).273 This cosmology is not an empirical
description of a physical landscape. It is a map of cosmic proportions that must be drawn
in the mind. It must be imagined. It is not here (pointing down like Aristotle in Raphael’s
The School of Athens), it is not here (pointing up like Plato) at least as far as we can see
with our eyes open, it is here (pointing to the head). In imagining it we become players in
a “mental theater” or practitioners of an “immaterial demiurgy.”274 If Hermes is going to
initiate Asclepius, Tat, and Hammon into this cosmology, he has to do more than
describe it. He has to prescribe it. Hermes’ anthropology is equally suggestive and
impressive to a seeker. Humanity is conjoined to heavenly gods, airy demons, and earthly
nature: “Everything is permitted him: heaven itself seems not too high, for he measures it
in his clever thinking as if it were nearby. No misty air dims the concentration of his
thought; no thick earth obstructs his work; no abysmal deep of water blocks his lofty
view. He is everything, and he is everywhere” (6).275 Such an expansive, ekphrastic,
rhetorical strategy posits an imaginal world as fact and orients the audience in that world.
We are told what we are, where we are, and what we can do there…with our eyes closed.
This world is “figuratively real” because, as Patricia Cox Miller has observed, the
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“narrative pictorial strategies…seduce the reader into forgetting that these are images in
texts.”276
Put to the imagination, pictorial narratives serve as so-called spiritual exercises.
The classic example would be Plotinus’s “sphere exercise”:
Let there be, then, in the soul a shining imagination of a sphere, having everything
within it, either moving or standing still, or some things moving and others
standing still. Keep this, and apprehend in your mind another, taking away the
mass: take away also the places, and the mental picture of matter in yourself, and
do not try to apprehend another sphere smaller in mass than the original one, but
calling on the god who made that of which you have the mental picture, pray him
to come (Enn. 5.8.9).277
In this exercise, “Plotinus appears to be engaged in an introspective experiment in both
self-consciousness and metacognitive self-awareness.”278 Plotinus offers the “sphere
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exercise” as an explicit practice, cuing the reader with the hortatory subjunctive, “Let
there be….”

Self-Identification with Deus
On the other hand, the self-identifications with the god we see throughout the
Hermetica, function as implicit exercises. Offering no cue to the reader to perform a
visual exercise, there are nonetheless performative. In one love spell from the hermetic
Papyri Graecae Magicae, we find two instances where divine identity is formed in order
to empower the aim of the performer: “For you are I, and I am you; your name is mine,
and mine is yours. For I am your image” and “I know you, Hermes, and you know me. / I
am you, and you are I” (Papyri Graecae Magicae 8.37-38, 49-50).279 In one tractate of
Corpus Hermeticum we see a forceful statement equating self-knowledge with selfdeification: “So you must think of a god in this way, as having everything—the cosmos,
himself, [the] universe—like thoughts within himself. Thus, unless you make yourself
equal to god, you cannot understand god; like is understood by like” (11.20).280 For
Wouter Hanegraaff, the final salvation of the Hermetic material—to become divine—
“consists not so much in unification with the divine as in the recognition that he has
always been one with it. … In looking at this ultimate divine reality, he finds that he is
looking at himself.”281 The emphasis shifts from “ultimate divine realty” to “self.”
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Those who understand “the divine” to be something that is transcendent and
beyond the self might be tempted to think of the self as a subset of that ultimate realty. I
am trying to put that view—which may be more a Christian overlay—on its head: In this
case, the ultimate reality is something that is rather a part of self, an inner experience,
immanent. It is not as if there is an outer, other being that the self approaches and seeks
union with but rather that “being” is an inner, familiar capacity that just needs to be
understood the right way. These exercises help the Hermetist develop the inner vision
needed to navigate an inner cosmology and to impress that understanding upon the
perceptible world. The spiritual world is an imaginal world and its first founding
inhabitants are not gods or demons or angels but rather our thoughts.

Consciousness is Divine
Hermes tells us that consciousness is made not from the four perceptible elements
but from invisible ether (Asclepius 6). Consciousness, like thought, is invisible,
immeasurable except in its effects, interior, private. Consciousness is, Hermes reveals, “a
great subject and very holy, no less than an account of divinity itself” (6).282
Consciousness is divinity itself. Indeed, Hermes insists, it takes a “godlike concentration
of consciousness” to follow such a fluid account of divinity, “most like a river running in
torrent from a height, sweeping, plunging, so that its rapid rush outraces our
concentration…” (3).283 A discourse on the divinity of consciousness requires a
consciousness of divinity, it seems, a concentration of god-like self-consciousness.

282

Copenhaver, trans. “est enim sanctissima et magna, et non minor quam ea quae est
divinitatis ipsius.”
283

Copenhaver, trans. “torrenti simillima est fluvio e summo inpronum praecipiti
rapacitate currentis; quo efficitur ut intentionem nostrum.”
92

Some might object that I am overstating humanity’s apotheotic telos according to
the Hermetists. After all, for Hermes, the “true, pure and holy philosophy” is to “adore
the godhead with simple mind and soul and to honor his works, also to give thanks to
god’s will” (14).284 The highest god, the “master and shaper of all things” (8)285 seems
much like the familiar king-god. Theurgy is divine work but it is explicitly conceived as
“being worked upon by the gods.” Indeed, Sarah Iles Johnston’s characterization of
“[t]he pious Iamblichaean theurgist [who] subordinated himself to the gods, allowing
them to work upon him” could equally be applied to the theurgic Hermetist.286 This
representation appears again and again in the sources. But what if we were to read this
subordination from the point of view of a self armed with an imaginative, performative
technology? Subordination to a seemingly external power may be more nuanced than at
first it seems.
In his study of self-formation in the late antique The Fathers according to Rabbi
Nathan, J. Wyn Schofer observes the strategy of attaining “the character of a sage
through subordination to particular authorities with the goal of, in various senses,
internalizing aspects of them.”287 There is a fine and porous line between serving power
and being an agent or avatar of it, a line that has much to do with how one represents
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oneself. In imagining a god that is of a “higher order,” though a distant relative in the
spectrum of divinity (more on that in a moment)—say, a god whose “willing and
achievement are complete for him at one and the same moment of time” (Asclepius
8)288—the Hermetist imagines having that state in him or herself.289
I want to suggest that the emphasis we often see put on human subjugation to a
superior god is an inverted imaginative strategy that serves to stretch the identity of the
subject beyond its normal bounds. Imagining god is imitating god. Furthermore, if all the
levels of reality from matter to God “become levels of inner life, levels of the self” then,
Pierre Hadot concludes, “the human self is not irrevocably separated from its eternal
model….This true self—this self in God—is within ourselves…[W]e can identify
ourselves with it. We then become this eternal self….”290 All sacralization contains an
element of self-sacralization because it is self-reflexive awareness that recognizes or
inscribes perceived power. It is not the sacred, conceived as a powerful external force
that is Otto’s mysterium tremendum et fascinans, but rather the self-reflexive awareness
itself, which creatively names power sacred in the first place. That is our mysterious and
frightening “Wholly Other.”291 Durkheim helped us to see that in those organized
sacralizing behaviors we have come to call “religion,” a society effectively adores itself.
288
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These collective efforts also require individual agents who are self-reflexively aware. If
all sacralizing behaviors contain an element of self-sacralizing and if, as a sacralizing
behavior, apotheosis is self-sacralizing, then the sacred is society writ large, yes, but
more so, the sacred is self-reflexive awareness—the self— writ large.

Self as Statue
Abruptly Asclepius interrupts Hermes: “Are you talking about statues,
Trismegistus?” who responds, “Statues, Asclepius, yes. See how little trust you have!”
(Asclepius 24).292 Now I think we can talk a bit about the statues that so irked our Bishop
of Hippo who chides the theurgists for idolatry (“making gods”). Hermes says just as god
“is maker of heavenly gods, so it is mankind who fashions the temple gods…” (23).293
Yet, god still serves as the “eternal model” for mimesis: “Humanity persists in imitating
divinity, representing its gods in semblance of its own features, just as the father and
master made his gods eternal to resemble him” (23).294 What appears to be making gods
and idolatry, as it did to Augustine, is actually the symbolic enactment of an inner
change. Making gods makes you a god: “What we have said of mankind is wondrous, but
less wondrous than this: it exceeds the wonderment of all wonders that humans have been
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able to discover the divine nature and how to make it” (37).295 In an analogy I doubt was
lost on the Hermetists, just as gods, demons, or angels can inhabit statues, so the divine
souls of humans inhabit human bodies. Animating statues reflects an inner imaginal
process, “working on one’s inner statue” in Plotinus’s words (Ennead 1.6.9)296, toward
apotheosis, theurgic divinization, theothenai.

Conclusion
In Asclepius, the imagination is a technology for embodying what both Hermetic
writers (and the Neoplatonists who followed them) viewed as the soul’s inheritance: to
become a god. For the late antique Hermetist, apotheosis was an imagined, embodied
state: “We rejoice that you have deigned to make us gods for eternity even when we
depend on the body” (Asclepius 41).297
I’d like to propose a new term: “autourgos,” usually translated as “farmer,”
literally, “self-worker.” Gregory Shaw has argued that apotheosis, or theurgic
divinization, is demiurgy.298 That is, the “divine work” of theurgy is not only changing
one’s imaginal state to that of god but also identifying as co-participant, divine crafter, in
creating the cosmos. Theourgos is dēmiourgos. Extending this equation—that the
theurgist is demiurgist, I would add that theurgist is also “autourgist”— theourgos is
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autourgos. No, not the “farmer” but literally, the “self-worker” who “works alone”!
Corpus Hermeticum 2.14.4 says as much: “Working alone, he is in his work eternally
since he is what he makes.”299
In Symposium 1, Xenophon used the expression “autourgos tes philosophias” for
“one that has worked at philosophy by himself, without a teacher.”300 But, philosophy as
a way of life is always eventually worked at without a teacher if it is to fulfill the aim of
self-transformation. We have to do the intellectual, and the imaginative, “heavy lifting”
ourselves. Theurgy is the work of the autourgos, the self-worker, cultivating inner
divinity, whose “seed” is the imagination.
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CHAPTER 3
DIVINATION IS DIVINIZATION: ORACLES IN LATE ANTIQUE EGYPT
While traveling in Egypt, the first-century Greek doctor, Thessalos of Tralles,
sought a “direct divination,” an “eye-witness” oracle with Asclepius, the god of healing,
to advise him on the medical uses of plants. In a letter to Emperor Augustus, he writes:
Arriving, then, in Diospolis (Thebes) — I mean the most ancient city of Egypt which also
has many temples — I was residing there, for there were scholarly high-priests
(archiieris) and elders ascribing to various teachings there. Now as time advanced and
my friendship with them increased, I was inquiring whether any magical operation
(magikes energeias) was still preserved. I observed the majority protesting strongly
against my rashness concerning such an expectation. Nonetheless, one man, who could
be trusted because of his patient manner and the measure of his age, did not throw away
the friendship. This man professed to have the ability to perform direct (autoptiken)
divination by means of a bowl (Thessalos 1.12-15).301
When it comes to divination in late antique Graeco-Roman Egypt, it is difficult to
separate the “priest” from the “magician,” “religion” from “magic,” or philosophy from
all of the above. Whether performed publicly as a part of state cult or privately for elite
(or non-elite) clients, divination often suggested divinization—the possibility of personal
divinity—for those involved. To bring this possibility of personal divinity as understood
by the Egyptians into greater relief, this chapter will interpret two divination practices —
the New Kingdom Egyptian pḥ-nṯr oracle in its public and private guises and the Late
Antique Graeco-Egyptian “Mithras Liturgy.” I will attend to the Egyptian concept of ḥk3
and those who deployed it in the context of Greek and Egyptian cultural interactions. I
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will make the case that personal divinity as expressed in late antique Graeco-Egyptian
oracular literature—even when written in Greek—was not an interpretatio graeca or
“Hellenization” but rather part of a more general cultural milieu of traditional Egyptian
temple thought and cultic practice. This chapter demonstrates the contribution of
Egyptian thought to Late Antique discourses on personal divinity seen in Hermetic texts
as well as in the theurgic attitude of the Neoplatonists.302 Finally, I will suggest that
divination is divinization—that divination bestows a “sacred status” upon the querent
(and the audience)—giving him or her access to powers and states of being normally
attributed to the Egyptian gods—in both explicit and implicit ways. Divination rituals,
performed publicly or privately, can be read as texts that function as imaginative
technologies of self-transformation that suggest personal divinity.

The Egyptian “Priest-Philosopher”
The ritual expert in Egypt like the one in the Thessalos anecdote above,
performed divination rites that embraced the roles of “priest,” “magician,” and
“philosopher.” However, except from the point of view of Roman legislation in Egypt
that condemned magia, “magician” or “magic” may not be the most helpful terms to use
in our discussion. Indeed, “magician” and “magic” carry a long history of polemical
baggage, often being used by historical agents and scholars alike to sanction certain
practices while condemning others, and then with reference to that equally slippery term,
“religion,” a category that the Egyptians didn’t have either in the way moderns have
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tended to apply it to them—“etically.”303 Neither category—“magic” or “religion”—was
indigenous to the Egyptians.
Beginning in the reign of Diocletian (c. 244-311), divination and other related
practices were reclassified as illicit magia.304 By 359, an Egyptian oracle prompted the
emperor Constantius II (317 – 361) to abolish oracles throughout the empire.305 Egyptian
cult practices were negatively recast in the Roman Christian mind. Writing in the fifth
century, the Christian polemicist Zacharias Scholasticus accused Neoplatonist theurgist
Isidore of using rituals and words of power for malefic purposes (i.e. “sorcery”).306 The
lines between categories like “religion,” “philosophy,” “theurgy,” and “magic,” blur and
change over time—especially so in the great confluence of cultural identities that was late
antique Egypt. The Neoplatonic theurgist used many of the same methods as the Egyptian
“priest” including invocations, words of power, and natural materials. The theurgists
utilized materials that indexed the gods, “the symbola that [the gods] themselves have
sown in the cosmos.”307 Engaging these sacred symbols, theurgic rituals of supplication
were seen to raise practitioners “gradually to the level of the object of supplication”308
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That is, the practitioners became divine. Especially for the Iamblichan “philosopher,”
ritual engagement with the material expressions of the divine as they are manifest in
nature was seen equally as engaging the imagined, invisible, transcendent, expression of
the divine as an achievement of personal divinity.
Let us perhaps use the Egyptian term normally translated into “magic,” ḥeka,
instead. Unlike magia, ḥeka had no unorthodox, illegal, or deviant connotations. Rather,
as both a cosmic force and a deity of that force, ḥeka was “a primary and necessary
element of creation, used naturally by the gods, and granted as a…benefit to
[hu]mankind.”309 The hieroglyph means, “power.” As a god, Ḥeka had official cult status
in the temple at Esna in Upper Egypt even in Roman times and was invoked equally as a
“destructive force of compulsion…[a] generative harvest deity, and [a] patron of
oracles.”310 Egyptologist Robert Ritner comments: “Serving both generative and
destructive ends, Ḥeka/ḥeka represents an amoral force inherent in the created order, a
power which could be tapped by appropriate words and gestures. There is no ‘black’ vs.
‘white’ magic; both gods and demons may use its force.”311 On the identity of the
practitioner of ḥeka, Ritner rightly argues against the hotly debated image of the
“itinerant” or “freelance” magician in Egypt. He says:
Preconceived notions of the magician…on the outskirts of tradition are totally
inappropriate for Egypt where the magician was invariably a literate priest, the
very source of tradition. The common Egyptian term for magician signified
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‘lector priest’, the ritualist who recited the written spells. Such spells were temple
property, composed, edited, and stored in the temple scriptorium.312
So, we might also use ḥry-tp, the native term for this “lector priest”—who was ritual
expert and practitioner of ḥeka—as an alternative to the awkward hybrid, “priestmagician-philosopher.” Using such native terms as ḥeka and ḥry-tp avoids many
misunderstandings of Egyptian thought and practice that stem from Greek and Roman—
as well as modern scholarly—biases.

Greek and Egyptian Interactions
In order to understand the Egyptian contribution to late antique discourses about
personal divinity evident in the transition from the public pharaonic-era oracles (pḥ-nṯr)
to private oracles (such as the “Mithras Liturgy”), we need to address the problem of
accessing Egypt through Greek (linguistic) hands. After the conquest of Alexander,
Egypt is said to have become “Hellenized.” The term “Hellenization” carries with it two
assumptions: 1) Greek culture is superior to Egyptian culture; 2) Egyptians assimilated to
Greek culture, rather than appropriated it. Recently scholars have begun to consider a
more nuanced encounter between Greeks and Egyptians than simple “Hellenization.”
Arguing against the Hellenization model, Glen Bowersock suggests that rather “[t]he
Egyptian elite was probably quick to seize the instrumental advantages of learning Greek
already under the Ptolemies, and by the third century it had fully internalized the
conquerors’ culture.”313 Egyptian elites didn’t stop being Egyptian, just because they
learned Greek. Taking advantage of new cultural currency hardly means abandoning all
312
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of the old. Robert Ritner challenges the idea that the use of Greek language suggests the
primacy of Greek influence:
Greek language does not necessarily imply Greek culture. One must not confuse
the Greek-speaking world with the Greek cultural world, any more than one
should assume a unity of cultural outlook in English writings from London,
Navaho reservations, Botswana, and New Delhi.314
As an example, Ritner points to the oldest Papyri Graecae Magicae spell, written in
Greek by an Egyptian woman of Greek descent before the arrival of Alexander that
follows standard temple uses and protocols.315 Ritner challenges Hellenizing
triumphalism by pointing out the Egyptian mythic and theological elements—specifically
solar in nature—that underlay the Papyri Graecae Magicae. He asserts: “Confronting the
divine powers or ascending to join them, engendering favor and controlling one’s
enemies—are not newly spawned by contemporary ‘philosophies,’ but derive from
unbroken Egyptian traditions far older than Greek philosophy, indeed older than Greek
culture itself.”316 While the notion of “unbroken tradition” remains controversial—flying
in the face of current thinking about cultural mobility, perhaps—it should be considered
cautiously but seriously.317 In the study of culture, we ought not disregard the resiliency
of habitus nor the “transmissibility” of cultural memory.318
Native Egyptian constituencies appropriated elements of Hellenism to form a
“subtle interpenetration” in order to maintain a cultural identity distinct from
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Hellenism.319 Ian Rutherford reminds us: “For ancient Greek writers themselves the
similarities and differences between Greek and other peoples, real or imagined, was a
central concern, not only because this is a way of defining what it means to be Greek, but
also because in the hyper-connective ancient Mediterranean, encounters with other
cultural traditions was central part of lived experience.”320 Reassessing Arnaldo
Momigliano’s thesis of Egyptian decline under Greek rule “through an intellectual
imperialism that exoticized and dominated Egypt, its customs, and its wisdom through
representations that served Greek needs or desires…,”321 Ian Moyer revisits Herodotus’s
meeting with Egyptian priests in Thebes, Manetho’s composition of an Egyptian history
in Greek, the arrival of Egyptian gods on the Greek island of Delos, and a Greek doctor’s
magical revelation in Egypt as “four transactional moments—moments when Egyptian as
well as Greek discourses, actions, and representations produced the historical
outcome.”322 In the process, he shows how much of the scholarship on Hellenistic Egypt
has drawn from nineteenth-century colonial concerns especially those of Johann Gustav
Droysen.323
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Garth Fowden’s argument for the prominence of Egyptian intellectual influence in
the post-pharaonic Hermetica, although largely accepted today, challenges the dominant
thinking for most of the twentieth century. While Hellenism held sway politically,
Egyptianism permeated cultural expression so much so that “the product of their
interaction was at least as much Egyptian as Greek.”324 Greek and Roman writers such as
Lucian, Lucan, Plutarch, Porphyry, and Iamblichus acknowledged this autochthonous
intellectual primacy. Acknowledging that literary references might be more than appeals
to the authority of timeless Egyptian wisdom allows us to consider such evidence as
genuine expressions of identity, tradition, thought, and practice.
The interaction between Greeks and Egyptians is as complex as the resultant
dynamic syncretism. Syncretized figures such as Hermes-Thoth were nothing new to the
Egyptians. The internal syncretism of the Egyptians can be seen in deities such as AmunRe or Atum-Khepri that predate Hermes Trismegistus considerably. The practice of
absorbing foreign gods is also well attested and can be seen in Baal-Set during the
Canaanite occupation and in Zeus-Ammon under the Ptolemaic Greeks. Syncretic
cultural expressions go much deeper than names of deities. The Hermetica express a
more general “fusion of Egyptian and Greek ways of thought” which occurred after the
conquest of Alexander in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods. Peter Struck offers ample
examples of Jewish, Christian, Platonic, and Egyptian elements in Late Antique RomanEgyptian literary productions.325 There is little question that the Hermetica as a whole
display manifold traditions together.
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By the fifth century, “traditional Egyptian…temple culture was mixed
inextricably with classical culture, spectacle, and a thorough syncretism of sacred
idioms.”326 The Alexandrian intellectual culture was elite, urban, and for the most part
Hellenistic. However, certain Egyptian-identified luminaries stood out such as
Chaeremon in the first century, the Panopolitan family of Aurelius Petearbeschinis in the
fourth century, and the family of Horapollon in the fifth century (see detailed discussion
in chapter 4).327 The example of the ethnically Egyptian family of Horapollon who taught
in the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria as “Hellenized” elites is helpful in understanding
how Egyptian thought made its way into Hermetic texts. These Egyptian thinkers were
raised in families “familiar with the temple culture, trained in temple rituals, but
individually dedicated to expressing their traditions in Hellenistic literary and
philosophical forms.”328 But, the Egyptianizing elements in Neoplatonic philosophy were
established from the beginning, emphasized by Iamblichus, and enacted by families such
as Horapollon’s.
The Egyptian temple ḥry-tp in his or her Hellenistic form had become the illicit
magos under Diocletian, casting a new light on traditional practices. At the same time
Neoplatonists such as Horapollon sought to “claim links with indigenous temples in order
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Like many families tied to temple cult of the fifth century, they attempted to preserve
Egyptian cultural identity while gaining stature as Hellenic intellectuals. The Corpus
Hermeticum material that would have been well known to Horapollon and the
Alexandrian Neoplatonists is a likely heir to at least some Egyptian esoteric teachings.
Garth Fowden has argued that the “hybrid late antique theosophical system of Hermetism
was the project of none other than Egyptian ḥry-tp who understood Greek models of the
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to promote values quite different from indigenous temple culture.”329 Neoplatonist
philosopher and historian Damascius describes Horapollon’s family “earnestly pursuing
the…traditions of their (native Egyptian) heritage with … passion….”330 The question
remains as to what extent the Neoplatonic theurgists were invoking the authority of
“eternal Egyptian wisdom” or drawing on current practices that complemented, or
perhaps, were at the root of Neoplatonism. While the expediency of repackaging native
wisdom for Hellenized consumers is easily overstated, it almost certainly played its role
in the centuries since Alexander, transforming the performance of “Egyptian wisdom”
first encountered or imagined by Plato and Pythagoras.
A more nuanced understanding of Hellenism offers an opportunity to find
“[t]races of the Egyptian voices in the long history of dialogue between Greece and Egypt
[that] are there to be found, even in texts designed to erase or supplant them….”331
Indeed, Hellenism provided a “creative translation of traditional texts, practices, and
ideas into a new cultural idiom, not their obliteration in the face of higher culture.”332
These traces in translation provide clues that help us to recover lost or rejected
intellectual and cultural contributions, for our purposes particularly in regards to personal
divinity and imaginative technologies of self-transformation. A close reading of our two
sites of divinization, the pḥ-nṯr oracle and the “Mithras Liturgy,” confirms this.
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Popular Piety and Personal Divinity
In order to understand the public performance of the pḥ-nṯr oracle as a
“transformative text,” we need to consider the nature of public piety in ancient Egypt.
The archeological record favors material culture produced by and for elites but evidence
for workshop and personal piety resides in fragmentary votive offerings, penitential
inscriptions, and literary or visual accounts of public festivals and oracles.333 In the Old
Kingdom common people performed temple service in assigned rotations, after the New
Kingdom formal religious rituals were primarily conducted by a professional class.
Nonetheless, it is clear that over the long stretch of time access to divinity became
“democratized”334: “[S]ources that originated in royal and priestly circles later came to be
translated, often reformulated, and popularized.”335 Progressively, “mysteries associated
with divine kingship became available to deceased mortals as royal esoteric texts and
myths were incorporated in the mortuary literature of commoners.”336 In the Middle
Kingdom, this trend continued through the Book of the Dead, in some cases adapted to
particular trades or occupations including “spells designed to transform an individual into
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a divine entity and those containing statements baldly identifying the speaker with a high
deity such as Re or Atum.”337
In the New Kingdom, commoners had access to the Book of Amduat that
“included references to its efficaciousness on earth for the living person who knows its
contents, and it is stated that such an individual is the likeness of the great god.”338 A
Late Period Demotic text, Setne Khamwas and Naneferkaptah, describes a seeker of
wisdom in search of the “Book of Thoth” that bestows godlike powers upon the owner.339
The themes of self-transcendence, divine visions, and even union with the divine that
appear in early Royal liturgy become the concerns of non-elite populations before the
Ptolemaic period.
In the Roman period, temple culture revolved around local cults.340 Certain
aspects of cultic life expanded from elite circles to included popular audience. Gaëlle
Tallet suggests that, “deprived of previous revenues and privileges, the clergy was highly
dependent on private income.”341 Especially in the changing spiritual climate of the
second and third centuries, when such private incomes were revoked by law, “the
intimate contact with the One God that could be attained by members of a cultural elite
after years of rigorous intellectual training was not going to be confined to the tiny
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minority that had the necessary wealth and education to qualify for membership.”342
Russell observes in the sources a growing demand for esoteric teaching “amongst the
many merchants, artisans, and government official who thronged the major cities of the
empire….”343 One can imagine a range of responses to such demand, exemplified in the
Thessalos vignette above, from sincere to opportunistic and everywhere between.
However, our attention to the opportunistic impulse need not overshadow the sincere
ones.
Popular piety in Egypt included some notion of god-like immortality. While it
was common in the ancient world to expect some kind of survival after death, for most of
the ancient world “the lot of the dead was rather dismal.”344 However, “[t]he great
exception to common beliefs about the afterlife was provided by ancient Egypt.”345 The
prospect of immortality was built in to Egyptian anthropology:
Humans were perceived as composites of physical and nonphysical aspects or
modes of existence. The most important of these were the physical body and the
heart and the incorporeal entities called the ka and ba. Each of these kheperu
(manifestation) could act as the vehicle for survival after death….The ba,
originally the manifestation of an entity’s distinctive powers, came to signify the
capacity of the deceased to move freely between the earthly realm and that of the
gods.346
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While in second-century Rome, “deification could be taken for granted as following
upon death without any implied claim to high social status”; in Egypt “this process of
‘democratization’ had been going on for many centuries.”347 Progressively, “mysteries
associated with divine kingship became available to deceased mortals as royal esoteric
texts and myths were incorporated in the mortuary literature of commoners” as noted by
Edward Wente.348

The pḥ-nṯr Divination Oracle
An Egyptian divination ritual was an opportunity to ask questions of the “gods,” in
Egyptian, the nṯrw, conceived of as active powers or energies in life. By means of an
oracle, statues embodying the powers of the nṯrw could be approached by common
people to answer important questions on matters of health, marriage, and work and to
make judgments in legal matters.349 From the New Kingdom onward, “the primary way
to consult the gods was to appeal to them during their public appearances outside the
temple, either personally or through the mediation of a [ḥry-tp].”350 These public oracles
were known as pḥ-nṯr “the standard expression for an oracular consultation of a divine
statue”351—meaning “god’s arrival” or “reaching god.”352 Gaëlle Tallet describes the pḥnṯr:

347

Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 27.

348

Wente, “Esotericism and Mysticism,” 641.

349

Wilkinson, Complete Gods, 46.

350

Tallet, “Oracles,” 401.

351

Robert K. Ritner, The Mechanics of Ancient Egyptian Magical Practice (Chicago:
Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 1995), 214.

111

The procession of divine statues gave inquirers the opportunity to seek an oracle,
and once the god had ‘approved’ the request, the procession stopped and the
consultation could start. This kind of consultation could work through spoken
address or through the medium of writing, whereby written questions and names
were placed before the god…In oracles, the god is often said to nod his
head…some movement on the part of the priests carrying the shrine would have
been required to…indicate yes or no by moving forwards or backwards.353
Oracles and festivals provide compelling evidence for a prototypical idiom of
personal divinity among non-elites before and during the period of hermetic synthesis: 354
“While the ritual innovations particular to elite classes in Roman Egypt remain a rich
topic for synthetic discussion…it is clear that … practices lay on a continuum across
classes, both in the observance of traditional … and, ultimately, in Christian practices as
well.”355 Since the New Kingdom, oracles had been connected with personal piety
because they were a “privileged mode of direct contact with gods.”356 Public temple
festivals “permitted individuals to enter into direct personal relations with god….”357
Personal piety was exemplified by ritual expressions of intimacy, in Fowden’s
words, “shading into self-identification” with the god.358 Jan Assmann observes: “This
[personal] expression is so typical of the new movement that we can legitimately accord
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it the rank of a self-designation and equate personal piety with ‘giving god into one’s
heart.’”359 A similar sentiment can be seen in a prayer ostracon from Amenophis II: “I
have given you into my heart because you are strong, …[you] protector, behold: I no
longer know fear.”360 Votive offering like these were “placed in the path of the god as he
set out on his procession; thus, individuals could address the god ‘in person’ (that is, his
processional image) without the mediation of cult and state.”361 Though unlikely that
common people attending oracles and festivals would aspire to the level of divinity
attributed to the pharaoh, the notion of continuing a personal relationship with a cult
figure is idiomatic.362
Once divination was prohibited under Roman rule at the end of the second
century,363 pḥ-nṯr practices were “driven underground, becoming instead a private
practice.”364 Like the public oracle, private oracles too expressed personal piety. While
“[i]ntrinsically ‘private’—eliciting answers, revelations, and aid for purely personal
concerns—the [private] oracular procedure was no less sacerdotal…” nor were they less
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an expression of personal piety and intimacy with the gods.365 The story of Thessalos’s
consultation with an Egyptian ḥry-tp is an example of such a private pḥ-nṯr. Ritner
describes it in its private guise:
[T]he most common goal of the procedures…was the direct petition of a god for
revelation, using lamps, bowls, mediums, or dreams. ‘Bowl [ḥeka]’ is attested in
Egypt from the New Kingdom onward, specifically in spells for beholding the
solar bark and the gods of the underworld. The bottoms of shallow bowls are
painted with scenes of the sun god or other deities whom the ritualist intends to
visualize.366
Importantly, the oracular procedures in the Hermetic Papyri Graecae Magicae such as
the “Mithras Liturgy” bear a striking similarity to the pḥ-nṯr. Although private, they
display a ritual tradition rooted in native Egyptian public temple practice.367

The “Mithras Liturgy”
The so-called “Mithras Liturgy” is both oracle and ritual of apathanatismos
(“immortalization,” a feature of personal divinity). This oracular ritual is part of the
“Theban cache” known by scholars since Karl Preisendanz in the early 20th century as the
Papyri Graecae Magicae.368 As a “direct divination,”369 it is a descendent of the New
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Kingdom pḥ-nṯr at home with other Theban cache divination rituals in the Papyri
Graecae Magicae. The name “Mithras Liturgy,” so-called, derives from Albrecht
Dietrich who believed that the text was used in the ancient cult of Mithras, a thesis now
generally dismissed. The more recent translation by Hans Dieter Betz370 suggests
substantial Greek Middle Stoic influence in contrast with Garth Fowden and Robert
Ritner who have ably identified its Egyptian underpinnings.
Addressed to a daughter, a female ritual expert (whose appearance confirms that
women were Hermetic practitioners, a point that has been given surprisingly little
attention by scholars), the ritual structure of the “Mithras Liturgy” consists of a complex
series of “ascension” visualizations taking the operator from the elemental world to
become a “rising star” (“Mithras Liturgy” l.574) passing through the gate of the sun disk
(l.576) into the realm of various gods including seven snake-headed maidens (or tychai,
2.663-673) and seven bull-headed youths (or “pole lords,” 2.674-693), all stellar figures
related to Egyptian cosmology, to consult the god Helios-Mithras.371 Importantly, the
vision of the sun disk here resembles pḥ-nṯr bowl oracles that utilized painted scenes of
the solar Re on the bottom of bowls to aid visualization. The “visualizations” are multisensory which intensified the inner experience rendering a more effective “spiritual
exercise.” The supplicant is exhorted to “see” (in Greek, opse, “you will see,” passim)
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various images but also to feel sensations such as the quaking of thunder (“you will hear
thundering and shaking in the surrounding realm…you will experience yourself being
shaken,” 1.622-3).372
In addition to visualizations and imagined sensations, ritual techniques of the
“Mithras Liturgy” include performative utterances (“I am going to envision with
immortal eyes,” l.516),373 ritual gestures (“at once put your right finger on your mouth,”
l.557),374 words and names of power (the often untranslatable voces magicae, passim),
and breathing (“Draw in breath from the rays three times, drawing in as much as you
can,” l.538).375 Performative utterances include identification with the source of creation
(“Origin of my origin…first beginning of my beginning…,” 2.488-489),376 identification
with the five elements, and identification as a god (“I am PHEROURA MIOURI,”
l.724).377 The visualizations, utterances, and attendant ritual actions reinforced the
practitioners’ sense of being divine. Following the process of self-divinization in the
“Mithras Liturgy” described above, the divination proper begins—but, becoming godlike was a precondition for receiving knowledge of the oracle. Again, in Norman
Russell’s words, “to obtain an oracle directly from the god…can only be done if the
human mind is raised to the level of the divine.”378
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Self-Identification with the God
Garth Fowden observes that “self-identification with a god…is an authentically
Egyptian trait” that can be seen across Egyptian ritual texts from all periods.379 Robert
Ritner explains: “Identification of ritualist…and deity is fundamental to all Egyptian
spells. The pattern is continued without break in the [Papyri Graecae Magicae], where
the expression ‘I am (NN)’ is still usually written in Egyptian as ANOK.”380 The
pharaonic inscription on the statue of thirteenth-century Ramesside Prince Khaemwaset
testifies to the antiquity of the notion: “He [Setne] hath caused thee to become great of
form, he liveth through thee, O god, and thou livest through him.”381 Later, in one Papyri
Graecae Magicae love spell, we find two instances (cited previously) where divine
identity is formed in order to empower the aim of the performer: “For you are I, and I am
you; your name is mine, and mine is yours. For I am your image” and “I know you,
Hermes, and you know me. / I am you, and you are I” (8.37-38, 49-50).382
One example, “Thanksgiving Prayer,” appears in the Papyri Graecae Magicae,
the Corpus Hermeticum, and the Nag Hammadi codices.383 While the “Thanksgiving

379

Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 26. Ritner, "Magical Practice,” 3346.

380

Ritner, "Magical Practice,” 3346-3347. “NN” = “name of the deceased.” “ANOK” =
“I am.” In this example, the practitioner identified with a divine, immortal ancestor.
381

A.W. Shorter, “The statue of Khā’emuas in the British Museum,” in Studies presented
to F. Ll. Griffith (London 1932), 130.
382

Betz, PGM trans. “σὺ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἐγὼ σύ, τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν σόν· ἐγὼ γάρ
εἰμι τὸ εἴδωλόν σου” and “οἶδά σε, Ἑρμῆ, καὶ σὺ ἐμέ. ἐγώ εἰ<μι> σὺ καὶ σὺ ἐγώ.”
383

The discovery of the Nag Hammadi Codices refuted “Festugiere’s contention that
there was no hermetic community and that hermeticism was simply a literary
phenomenon” in Shaw, “Hermetic Rebirth,” 2.
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Prayer” is appended to a ritual in the Papyri Graecae Magicae, the ritual part is omitted
in the Latin Asclepius, again calling into question the line that had been drawn between
technical and philosophical Hermetica (see chapter 2). In the Nag Hammadi version, the
prayer follows a rare Hermetic tractate, similar to the Corpus Hermeticum, but also
includes the trademark voces magicae or vocalic chant of the Papyri Graecae Magicae,
perhaps a surviving bridge between philosophical and technical Hermetic text.384
Scholars have taken this as evidence of “‘a certain amount of sharing between
Hermeticists and the magicians who produced the Greek Magical Papyri.’”385 The
current consensus is that there was considerable overlap. The “Thanksgiving Prayer” also
provides one of the best examples of apathanatismos—self-identification with a god
while still embodied. In its Papyri Graecae Magicae form we find: “We rejoice because
you showed yourself to us; we rejoice because while we are / [still] in bodies you deified
us by the knowledge of who you are” (3.598-601).386 Similarly, in the Latin Asclepius 41:
“And we who are saved387 by your power do indeed rejoice because you have show
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Patricia Cox Miller write about the use of vocalic chant in the PGM in her essay, “In
Praise of Nonsense”: “Clearly the vowels of the alphabet designate that point at which the
human and divine worlds intersect, at least from the perspective of this text. To speak this
language is not only to invoke the God; it is also to sound the depths of one’s own primal
reality. These strings of vowels are hymnic recitations of praise to the God and to human
Godlikeness.” The Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity: Essays in Imagination and
Religion (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2001), 224.
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William Grese, “Magic in Hellenistic Hermeticism,” in Hermeticism and the
Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe, eds. Ingrid
Merkel and Allen G. Debus (Washington: London: Folger Shakespeare Library:
Associated University Presses, 1988), 51-55.
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Betz, PGM trans. “χαίρομ[ε]ν, ὅτι σεαυτὸν ἡμῖν ἔδειξας, χαίρομεν, ὅτι ἐν πλάσμασιν
ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἀπεθέωσας τῇ σεαυτοῦ γνώσει.”
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Salvati in Scott, Hermetica 1, p. 374. Scott offers a line-by-line comparison of the
Greek PGM version with the Latin Asclepius.
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yourself to us wholly. We rejoice that you have deigned to make us gods for eternity even
while we depend on the body.”388 In the Nag Hammadi Codex (6.7) in Coptic (though
probably copied from the Greek), the parallel “Prayer of Thanksgiving” passage reads:
“We rejoice, having been illuminated / by your knowledge. We rejoice / because you
have shown us yourself. We rejoice / because while we were in (the) body, you have
made us / divine through your knowledge.”389 Iamblichus shares a similar understanding
in On the Mysteries, his defense of theurgy and homage to the way of Hermes: “The
benevolent and gracious gods shine their light generously on theurgists, calling their
souls up to themselves, giving them unification, and accustoming them, while they are
still in their bodies, to be detached from their bodies and turned to their eternal and noetic
principle” (1.12).390 The many examples of embodied personal divinity in our sources
point to a basic precept in the Egyptian imagination.

Conclusion
To access and understand the privileged knowledge the oracle provides, the
practitioner must become like the source of the oracle in perspective. You must become
godlike. Through a series of visualizations, ritual actions, and performative utterances—
notably, an explicit statement of self-identification with a god, the practitioner of ḥeka
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Copenhaver, trans. “Gaudemus quod te nobis ostenderis totum, gaudemus quod nos in
corporibus sitos aeternitate <tua> fueris consecrare dignatus.” Copenhaver suggests
that consecrare indicates the “diffidence of the Latin translator about apotheosis,” 260.
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Brashler, trans.
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Shaw, trans. “οἱ θεοὶ τὸ φῶς ἐπιλάμπουσιν εὐμενεῖς ὄντες καὶ ἵλεῳ τοῖς θεουργοῖς, τάς
τε ψυχὰς αὐτῶν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνακαλούμενοι καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐταῖς τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς
χορηγοῦντες, ἐθίζοντές τε αὐτὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐν σώματι οὔσας ἀφίστασθαι τῶν σωμάτων, ἐπὶ δὲ
τὴν ἀίδιον καὶ νοητὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν περιάγεσθαι.”
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identifies as divine and therefore assumes the ability to understand the privileged
knowledge about to be received. This is achieved through self-identification with the
oracle’s nṯrw.
While the self-identification with the god in the “Mithras Liturgy” is explicit,
self-identification with the nṯrw in the earlier public festival pḥ-nṯr oracles is implicit, by
virtue of personal piety. The intimacy of the personal relationship that “shades into selfidentification” through word, visualization, or offering—whereby the deity is understood
to reside “within the heart” as we saw on the prayer ostracon—is a participation, a form
of sharing the powers of the deity by internalizing those powers. Public ritual has a
personal, inner aspect. The tendency toward using self-identification with a god while
embodied as a technology of self—apathanatismos—in traditional Egyptian temple
thought and cultic practice becomes fully expressed in the Hermetica, an innovation later
adopted by Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and Iamblichus who aligned themselves with
Egyptian intellection tradition.
We have fully explored the imaginal mechanism—spiritual or imaginative
technologies of self-transformation—in previous chapters. With all his emphasis on the
“error” of idolatry, Augustine seems anxiously unaware that the Hermetists who were
“making gods” (De civitate Dei 8.23) were also making themselves into gods. Although
Augustine cites the Latin Asclepius at length, but he does not bring the following line to
our attention: “Not only is he god he also creates gods.”391 From the point of view of the
Hermetists, “[t]his human fashioning of the earthly gods far from diminishing their

391

Cf. Nag Hammadi Codex 6.8 and Asclep. 23. See Copenhaver, Hermetica, 80; The
Nag Hammadi Library in English, edited by James M. Robinson and Richard Smith (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 333.
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stature only points to the divine nature of human beings themselves.”392 The Hermetists
held that a person, through philosophical practice and ritual enactments, could achieve
apathanatismos, could become immortal and divine while still in a body. But the source
of this perspective on the self “was probably not earlier Greek philosophical schools, but
such Egyptian ḥry-tpw as Chaeremon, Anebo, Bitys, or Orion, as expressly claimed by
the Neoplatonists themselves.”393
A late fifth-century Egyptian teacher at an elite Alexandria philosophical school,
surely familiar with the Hermetica,,394 expressed traditional Egyptian popular cultic piety
when he “went out to an Isis temple in the village of Menouthis for assistance in
procreation.”395 His understanding of apathanatismos as the aim of the Mithras oracle
was similar to his understanding of the pḥ-nṯr with Isis: the purpose in both cases was “to
obtain an oracle directly from the god, which can only be done if the human mind is
raised to the level of the divine.”396 That fashioning of personal divinity—a sacred self—
occurs through an imaginative exercise of self-transformation placed upon an inner
landscape of cosmic proportions.
Let us return to Thessalos, our Greek doctor who sought Egyptian wisdom. He
won his direct divination with Asclepius but he doesn’t tell us exactly how the direct
divination was performed except that he was “led through the god’s secret names”—
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Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 47.
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ḥry-tpw is the plural form. Ritner, “Magical Practice,” 3371.
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presumably a series of voces magicae (Thessalos l. 23).397 But we might know a little
more.
After the main part of the “Mithras Liturgy” oracle ends, optional variations on
the rite are provided that involve additional participants: “[I]f you wish to show [another],
after you judge whether his worth as a man is secure, handling the occasion as though in
the immortalization ritual you yourself were being judged in his place, recite for him the
first prayer, of which the beginning is “First origin of my origin…[a]nd say the
successive things…over his head, in a soft voice, so that he many not hear…” (2.739747).398
It is quite likely that Thessalos’s Egyptian ḥry-tp took this option—being
uncomfortable with the alien Thessalos’s bold wish for a direct divination and with the
danger involved in performing an illegal act—instead himself performing the prerequisite
self-divinization—using a rite similar to the “Mithras Liturgy” on behalf of his client.399
But, Thessalos seems to have secured a bit of divinity for himself as well. Left alone in
the room, Asclepius says to him: “Oh blessed Thessalos, attaining honour in the presence
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Friedrich, trans. “προαγαγὼν διὰ τῶν ἀπορρήτων ὀνομάτων τὸν θεὸν.”
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Betz, ML trans. “ὡς σὺ ὑπὲρ αὺτοῦ χρινόμενος ἐν τῶ ὰπαθανατισμῶ.”
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J.Z. Smith argues against the standard interpretation that the priests’ hesitance to meet
Thessalos’ demand for a “face to face” encounter with the deity: “The propeteia of
Thessalos does not consist of his inquiry into a forbidden subject which, if exposed,
might make the priests liable to prosecution; rather it is his faith in the continued efficacy
of magic itself—a faith which the priests had evidently lost.” Smith, Map, 179.
Interestingly, Thessalos’ rash demand, monos pros monon (“face to face”), recalls similar
phrases in Neoplatonic theurgy. See Plotinus, Ennead, 6.9.11; Porphyry, De abstinentia,
2.49; Proclus, In Timaeus, 1.212, 24; et cetera.
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of the god. As time passes, when your successes become known, men will worship you as
a god” (Thessalos 1. 25).400

400

Friedrich, trans. “ὦ μακάριε παρὰ θεῷ τυχὼν τιμῆς θεσσαλέ, προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου
καὶ γνωσθέντων τῶν σῶν ἐπιτευγμάτων ὡς θεὸν ἄνθρωποί σε θρησκεύ<σ>ουσιν.”
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CHAPTER 4
THE PHILOSOPHER IN LATE ANTIQUE ALEXANDRIA
This chapter will present a “snapshot” of the intellectual and social life of the late
antique Neoplatonic classroom by focusing on one moment recalled in the sources below
concerning the family of Horapollon and an incident involving the student Paralius.
There is much more that could be said about the social life of the Neoplatonists. Richard
Lim’s work on public disputation in late antiquity offers an important qualification for
my history of ideas approach particularly in regard to the theme of the Neoplatonic and
Hermetic pursuit of a “noesis” beyond “logos” that appears throughout this dissertation.
Lim argues that late antiquity heralded a devaluation of dialectic as a method for arriving
at truth and legitimizing authority. He writes:
An intensified advocacy for apophatic simplicity as a paradigmatic virtue was but
one of the many results of this confluence of competing interests. Many
individuals and groups sought to domesticate the perceived threat of dissensus in
public disputing, choosing from various ideological strategies and cultural values
to mobilize hierarchical form of authority against a culture that validated
individualistic claims and rational argumentation.401
In this chapter, I hope to strike a balance between reading the sources for the experiences
they may have engendered (i.e. personal divinity) and presenting something close to an
emblematic portrayal of the life of the philosophers—Neoplatonic and Hermetic descents
of the ḥry-tp discussed in chapter 3—in late antiquity on the ground.402
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Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 33.
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Robert Lamburton offers an example of reading the Neoplatonists not only for their
philosophical value but for what they tell us about daily life in the past: “The Life of
Plotinus provides important support for the notion that students of philosophy typically
shopped around, listening to teacher after teacher in one center of learning, and then in
some cases moving on to other centers. There is little doubt that, by the year 300, this sort
of philosophical odyssey of inquiry had become a topos, a frequently repeated motif
suitable to the characterization of the restless, young intellectual in his thirst for
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In the 460s, despite a history of occasional persecution--mostly notably the attack
on the Serapeum in 391 and the murder of Hypatia in 415—Neoplatonism was “a
generally accepted way of thinking and living in the Eastern Mediterranean; moreover, as
epitomized by Proclus and Athens, it was a recognizably Greek way.”403 Yet, from its
Alexandrian beginnings it incorporated cult practices of Hellenized Egypt and Syria in
tandem with the ideas and prescriptions of Plato and Pythagoras. Adherents considered
Neoplatonism, in the words of Hierocles, the “purified philosophy of Plato.”404
Neoplatonism was more than a literary tradition reinvented in the Second Sophistic for
elite imperial unity as the rhetoricians and grammarians in Alexandria might have led
their Christian students to believe.

The Family of Horapollon
The Alexandrian teacher Horapollon is an interesting case who opens doors to a
further consideration of resilient heritages, continuities, cultural exchange, and strategies
of resistance. Until recently scholarship on the effect of Hellenism on Egypt has been
viewed reductively as “colonizer versus colonized.” More recently scholars have begun
to consider a more complicated encounter where native constituencies appropriated
elements of Hellenism to form a “subtle interpenetration” in order to maintain a cultural
identity distinct from Hellenism (see chapter 3 for detailed discussion of Greek and

knowledge and truth.” Robert Lamberton, “The Schools of Platonic Philosophy of the
Roman Empire: The Evidence of the Biographies,” in Education in Greek and Roman
Antiquity, ed. Yun Lee Too, Leiden: Brill, 2001), 438.
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Fowden, “Pagan Holy Man,” 33.
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Egyptian interactions).405 Assimilation has two sides. The “other” native cultural identity-the Egyptian priest-philosopher (or ḥry-tp, see chapter 3)—became romanticized,
endowed with “alien wisdom.” On the other hand, especially in Roman times, it was
feared for its “potential to subvert society and cosmos.”406
Horapollon himself emphasized the Hellenistic culture of his upbringing, but
Damascius describes his father Asclepiades and uncle Heraiscus “earnestly pursuing
the…traditions of their [native Egyptian] heritage with religious passion….” (Isidori, fr.
174).407 Like many families of the fourth century tied to temple cult, Horapollon’s
attempted to preserve Egyptian cultural identity while gaining stature as Hellenic
intellectuals. The Corpus Hermeticum, material that would have been well known to
Horapollon and the Alexandrian Neoplatonists, is heir to at least some Egyptian esoteric
teachings. Garth Fowden has argued:
Our philosophical texts imply an actual historical milieu that was dedicated to the
spiritual life. Instruction and initiation were group experiences, even when at the
highest levels, they involved only the spiritual guide and a solitary pupil; and
those who participated in these encounters instinctively expressed their solidarity
and joy through prayer and hymnody, and in such comradely gestures as
embraces and the sharing of food.408
While the tone of the Corpus Hermeticum is overwhelmingly contemplative and
dialectic, it also has some philological connections with the theurgic Papyri Graecae
Magicae of the same era. Horapollon, Heraiscus, and Asclepiades can be seen to
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negotiate the intersection between Hellenic and Egyptian intellectual traditions and
identities evident in Alexandrian Neoplatonism and Graeco-Egyptian Hermeticism.
Horapollon shared a complex at Kom el-Dikka in Alexandria with his father and
uncle as well as with other notable Neoplatonist teachers including Ammonius Hermiae,
Isidore, and Asclepiodotus. Watts imagines lively halls providing a stage for
interscholastic rivalry where traditionally-minded students “could argue that Plato agreed
with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world, [while] Christian students
could counter that Plato’s Timaeus seems to say very much the opposite,” where
traditional cultists would talk about “trips to the shrine of Isis in Menouthis, [while]
Christians [would speak] of miraculous cures at the shrine of St. Cyrus.”409 Nonetheless,
the vibrant heterogeneity of the Neoplatonic classroom and, perhaps, the growing
exuberance of Horapollon’s interest in traditional cult, proved too much for the young
Paralius, a new student from Aphrodisius sent to be groomed, most likely, for an imperial
post. After an unsatisfying encounter at the suburban Menouthis shrine of Isis, Paralius
broke the taboo against disloyalty to alma mater and is beaten by his peers. Zacharaias, a
leading anti-Chalcedonian monk at Enaton aided by “schoolyard evangelicals”—
philoponoi—recast the “punishment of an obnoxious teenager into a religious
persecution.”410 Hearing the complaint, Patriarch Peter Mongus seized the opportunity to
heal a long “confessional dissonance” with Enaton by inciting an anti-pagan riot in 486
CE that led to the sacking of the Isis shrine. Horapollon fled temporarily with aid of
praefectus Entrechius; Neoplatonic headmaster Ammonius Hermiae agreed to curtail
409

Edward Jay Watts, Riot in Alexandria: Tradition and Group Dynamics in Late
Antique Pagan and Christian Communities (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2010), 8.
410

Watts, Riot in Alexandria, 11.
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religious instruction, end ritual sacrifice, and remove the theurgic Chaldean Oracles from
the curriculum.411

A Philosophical History
Damascius (458 – after 538), the last scholarch of the Neoplatonic school in
Athens, composed the Life of Isidore during the first quarter of the sixth century after he
had become head of the Academy. An “irreverent hagiography,” it describes the
intellectual elite in Athens, Alexandria, and Aphrodisias in the tradition of Neoplatonic
aretalogies.412 Horapollon’s grandfather, Horapollon the Elder, was a cosmopolitan and
thoroughly Hellenic intellectual who embraced the Classical canon at the Alexandria
mouseia.413 Damascius describes the elder’s sons, the divine Heraiscus and erudite
Asclepiades, as more interested in reviving an alternative “Egyptian canon” in the context
of Iamblichan theurgy: “But by nature Heraiscus had a more godlike form in appearance,
but the one who was more knowledgeable and skillful in the wisdom of the Egyptians
(was) Asclepiades, because the latter had been spending so much time studying Egyptian
wisdom” (Damascius, Vita Isidori, fr. 161).414 Heraiscus explored sacred spaces and rites:
“and his soul on every occasion dwelt in holy sanctuaries of initiation, practicing not only
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My trans. “τὴν μὲν φύσιν θεοειδέστερος ἦν Ἡραί̈σκος, ὁ δὲ τὴν Αἰγυπτίων σοφίαν
δαημονέστερος, ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης, ἅτε τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὗτος μὲν τῇ Αἰγυπτίων
προσδιατρίβων.”

128

his native rites in Egypt but also those of the other (nations)” (fr. 174).415 Heraiscus was
known for his spiritual discernment: “Heraiscus had a natural ability for distinguishing
between sacred statues that were living and those that were not. For just as he saw one,
his heart was struck with divine power and he was startled in body and soul, as though
fallen upon by the god” (fr. 174).416
Asclepiades, on the other hand, “reared himself more in the Egyptian books [and]
was more precisely informed of their native theology” (fr. 161).417 In the spirit of
Neoplatonic ecumenism, he sought a “harmony of all discourses about the gods” (fr.
161)418 and “wrote a treatise encompassing the knowledge of the primeval Egyptians” (fr.
161).419 Damascius was familiar with the written work of Heraiscus and Asclepiades. He
understood the Egyptian convention of dividing the cosmos into traits of many gods as a
intellectual gift to the Neoplatonists: “[I]t is possible for those who wish to learn by
reading their writings, and I speak of the written work of Heraiscus concerning the
Egyptian teaching in general (that was) written for Proclus the philosopher, and that of
the Egyptians with the other theologians that was begun to be written by Asclepiades”
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My trans. “ἐν ἀδύτοις ἑκάστοτε καὶ τελεστήριον ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, οὔτι κατ'
Αἴγυπτον μόνην κινοῦντι τὰς πατρίους τελετάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀλλοδαπῆς.”
416

My trans. “Ἡραῖσκος αὐτοφυὴς ἐγένετο διαγνώμων τῶν τε ζώντων καὶ τῶν μὴ ζώντων
ἱερῶν ἀγαλμάτων. εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐμβλέπων ἐτιτρώσκετο τὴν καρδίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θειασμοῦ καὶ
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ἦν ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πάτριον.”
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My trans. “τῶν θεολογιῶν ἁπασῶν τὴν συμφωνίαν.”
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My trans. “καὶ συγγραφὴν δὲ ἔγραψεν Αἰγυπτίων ὠγυγίων πράγματα περιέχουσαν.”
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(Damascius, De Principiis 3.3).420 When Heraiscus died, Asclepiades, who had some
knowledge of traditional funerary rites, prepared the body with a shroud when “at once
hieroglyphs shone with light on all over the cloth, and around them were seen apparitions
befitting a god.” (Damascius, Vita Isidori, fr. 174).421 On the miraculous circumstances of
his birth appropriate to a Neoplatonic saint: “[H]e is said to have been born from his
mother holding the silencing finger up to his lips, like the Egyptians tell in the sacred
story about Oros [Horus] and before Oros about Helios” (fr.174).422 The Hellenized
“Oros” descends from the child form of the Egyptian sun god Horus, becoming
Harpocrates in the Hellenistic period. Harpocrates is often portrayed with a finger in his
mouth.423 The allusion to the Egyptian “Opening of the Mouth” ceremony used to
“animate” devotional statuary, would have been obvious to the Egyptian theurgists.424
Horapollon does not fare as well as his father and uncle in Damascius’ view.
Heraiscus had predicted that Horapollon would eventually convert to Christianity:
“Horapollon did not have the character of a philosopher, but kept hidden the notion about
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My trans. “ὠς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχοῦσι τοῖσ βοθλομένοις, λέγω
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Ὡρου τὸν Ἥλιον.”
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Function of the ntrwj-Blades,” The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology v. 79 (1993): 57-79.
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God that he held” (fr. 314, 317).425 In the Syriac Life of Severus, Zacharias Scholasticus
introduces Horapollon as a grammarian, “a man who was a specialist in his art and a
splendid teacher” but “also a pagan, bewildered by demons and magic” (15).426 Just
before Paralius led the mob to sack the Menouthis shrine, Horapollon escaped
temporarily.427 Zacharias describes the astonishment of the pagans when the Christians
survived the night without divine retribution (32).428 Soon afterward, “all the people of
Alexandria, at the time of gathering for service, were shouting many words against the
“pagans” and against Horapollon, that he should not be called Horapollon but
‘Psychepollon,’ which means ‘destroyer of souls.’” (32).429
The year of the riot Bishop Peter Mongus succeeded in closing down
Horapollon’s school of rhetoric in all of its real or supposed theurgic frenzy. The
425

My translation. “ὁ δὲ Ὡραπόλλων οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἦθος φιλόσοφος, ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐν βυθῷ τῆς
περὶ θεοῦ δόξης ὧν ᾔδει ἀποκρυπτόμενος.”
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Alan Cameron criticizes scholars who argue that an organized “pagan resistance”
existed in late antique Christian Egypt. See appendix C. The misunderstanding, in his
view, is based on a reading of sources like Damascius’ Life of Isidore and Zacharias
Scholasticus’ biography of Bishop Severus of Antioch. Although he acknowledges
Syranius’ statement (“One could call us fighters since we defend the best and most
beautiful of philosophies from the charges brought against it,” Metaphysica 91.8), he also
points out that the Neoplatonists were as antagonistic with their philosophical colleagues
as Christian thinkers. Acknowledging the survival of traditional pre-Christina thought
and cult in late antiquity, he still questions interpretations that equate survival with
resistance. In his view, too much credence is given to the testimony of Paralius in
Zacharias. He argues that the “paganism” of the poets (and philosophers) that seemed to
“flower” in a Christianized late antique Egypt is more literary than cultic. Christian
fanatics, he claims, were unable to tell the difference between cult statues and
mythological art, and were “probably raiding the sculpture gardens of well-to-do
Christians.” Wandering poets and other essays on late Greek literature and philosophy
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 160.
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grammarian was arrested with his uncle Heraiscus and tortured by Nicodemes, a Roman
Christian Praetorian prefect under Emperor Zeno. When they were released, Horapollon
left Alexandria and Heraiscus went into hiding in the house of a Christian doctor named
Gessius where he fell ill and died. Asclepiades joined him shortly thereafter.430
Horapollon returned to Alexandria to take over the school after having accepted
Christianity. Such was the fate of these “Hellenizing priests who gave the cities’
philosophers the illusion of continuity with an Egyptian religious ‘essence.’”431 But, was
it an illusion? Let us now turn to the Egyptianizing elements in Neoplatonist writings as
well as the Hermetic texts said to be the product of Egyptian “priest-philosophers.”

Representing Egypt
The Pythagorean tradition “laid great emphasis on the sage’s duty both to honor
the gods himself, and to ensure that the public cults were conducted in a fit and becoming
manner.”432 In On Isis and Osiris, Plutarch writes that Pythagoras learned the use of
symbols from Egypt.433 Plato in Timaeus and Phaedrus demonstrated high esteem for the
oral wisdom of the Egyptians. The Egyptian Plotinus considered hieroglyphs to be
evidence of a parallel, if not original, theory of Platonic Forms: “[B]y drawing devotional
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Mark Edwards, trans., Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their
Students (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000): 68.
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images and inscribing in their temples one image to each thing, they created a way of
understanding” (Porphyry, Vita Plotini 5.8.6).434
Damascius also portrayed the Egyptians as seminal contributors to Neoplatonism:
“Egyptian philosophers in our own day have discovered and brought out the truth hidden.
in certain Egyptian understandings, so that with them the unique principle of the all (One)
was celebrated as unknowable darkness.” (Damascius, De Principiis 17.124.4).435
Writing in the guise of an Egyptian ḥry-tp in On the Mysteries, Iamblichus responds to an
attack from Porphyry. He “allies himself with the ancient holy ranks of the Egyptian
caste, and reminds us of the tradition that the Greek philosophers (including Pythagoras,
Plato, Democritus, Eudoxus and ‘many others’) first learnt their wisdom from the
Egyptians.”436 Defending his theurgical innovation, Iamblichus responds:
First, I would like to interpret to you the type of theology (used by) the Egyptians.
For these people, imitating the nature of the universe and the demiurgic power of
the gods, display certain signs of mystical, arcane and invisible notions by means
of symbols, just as nature copies the unseen principles in visible forms through
some mode of symbolism, and the creative activity of the gods shows the truth of
the forms in visible signs (Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 7.1).437
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Hadot, trans. “ἀγὰλματα δὲ γράψαντες καὶ ἒν ἑκαστον εκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα
ἐντυπώσαντες ἔν τοῖς ἴεροῖς τὴν ἔκείνου οὐ διέξοδον ὲμφῆναι.”
435

Ahbel-Rappe, trans. “οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες ἐξένεγκαν αὐτῶν
τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην εὑρόντες ἐν αἰγύπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις, ὡς εἴη κατ᾽αὐτοὺς ἠ μέν |
μία τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴ Σκότος ἂγνωστον ὐμνοθμέν.”
436

Emma C. Clarke, Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis: A Manifesto of the Miraculous
(Aldershot, Burlington, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 2001): 8.
437

My trans. “πρότερον δέ βούλομαι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων τὸν τρόπον τῆς θεολογίας
διερμηνεῦσαι. ὅτοι γὰρ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν | τῶν θεῶν μιμούμενοι
καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μθστικῶν και ἀποκεκρυμμένων καὶ ἀφανῶν νοήσεων εἰκόνας διὰ συμβόλων
ἐκφαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ χαὶ ἠ φύσις τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν εἴδσι τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λόγους διὰ συμβόλων
τρόπον τινὰ ἀπετυπώσατο, ἡ δὲ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργία τὴν ἀληθειαν τῶν ἰδεῶν διὰ τῶν
φανερῶν εἰκόνων ὐπεγράφατο.”
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Iamblichus’s idea that theurgy was needed to surpass the limits of purely philosophical
thinking was a break from Porphyry and Plotinus. Eunapius of Sardis (ca. 349 – after
414) uses the term “theurgy” in his Lives of the Philosophers where he presents it as a
branch of the paideia of a philosopher. Referring to Porphyry’s accomplishments,
Eunapius includes “theurgic rites” (Vitai Sophistarum 6.2, 2-3).438 Damascius considered
Iamblichus an “innovator,” but with some reservations. To many within and beyond
Neoplatonist circles, Iamblichus’s emphasis on Egyptian, Orphic, and Chaldean cultic
practice appeared to verge on illicit magia even though it was a reasonable extension of
Hellenic ecumenism. Using the symbols that the gods have embedded in the world, the
Iamblichan theurgist “made use many of the invocations, including voces magicae, and
many of the materials, of the ‘vulgar’ … but he [used] them with a proper understanding
of how they work.”439 While, “deference to Egyptian wisdom [...] was already a topos in
the Platonic dialogues where ‘Egypt’ functioned as an ideal culture against which Plato
measured his own,” Iamblichus’s “Egyptomania” has been overstated.440 Iamblichan
theurgy, especially translated and adapted by Alexandrian teachers like Horapollon,
probably did reflect genuine Egyptian cult practices.
I will turn my attention now briefly to examples from the Corpus Hermeticum and
Papyri Graecae Magicae that suggest at least a bidirectional influence. The following
excerpt from a spell clearly borrows from the “thanksgiving” or “spiritual sacrifices”
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My trans. “θεουργὸν τελεταῖς.”
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Dillon, “Iamblichus,” 35.
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Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995): 238-239.
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found in the Corpus Hermeticum, the Nag Hammadi codices, and both Neoplatonic and
Christian discourse. It also mirrors Neoplatonism’s concern with incorporate salvation:
“We give you thanks to you, psyche, with each heart stretched out to you,
unutterable name honored by the addressing of god and blessed by the holiness of
god, for to everyone and to everything you have been fatherly / goodwill,
affection, friendship and sweetest power, give us charisma of mind, speech,
knowledge; intellect so that we might understand you, speech so that we might
call upon you, knowledge so that we might know you. We rejoice because you
showed yourself to us; we rejoice because while we are / presently embodied you
deified us by the knowledge of yourself” (Papyri Graecae Magicae 3.591-601).441
Another example from the Corpus Hermeticum portrays a student of the GraecoRoman hybrid Thoth-Hermes or Hermes Trismegistus, who ironically warns his reader
about the deficiencies of the Greek language in expressing Egyptian wisdom:
“[I]t will be more obscure (he explained) when the Greeks later desire to
translate our language to their own and thus produce in writing the greatest
distortion and obscurity. But this discourse, expressed in our paternal
language, keeps clear the meaning of the words. The making of the sound
of Egyptian words have in themselves the energy of the objects they speak
of” (Corpus Hermeticum 16.1-2).442
Greek readers would find reinforcement of the idea of a deeper Egyptian source in
Neoplatonism. These texts served to authorize and sacralize the Egyptian philosopher as
well as the broader Neoplatonic intellectual community.
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My trans. “χάριν σοι οἴδαμεν, ψυχῆ, κατὰ καρδίαν πρὸς σὲ ἀνατεταμένεν, ὄνομα
τετιμημένον | τῆ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορία καὶ εὐλογούμενον τῆ τοῦ | θεοῦ ὀσιότητι, ἦ πρὸς
πάντας καὶ πρὸς πάντα πατρικὴν || εὔνοιαν καὶ στοργήν καὶ φιλίαω καὶ ἐπιγλυκυτά|την
ἐνέργειαν εδείξω, χαρισάμενος ἠμῖν νοῦν, | λόγον, γνῶσιν. νοῦν μέν, ἵνα σε νοήσωμεν,
λόγον | δέ, ἵνα σε ἐπικαλέσωμεν, γνῶσιν, ἵνα σε ἐπιγνῶ|σωμεν. χαίρομεν, ὅτι ἐν πλάσμασιν
ἠμᾶς ὄντας ἀπεθέωσας τῆ σεαυτοῦ γνώσει.”
442

My trans. “καὶ ἔτι άσαφεστέρα (φανήσεται) τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον βοθληθέντων τὴν
ἠμετέραν διάλεκτον εἰσ τὴν ἰδίαν μεθερμηνεῦσαι, ὅπερ ἔσται τῶν γεγραμμένων μεγίστη
διαστροφή τε καὶ ἀσάφεια. ὁ δὲ λὀγος τῆ πατρώα διαλέκτω ἑρμηνεθόμενος ἔχει σαφῆ τὸν
τῶν λόγων νοῦν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ποιὸν…καὶ ἠ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων δύναμις ἐν ἑαυτῆ
ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν λεγομένων.”
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After the Riot
The Alexandrian philosopher would eventually become a casualty of Christian
aggression. Horapollon became Christian. Damascius despises Horapollon for his
“conversion” (under torture) but perhaps, as Athanassiadi suggests, this once “combative
spirit had been worn away by a psychological war of attrition which lasted too long.”443
His uncle Heraiscus, who had raised him, was dead. His father and teacher also. His wife
took the household goods and departed with her lover. Perhaps, the “fortunes of his
professional and domestic life thus seemed to combine against any hope of peace and
happiness.”444 The vitality of fifth century Alexandrian Neoplatonism was, in part, “the
expected product of a world which had endorsed intolerance.”445 While a self-serving
“bricolage” and a nostalgic grasp at recalling an earlier authority was surely at play, the
material that the ecumenical intellectuals had at their disposal in Egypt—as heirs to
traditional cultic thought—was also at hand. At the very least, the family of Horapollon
worked to expand the preexisting Egyptianizing elements in Neoplatonism as well as its
practical application through theurgic ritual.
Just as we see new ideological movements invoking authentic pasts,
Neoplatonists like Horapollon appropriated the language, rituals, and monuments of
traditional Egyptian cult to bolster the sense of authenticity and authority of their
“theosophy” and in opposition to Christianity. Identity connects as much as it
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differentiates, it depends on “others” and responds to them.446 More than a narrative
constituent in a literary world, the material and documentary record portrays identity as
negotiable currency in social power relationships.447 Through the choices and actions of
Horapollon and his family, Alexandria, ‘the city of foreigners’, for a short time may have
been “vindicated in Egyptian eyes and was even viewed as the very epitome of
Egyptianism.”448
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CHAPTER 5
ISIS, THE CULTUS OF SELF, AND THE GENIUS OF APULEIUS
Shortly after his initiation as a priest of Isis, Lucius speaks these words to the
goddess: “I shall store your divine countenance and sacred godhead in the secret places of
my heart, forever guarding it and picturing it to myself” Intra pectoris mei secreta, “the
secret places of my heart” (Apuleius, Metamorphoses 11.25). The word “secret” derives
from the Latin secerno, meaning that which has been “set apart.” Lucius “sets apart” his
heart, his deepest knowing. This line roundly echoes the words that Isis imparted in the
dream vision promising Lucius “salvation” from his asinine fate: “You will clearly
remember and keep forever sealed deep in your heart the fact that the rest of your life’s
course is pledged to me until the very limit of your last breath.” Penita mente, “deep in
your heart,” which can also be rendered as “in the innermost part of the mind” (11.6).
When we read The god of Socrates, these secret places of the heart, these innermost parts
of the mind—claimed by the goddess in Metamorphoses—shift slightly in meaning and
location.
This chapter explores how Apuleius’s philosophical work, The god of Socrates,
informs his portrayal of the Isis Cult in his second-century Latin novel, Metamorphoses.
In doing so, I hope to complicate our understanding of the Isis cult as portrayed in
Metamorphoses and to offer some thoughts about the construction of the “sacred power”
and what I am calling the “sacred self,” arguing that the self is the source of sacred power
to achieve personal divinity in Metamorphoses even though it appears that Isis is that
source.
To some extent, this will be a Platonic reading of Apuleius’s novel, a point of
view that a number of scholars beginning with Filippo Beroaldo in the 14th century and
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more recently, Thibau, DeFilippo, Moreschini, Dillon, Schlam, and Walsh to name a
few—have entertained, at least to some extent, particularly in regard to the embedded
“Cupid and Psyche” tale in Books 4 through 6.449 Acknowledging the Platonic themes at
play, Nancy Shumate writes: “The well-documented syncretistic tendencies of the age
make a fusion of Platonic philosophy and Isiac religion not at all strange in a text from
the imperial period; Plutarch’s treatise On Isis and Osiris makes this very clear.”450
Recently Friedmann Drews offers a Platonic reading using Apuleius’s “daemonology”
from The god of Socrates to explain the problem of the relationship between the Isis and
Osiris initiations in Book 11, the so-called “Isis Book.”451 What hasn’t been done is to
apply Apuleius’s daemonology—in particular his theory of the personal daemon—to the
revelation of Isis. This application of “daemon” theory is not arbitrary in my reading.
Rather Metamorphoses explicitly invites it. I bring four modern perspectives into play in
order to suggest another way to think about the role of selves in the construction of the
“sacred” that helps us understand how Late Antique people became divine.
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The God of Socrates
In The god of Socrates, Apuleius elaborates on Plato’s idea of the daimonion (in
Latin, daemon), the personal divine voice or guardian that advised Socrates, a favorite
topic of writers of the Greek Second Sophistic. Apuleius lays out a taxonomy of being
consisting of the “highest, intermediate, and lowest” (Apuleius, De deo Socrates 115), the
highest status reserved for the immortal gods and the lowest for humans. The
intermediate beings are daemones: intermediary powers, beings in substance and
habitation somewhere between gods and humans, closer to the air.452 Their job is to
deliver prayers to the gods. These more or less invisible beings have “no earthy solidity
which can occupy the field of our vision…the rays of our gaze are let through by their
loose texture” (144).453 Active imagination is required to “see” them: “Come then, let us
shape in our minds and imaginatively create a kind of bodily texture…” (140).454
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In his study on the matter, physics, and biology of demons in late antiquity, Gregory
A. Smith notes: “Being invisible is also not the same as being a metaphor.” “How Thin is
a Demon?” Journal of Early Christian Studies 16.4 (2008): 482.
453

Harrison, trans. “quod nulla in illis terrena soliditas locum luminis occuparit, quae
nostris oculis possit obsistere, qua soliditate necessario offensa acies inmoretur, sed fila
corporum possident rara et splendida et tenuia usque adeo ut radios omnis nostri tuoris
et raritate transmittant et splendore reverberent et subtilitate frustrentur.”
454

Harrison, trans. “Cedo igitur mente formemus et gignamus animo id genus corporum
texta.” Interestingly, Gregory A. Smith comments: “Demons with superfine bodies fit but
poorly into a cosmos supposedly characterized by a sharp or even ‘dualistic’ opposition
between lifeless matter and pure spirit. Indeed, it is time to abandon the label ‘dualist’
altogether, especially if incautiously used in the context of material things. Among other
dangers, assuming a dualistic framework makes it far too easy to assume that invisible
things were conceived as (merely) mental things, in the Cartesian sense: internal or
imagined things, devoid of spatial extension, products or objects of pure thought. In
short, dualism makes it far too easy to reduce ancient demons to a metaphor, or to restrict
oneself to the psychological, wholly internalized, readings” “How Thin is a Demon?,”
489. See my chapter 1 for how active imagination in the ancient sense differs from a
modern “psychological, wholly internalized” sense.
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However, there is another class of daemones that concerns us here. Apuleius
compares them to the Latin genii: “You could call the daemon a ‘Genius’, since that
particular type of divinity, identical with the mind of each and every person, is (though
itself immortal) nevertheless born in some sense together with a human being” (151).455
More importantly, Apuleius describes the daemon as the “human mind (animus humanus)
itself, even while still located in the body” (150).456 It dwells “in the inmost sanctum of
the human mind in the function of consciousness itself” (156).457 The daemon seems
curiosus, inspecting “everything with close attention” (155), for one “can have no secrets
(secreti) before these guardians” (155).458 Though curious indeed, the daemonic self
desires the Platonic “Good”: “The virtuous desire of the mind (bona cupido animi) is also
a good god (bonus deus)” (150).459 Still in keeping with the general view of
Metamorphoses’ moral timbre, the human can be the curiosus as long as he or she desires
the authorized virtue of Plato and Plutarch. But, how do we locate authorized virtue? Is it
a philosophical or theological abstraction or an internally negotiated configuration of the
self? Before launching into these questions, let us briefly revisit the tale of Lucius on the
eve of his quest for salvation.
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Harrison, trans. “poteris ‘genium’ vocare, quod is deus, qui est animus sui cuique,
quamquam sit immortalis, tamen quodam modo cum homine gignitur.”
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Harrison, trans. “Nam quodam significatu et animus humanus etiam nunc in corpore
situs daemon nuncupatur.”
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Harrison, trans. “in ipsis penitissimis mentibus vice conscientiae deversetur.”
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Harrison, trans. “quin omnia curiose ille participet; omnia visitet, omnia intellegat”
and “ut sciatis nihil homini prae istis custodibus nec intra animum nec foris esse secreti.”
459

Harrison, trans. “Igitur et bona cupido animi bonus deus est. Unde nonnulli
arbitrantur, ut iam prius dictum est, “eudaemonas” dici beatos, quorum daemon bonus.”
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The Tale
On his way to Thessaly, a region in Greece known for its secrets, Lucius
overhears a conversation between fellow travelers about a saga or “wise woman” named
Meroe who “can lower the sky and suspend the earth, solidify fountains and dissolve
mountains, raise up ghosts and bring down gods, darken the stars and light up Tartarus
itself” (Apuleius, Metamorphoses 1.8).460 He describes himself to the travelers as “the
sort who wants to know everything, or at least most things” (1.2).461 Aristomenes obliges
with an unusual account of his own “present inquisitiveness [instans curiositas]” that led
to punishment at the hands of two sagarum, Panthia and Meroe (1.12). Apuleius becomes
the curiosus, the “one who looks,” while the saga Meroe, in her rare and secret power, is
“that which attracts attention.”462 The saga uses this secret power to punish lovers who
stray or spurn (1.9). Soon thereafter, Lucius arrives at the farmhouse of Milo and
Pamphile where he meets the lovely Photis and his aunt, Byrrhena. Byrrhena warns him
that his hostess Pamphile is a maga, a dabbler in secret knowledge, similar to the saga.
This news fascinates him. He has an “excessive passion to learn the rare and
marvelous…those spells of the magic art (artis magicae)” (1).463
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Hanson, trans. “‘Saga’ inquit ‘et divini potens caelum deponere, terram suspendere,
fontes durare, montes diluere, manes sublimare, deos infimare, sidera exstinguere,
Tartarum ipsum illuminare.’”
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Hanson, trans. “sed qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certe plurima.”
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Carlin Barton describes the person afflicted with “cura” as too filled with care and
interest; that is, too careful or anxious.
463

Hanson, trans. “anxius alioquin et nimis cupidus cognoscendi quae rara miraque sunt,
reputansque me media Thessaliae loca tenere, quo artis magicae nativa cantamina totius
orbis consono ore celebrentur.”
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Lucius is transfixed by the rare and the secret. Curiosus, curiose, and curiositas
connote an excessively anxious attention and extreme inquisitiveness: “I was on
tenterhooks of desire and impatience alike, and I began to examine each and every object
with curiosity” (2.1).464 His desire to know transforms his perception: “Nothing I look at
in that city seemed to me to be what it was; but I believed that absolutely everything had
been transformed into another shape by some deadly mumbo-jumbo” (2.1).465 He spies
on Pamphile, as she is about to steal away to her lover by transforming into an owl.
Photis helps Lucius replicate the operation by rubbing an herbal ointment over his body.
Subject to her artes magicae, he becomes “so transfixed with awe that [he] seemed to be
something other than Lucius” (3.21).466 But instead of being transformed into the bird of
wisdom, Lucius turns into an ass (3.25).467
Fortunately, Photis instructs him that he need only take a bite of roses in order to
return to his former state (3.25). Thus begins the misadventured quest for the rose where
Lucius learns more about wise women and joins the company of thieves, heroes, bakers,
legions, false priests, and aristocrats who beat, ridicule, and make a spectacle of him
until, in utter despair, he finds his salvation—which I argue is his “sacred self”—in a
dream vision, through a garland of roses, in the cult of Isis.
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Hanson, trans. “suspensus alioquin et voto simul et studio, curiose singula
considerabam.”
465

Hanson, trans. “Nec fuit in illa civitate quod aspiciens id esse crederem quod esset,
sed omnia prorsus ferali murmure in aliam effigiem translate.”
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Hanson, trans. “At ego nullo decantatus carmine, praesentis tantum facti stupore
defixus, quidvis aliud magis videbar esse quam Lucius.”
467

Carlin Barton summarizes: “Through his fatal fascination Apuleius’s curious Lucius
loses everything, even his human form, and becomes himself a monster, a human ass.”
Barton, Sorrows of the Ancient Romans, 91.
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The Sacred and Society
What is sacer about a “sacred self”? Sacer indicates a highly charged condition,
good or bad, but always a little dangerous or wild, and always very important. Further,
the sacred is something we respond to powerfully, often anxiously, and, in response, we
attribute power to it. For the Romans, to call something “sacred” was a hopeful tool for
acknowledging, controlling, channeling, or repelling a power. When something is set
apart, it becomes sacred in the Roman sense of sacer; that is, it requires heightened
attention or care, expressed in cura or cultus. A curate and a cult care for the sacred.
Carlin Barton describes the sacrificial system in ancient Rome as a way of
navigating, domesticating, elevating, mitigating, or nullifying forces, powers, or
functions in natural and social life (see chapter 2). That which becomes “sacred” is
isolated or “set apart.” In this Roman sense, sacer could be used to describe almost
anything: people, places, things, animals, ideas, emotions, natural processes, or invisible
beings—imagined, perceived, or something in-between: “Absolutely anything or anyone
could be sacralized.”468 Regardless, the sacred was always powerful, worthy of careful
attention, and likely dangerous.
That which is secret, set apart, or sacred invokes wonder, reverence, anxiety, and
even fear. Or, equally to the point, that which invokes wonder, reverence, anxiety, and
fear becomes set apart. What is both dangerous and desirable, to the many, to the few, or
to the one, is secret and sacred. The anxious care given to fire as the focus of the few in a
Roman home is similar to the emotional importance of the Vestal cultus to the many. But,
what of the one, the “sacred self”? This chapter assumes the existence of such a “one,” of
an individual, embodied, private self. I even suggest that this self can be “cultivated” (i.e.
468
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“care of the self”) and argue, that this is precisely the case in the works of Apuleius.469
For there remains, I contend, an aspect of self, however we understand its construction,
that is a cognitive ability, an internal reflexivity, and a solitary knowing. There exists in
many if not all of us a secret world of being, of imagination, thought, feeling, and desire.
Its contours are surely shaped by society but its existence as a space of experience is, I
maintain, an a priori, sui generis stratum of human existence.470 The same reflexivity that
allows one to critically assess society is also private, secret, and set apart from the social
world it criticizes. Of the self, it is reflexive awareness or the capacity to be aware that
one is aware that seems to withstand (if not enable) its own social deconstruction.
The extent to which shaping social layers can be shed is a matter of debate.
Nonetheless, the inner part of us that reflects upon these exterior shapers, in its ability to
do so, remains essential. The same wonder, reverence, anxiety, and fear, given to that
which is secret, set apart, or sacred in the social world, also applies to the self. We both
fear and desire our secret world and the secrets of others. The sacred, in this older sense,
was something—anything—that elicited a powerful response—like Lucius the ass’s
response when encountering Isis or like the philosopher’s when encountering her
daemonic nature—and, through that powerful response, we attribute power back to the
“Other,” to the person, place, thing, force, function, fantasy, etc. that presented itself so
469

While the scholarly literature that explores social and linguistic constructions of self—
including a technology for its care, I will not treat it here. The broader discourse incepted
by thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Judith Butler informs my own discussion in
what their discussions broadly offer and lack.
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My position is both common sense and Idealist. “Our idea of person is then the idea of
a consciousness which thinks, which has a certain permanence, which distinguishes itself
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powerfully charged. Hence, the awe-inspiring thunder and lightning storm becomes
sacralized or “set apart” as Zeus/Theos/Deus by virtue of our powerful response, our
experience of awe. And, if the awe is internalized, turned inward, the self becomes
sacred, personal divinity is attained.
In both The god of Socrates and Metamorphoses selves become sacred—set
apart—as the result of a new, more intimate, relationship with a source of sacred power.
What is interesting here is the question of when, why, and how the self was to become set
apart, i.e. how the self became sacred. As for “sacred power,” in the case of
Metamorphoses, the goddess Isis is the source of sacred power; in The god of Socrates, it
is the personal daemon that is source. For Apuleius, the process of entering into “a new
more intimate relationship” with a source of sacred power entails a metamorphosis, a
transformation, what Arthur Darby Nock views as a conversion expressing “the highwater mark of the piety which grew out of the mystery religions”471 or what Nancy
Shumate would characterize as a “collapse of familiar cognitive constructs [that]
precedes…reconstruction of a new world and world view….”472 The new world of the
convert is an expression of agency although expressed through society and culture:
“Constituted by society and made competent by culture, individuals make their worlds
through their acts of perception and interpretation. The external world is filtered and, in
the process, remade, by the self. It is in this sense that the self is the centre and the
premise of the individual’s world.”473 Sacralizing the self not only changes how inner
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experience is framed by the subject, but changes how the world it inhabits is experienced.
“More intimate” suggests an identification with but also an internalization of an external
source of sacred power (a point to which I will return later.) One difference, so it seems,
is the location: The daemon is “in here.” Isis is “out there.” Or, is she?

“Chosen Subjection”
It appears for Apuleius’s Lucius in his ill-begotten form that the only way out of
“Fortune’s great tempests and mighty stormwinds” (Metamorphoses 11.15) is voluntary
subjection to an exalted authority.474 Salvation requires, as the initiating priest of Isis
Mithras explains, “obedience to our cult and taking on the voluntary yoke of her service;
for as soon as you become the goddess’s slave you will experience more fully the fruit of
your freedom” (11.15).475 However, this “voluntary yoke” or chosen subjection may be
(as alluded to in chapter 2) more subtle than it seems at first.
J. Wyn Schofer’s study of ethics and self-cultivation in The Fathers According to
Rabbi Nathan—a late antique Jewish commentary on ethical maxims and pedagogical
discourse that includes both legal and non-legal material—introduces the notion of
“chosen subjection,” the “subordination and internalization of external authorities” into
our conversation.476 The teachings contained in The Fathers were intended to instruct
rabbinical students in virtue, the ethics of character, and transform them into sages. A
key passage in The Fathers exemplifies this kind of subordination: “Let your house be a
474
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meeting place for the sages, sit in the very dust of their feet, and drink with thirst their
works” (‘Avot 1:4).477 For students of the sage, chosen subjection expresses “an
extremely hopeful sense that the self can expand in fundamental ways through
engagement with powers external to it….”478 As I argued in chapter 2, self-sacralization
occurs even when the self confronts a force that appears to be greater that it. In Schofer’s
words: “[O]ne attains the character of a sage through subordination to particular
authorities with the goal of, in various senses, internalizing aspects of them.”479
While Schofer modestly characterizes his project as descriptive and comparative,
he also seeks to theorize a dynamic at play in his source text, one that he admits may not
be explicit. Cautiously, he explains: “[This] project entails an assertion that some would
take to be controversial: vocabulary from outside the rabbis’ culture can give insight into
implicit or overarching concerns that they themselves did not name.”480 The etic
vocabulary Schofer employs has a Foucauldian pedigree. In his view, scholars who
hesitate to draw from modern formulations of “self” and “subject” in the scholarship on
discourse fail to understand the “full subtlety and complexity of the sources.”481 Like
Schofer, I point to Judith Butler’s general observation in defense of subtlety: “[P]ower
that at first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into
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subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject’s self-identity.”482
Although “scholars of discourse attend to the social function of language and its relation
to both practices (such as self-transformation) and institutions (such as the rabbinic
movement),” Schofer chooses to focus on practices of self-transformation.483 By doing
so, he demonstrates how chosen subjection serves more than the social function that
concerns many discourse scholars like Butler. In Schofer’s formulation, chosen
subjection “generates internalization of that which is other, extending or expanding the
self beyond its original capacities,” an approach that is relevant to my sources as well.484
Reborn and renewed, Lucius claims that Isis resides in his heart. Has Lucius
internalized Isis? Does Isis constitute his divine self-identity? Or, is the dynamic of
chosen subjection even more subtle? Schofer elaborates: “If the goal of willed subjection
is an expansion of the self through incorporation of that which is other, then we should
attend to the specific points at which the other…becomes part of the self.”485 How does a
person become a “sacred self,” be it sage, a priest of Isis, or daemon? The answer is both
through “‘practice’ (including ritual and exercises) and ‘discourse’ (including symbols,
tropes, and more generally ‘language in use’).”486 Perhaps it is not Isis, an external
authority internalized, but rather the daemon of Apuleius’s Lucius, an inner authority
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externalized as Isis, that constitutes his self-identity as a “sacred self.”487 The self is the
source of sacred power after all. Apuleius’ understanding of the daemon in The god of
Socrates suggests the insertion of an intentional Platonic subtext in Metamorphoses.
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“Internalization” is an important concept in contemporary psychological theory. David
Harvey claims that “discourses internalize power, beliefs and values, institutions,
material practices, and social relations. Humans are porous, absorbing elements of their
ecosystems as well as language and other aspects of their surrounding society” in David
Harvey, Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Publishers, 1996), 48 – 57 and David Harvey, Spaces of Hope (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), 98 – 101. Paul Ricoeur appeals to internalization at several points
in his treatment of character formation. He argues that dispositions are formed through
identification with or internalization of values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes.
Moreover, while most practices are fundamentally interactive and learned from others,
people can internalize such interaction and come to “play alone, garden alone, do
research alone in a laboratory, in the library, or in one’s office” in Paul Ricœur, Oneself
As Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 156. Kenneth C. Wallis and
James L. Poulton explore the development of “internalization” as a psychological concept
in which they explore the uses of the concept by Freudian, cognitive-behavioral, and
humanist schools in Kenneth C., Wallis and James L. Poulton, Internalization: The
Origins and Construction of Internal Reality (Buckingham: Open University Press,
2001). For W.W. Meissner, internalization is “any process of transformation by which
external relationships, object representations, and forms of regulation become part of the
inner psychic structure and thus part of the ‘inner world.’” in W.W. Meissner,
Internalization in Psychoanalysis (New York: International Universities Press, 1981).
Internalizing the sage depends on identification with the sage. This is something more
than just learning from the sage. For R.H. Kopp, “learning is more conscious while
identification remains on the whole unconscious” in R.H. Kopp, “A Definition of
Identification: a Review of the Literature,” The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.
42. Ludwig Eidelberg defines identification as a process in which the subject, whether
conscious or unconscious, “has the impression that he thinks, feels or acts like the
object—or the object has such an impression” in Ludwig Eidelberg, Encyclopedia of
Psychoanalysis (New York: Free Press, 1968), 184. Arnold H. Modell goes even further:
“[The] representation of an external object that has been taken in to the ego to form a
permanent element within the total personality’” in Arnold H. Modell, Object Love and
Reality: An Introduction to a Psychoanalytic Theory of Object Relations (London:
Hogarth [for] the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1969), 145. The external object “taken in
to the ego” consists of a “mental picture” for Hinsie and Campbell, a memetic impression
that forms a permanent structure of the psyche in Leland E. Hinsie and Robert Jean
Campbell, Psychiatric Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 373.
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“Conversion”
Lucius’ apparent “conversion” to the cult of Isis bears further consideration if we
are to entertain the possibility of Platonic influence. Nancy Shumate proposes a new
reading of Metamorphoses as “a narrative of conversion.”488 However, she disagrees with
Nock and others who suggest that we can get a picture of the Isis cult in antiquity from
Apuleius’s novel. Studies like Shumate’s question the narrative’s usefulness in accessing
social reality.489 The focus on the personal experience of conversion marks what is new
for Shumate. Moving from the external/social to the internal/personal, Shumate argues :
“The process of conversion is a kind of shift in cognitive paradigms, and the period of
crisis before conversion is an unsettling sojourn in paradigm limbo, so to speak, during
which habituated structures of meaning and systems of organizing reality disintegrate.”490
The resultant divinity achieved by Lucius’s return to human form and initiation as
a priest of Isis, especially when understood in the Platonizing terms of The god of
Socrates, “is not an agent of moral redemption (as a social phenomenon) but rather an
epistemological anchor and a transcendent source of meaning and order (as a personal
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experience).”491 Lucius becomes personally divine through the self-sacralization of
“conversion.” Lucius’ “process of conversion with which we will be concerned, then,
involves nothing less than the collapse of an entire system of premises and assumptions
about how the world works and its replacement by one radically different, or at least so it
seems to the convert.”492 Defending against the criticism that she is “confusing narrative
with experience,” Shumate asserts that “experience and narrative reinforce each other in a
kind of discursive loop”:493
Raw experience occurs within particular attributional systems that give it
particular and culturally contingent meanings. Literary narratives certainly have a
place in such systems, but overarching them are the larger and more thoroughly
naturalized master narratives of the culture, which in turn shape subsequent
narrative of all kinds as well as experience itself, and on and on….the moment
subjectivity begins, it enters a discursive system already saturated with
interpretations and report of experience, that is, with the preexisting scripts that
we use to make sense of reality. Even areas commonly regarded as bastions of
objectivity—notably those of scientific and social scientific inquiry—are not
immune.494
At first glance, Lucius’s initiation into the cult of Isis represents a self’s complete
submission to an external source of sacred power. In order for Lucius to be released from
the throes of his asinine fate, he must become a slave to Isis (deae servire,
Metamorphoses 11.15), who is the only power greater than fate: “[B]y the providence of
the great and mighty goddess, I would overcome Fortune who was so savagely battering
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me” (11.12).495 But, the Metamorphoses, read with The god of Socrates in mind, suggest
my alternative reading. Even in Lucius’s apparent surrender to Isis, there is nothing more
sacred than what lies within the secret places of the heart. Next, I shall consider ancient
dream theory in order shed light on the transformation of Late Antique selves, followed
by two modern perspectives on sacred selfhood that resonate with our two texts and a
return to the role of curiosity in the quest for personal divinity.

The Dream of the Daemon
Reading late antique dream literature, Patricia Cox Miller sees Middle Platonists
Plutarch and Apuleius as proponents for “a daemonic provenance for dreams…whose
placement of dreams in a daemonic context served to underscore their mediatorial and
transformative function.”496 In Miller’s view, Plutarch understood the daemon as “the
capacity of every person to construct a framework within which to interpret experience,”
but Apuleius, she continues, “understood daemons as deeply embedded in human
affairs.”497 So embedded, I contend, that the daemon is the self in the sense that I have
defined it, as a “reflexive feature of consciousness”—that part of us, remember, that
experiences awe at the powerful thunder and lightning storm. But, if the daemon is the
self, why does Apuleius speak of it as a separate entity? Miller solves this problem by
reconceptualizing Apuleius’s daemones as potestates (powers)—what she refers to as a
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“‘personalization[s] of power’…something more like ‘psychic’ abilities.’”498 In her view,
the daemonic is a function of mind, a function of consciousness itself. The daemonic
mind uses a “daemonic language” through dreams that express, in her terms, “the need
for finer tuning of the sensibilities”—that is, a transformative caring for the self.499
Lucius’s dream vision of Isis can be read as a voice or sign from his daemon—his
innermost secret, sacred, self—telling him, perhaps, it was time to turn away from
curious artes magicae toward the more socially sanctioned arcana secreta.500 Seen as a
daemonic production, the dream of Isis takes on, in Miller’s view, what she refers to as
"an epistemological function as source of self awareness and ethical reflection.”501 The
dream of the daemon functions as what Michel Foucault has called “a ‘technology’ of the
self, a hermeneutics of self-knowledge” that, I concur, empowers the dreamer to refine,
augment, and expand the self that has been “set apart” or sacralized.502
Regardless of his Isiac Platonism, such a self-centered or psychological
interpretation of the daemon might not have been that far from Apuleius’s mind either.
Using ancient dream hermeneutics as a critical lens, Vared Lev Kenaan suggests that
Apuleius would have been familiar with writers who deny the “divine provenance” of
dreams such as Heraclitus, Cicero, and Petronius. Not unlike Miller, Lev Kenaan posits
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that Apuleius’ approached daemonic dreams psychologically “as the source of subjective
imagination, as the locus of the private experience of the world, and as the material from
which the self is invented.”503

The Cultus of Self
In his study of “new religions” and the “New Age movement,” Paul Heelas
explores sacralization of the self in the modern context. The term “New Age movement”
loosely describes “a vast array of groups, communities and networks that are engaged in
a process of a transformation of consciousness.”504 Despite the problems with such
categories, “New Age movement” is meaningful in so far as it accounts for apparent
innovations that diverge from modern authorized notions of the sacred in conventional
religious institutions. However, students of the ancient world will immediately see that
there is nothing “new” or “modern” about New Age interest in self-sacralization. Heelas
admits this: “Self-religiosity is ‘as ancient as the Upanishads, for instance; or, to take an
example from the West, can be found in the millenarian movements of the Middle
Ages.”505
The similarities between New Age thought and Platonism in the late ancient
world are striking.506 Comparing the New Age approach to self-sacralization helps

503

Vered Lev Kenaan, “Delusion and Dream in Apuleius' Metamorphoses,” Classical
Antiquity 23, no. 2 (2004): 265.
504

Peter B. Clarke, Encyclopedia of New Religious Movements (London: Routledge,
2006), 401.
505

Paul Heelas, "The New Age in Cultural Context: the Premodern, the Modern and the
Postmodern," Religion. 23, no. 2 (1993): 110.
506

April D. De Conick, The Gnostic New Age : How a Countercultural Spirituality
Revolutionized Religion from Antiquity to Today (New York: Columbia University Press,
155

understand its correlate in ancient cult and philosophy. Indeed, the expression “inward
turn” is used by scholars of the New Age movement in much the same way as it is used
by scholars of late antiquity to describe the concern with personal divinity (epistrophe).
The New Age movement seems to agree with both the Isiac and Platonic concept of
universal creative divinity: In the world of Heelas’ subjects, “all life-all existence-is the
manifestation of Spirit, of the Unknowable, of that supreme consciousness known by
many different names in many different cultures.”507 A notion of a Platonic “world
behind appearances” also occurs: “All life, as we perceive it with the five human senses
or with scientific instruments, is only the outer veil of an invisible, inner and causal
reality.” The New Age anthropology of the self is two-fold consisting of “an outer
temporary personality and a multi-dimensional inner being (soul or higher self).” New
Age thinkers express a frustration with the “habit of materialism” nicely polemicized by
Apuleius in the end of The god of Socrates: “The outer personality is limited and tends
towards materialism.”508 Heelas’s finding that the New Age’s version of salvation
“cannot be found by tinkering with what we are by virtue of socialization”509 echoes
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Mithras’s admonition to Lucius: “Not your birth, nor even your position, nor even your
fine education has been of any help to you” (Metamorphoses 11.15).510
Likewise, wisdom in the New Age can only be attained by “moving beyond the
socialized self…thereby encountering a new realm of being.”511 New Age groups, like
the late Platonists, are interested in the innermost part of the self, the secret heart. Heelas
writes: “The inner realm, and the inner realm alone, is held to serve as the source of
authentic vitality.”512 The self is conceived as secret, sacred, and set apart from any
external authority or idea that would otherwise cultivate it. The (small “s”) self cultivates
the (big “S”) Self much as the daemon is the Self. Like Lucius secretly observing
Pamphile’s transformation realizing he “seemed to be something other than Lucius,”
(Metamorphoses 3.22), some New Age groups posit that we are not who we think we are,
that, in the course of our day to day life, we are working from a “lower self with base
instincts,” busybodies of curious desire. 513 How, then, and where, are we to locate the
sacred in the self? Quoting Heelas:
New Agers often treat practices (such as astrology or channeling), which might
be thought to involve external authority, in detraditionalized fashion (astrology
and channeling here being seen as ways of ‘putting us in touch with our deeper
selves’). If New Agers themselves have got it right, we are in the realm of the
[Zen] koan, not the Ten Commandments. That is to say, religion, as normally
understood in the west, has been replaced by teachers whose primary job is to set
up ‘contexts’ to enable participants to experience their spirituality and
authority.514
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Perhaps, the “great unspoken mysteries of the [Isis] cult” provided such a context for
Lucius; the notion of the daemon, a context for the philosopher. Once the external
authority was internalized, it transformed. As with New Age groups, “[t]he basic idea, it
should be apparent, is that what lies within—experienced by way of ‘intuition’,
‘alignment’ or an ‘inner voice’—serves to inform the judgments, decisions and choices
required for everyday life. The ‘individual’ serves as his or her own source of
guidance.”515

The Sacred Self
Thomas J. Csordas’s ethnography of Catholic Charismatic healing in New
England is a study of ritual efficacy and in this sense offers something to our
discussion.516 Csordas asks: “How does faith healing work, if indeed it does?” He locates
efficacy not in “symptoms, psychiatric disorders, symbolic meaning, or social
relationships, but [in] the self in which all of these are encompassed.”517 Similar to
Shumate, Csordas defines the transforming effect that occurs in ritual healing as “a
restructuring of cognition and memory.”518 Ritual performance, he asserts, “stimulated
transformations of memory and cognition…that in turn could have real emotional and
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physical effects.”519 An experience of the sacred is, in Csordas’ words, “an existential
encounter with Otherness that is a touchstone of our humanity….it defines us by what we
are not—by what is beyond our limits or what touches us precisely at our limits.”520
Healing is achieved when the “self is objectified and represented as a particular kind of
person with a specific identity” within the context of a “coherent ritual system”—the
embodiment of a sacred self.521 Csordas’s process of becoming a “sacred self” resembles
the transformation seen in both Metamorphoses and The god of Socrates.

Curiositas Revisited
P.G. Walsh claims that curiositas is “the key to the novel.”522 Apuleius uses the
word twelve times in Metamorphoses but it is little attested before, only once, in fact, in a
letter of Cicero.523 To begin to understand curiositas we must look to the better attested
curiosus which Apuleius uses twelve times in the novel as well. In general, curiosus
means bestowing care or pains upon a thing; in particular, it has the connotation of
inquiring eagerly or anxiously about a thing.
In her study of the emotional lives of Romans in the late Republic and early
Empire, Carlin Barton writes about a prevalent fascination with the “curious,” that is,

519

Porterfield, Healing in the History of Christianity, 18.

520

Csordas, Sacred Self, 5.

521

Csordas, Sacred Self, 24.

522

“The Rights and Wrongs of Curiosity (Plutarch to Augustine),” Greece & Rome 35,
no. 1 (1988): 76.
523

Walsh, “Rights and Wrongs,” 75.

159

“the one who looks and the strange or unusual object which attracts the look.”524 The
curiosus, she asserts, was motivated by frustration: “He or she could not resist those
things in heaven and earth prohibited by the Powers That Be. The secret was the rare; the
secrets of the gods the rarest and most forbidden—and therefore the most desired.”525
Envy or invidia were inextricably intertwined with curiositas; the unattainability of the
rare or the secret led to a contorted desire that turned to malice in frustration. Plautus
writes: “No one is curious who is not also malevolent” (Stichus 208).526 The envy of the
curiosus, Barton establishes through an exhaustive survey of the sources, was feared in
ancient Rome as the “evil eye.” In Platonic thought, the curiosus is a polupragmon, a
meddler, literally, a “busybody.” In On Being a Busybody, Middle Platonist Plutarch
writes about those who “pass over the stories and subjects of common speech and pick
out the hidden scandals of every household” (Plutarch, Moralia. De curiositate 516df).527 As a Middle Platonist himself who alludes to Plutarch in the Metamorphoses,
Apuleius would have been familiar with Plutarch’s discussion.
Apuleius portrays curiosity, “the drive for wonder,”528 in Carl Schlam’s words, as
a vice, especially in regard to secret knowledge and otherworldly spectacles—in this
case, the artes magicae and divina disciplina of the saga and the maga. On his eventual
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return to human form, Mithras, the priest of Isis who assists Lucius, encapsulates the
novel’s apparent moral: “[B]ut on the slippery path of headstrong youth you plunged into
slavish pleasures and reaped the perverse reward of your ill-starred curiosity” (Apuleius,
Metamorphoses 11.15).529
But is curiosity always a vice? Lucius’s desire to know eventually brings him his
desire. He does in fact, as he puts it, “penetrate to the hidden mysteries of the purest
faith” (Metamorphoses 11.21).530 The “hidden mysteries” are arcana secreta; Lucius
learns the secret of the sacred (Metamorphoses 11.21). This distinction between curiosity
and curiositas calls to mind the Greek thauma (or wonder), invoked by Plato as the first
impulse to philosophy.531 While Plutarch criticizes the curiose polupragmon, the
“meddling busybody,” he also suggests that we should, as P.G. Walsh puts it, “direct
such curiosity toward the things of heaven and earth and sea….”532 Neither Plato nor
Plutarch discourage inquiry or wonder as long as it is in the cause of becoming a better
person as they might have it. Perhaps, following Joseph G. DeFilippo, “curiositas is
blameworthy in a way that mere curiosity is not.”533 In On Isis and Osiris, Plutarch
suggests that the name of Isis itself is a Greek word relating to oida (know) and that, as a
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Walsh, “Rights and Wrongs,” 73.
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Joseph G. DeFilippo, “Curiositas and the Platonism of Apuleius' Golden Ass,”
American Journal of Philology 111, no. 4 (1990): 478.
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result, her shrine the Iseion, “promises knowledge and comprehension of reality”
(Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride 352a).534
In his study of curiositas and the Platonism of Apuleius’s novel, DeFilippo
suggests that knowledge of Isis can only be acquired when one is “free of the interfering
and unhealthy impulses which riddle the soul of the polypragmon.” Once Lucius regains
his form, Mithras reminds him that the promised revelation he has long sought must be
initiated by Isis in the form of a sign: “[T]he day on which each person can be initiated
was marked by a nod from the goddess…” (Metamorphoses 11.21).535 Prior to that point,
Lucius’s approach had been quite different. In Schlam’s words: “Lucius’s eagerness to
know what is wondrous, directed toward magic, is characterized as an unholy assault on
the divine.”536 By the end of the tale, we get the feeling that Lucius has learned his
lesson. But, the lesson is not so much about inquisitiveness as the way in which one
inquires. Perhaps, the desire for secret virtue directs one toward Isis, while the desire for
secret vice directs one toward the maga.

Conclusion
The aspect of self—that is, the “reflexive feature of consciousness” I have been
entertaining—that is in play, at least for Apuleius’s Platonic audience in his treatment of
the cult of Isis is something that can only be seen when read in tandem with The god of
Socrates which would have been the case for second-century readers and for Augustine

534

Babbit, trans. “τοῦ δ᾿ ἱεροῦ τοὔνομα καὶ σαφῶς ἐπαγγέλλεται καὶ γνῶσιν καὶ εἴδησιν
τοῦ ὄντος· ὀνομάζεται γὰρ Ἰσεῖον ὡς εἰσομένων τὸ ὄν, μετὰ λόγου καὶ ὁσίως εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ
παρέλθωμεν τῆς θεοῦ.”
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Schlam, Making an Ass, 48.
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in the fifth century. For Apuleius, even in Lucius’s apparent surrender to Isis, there is
nothing more sacred than the self. To behold Isis, in her sensible form as the moon, or in
powerful tides running through the natural and social worlds, is an awe-inspiring and
powerful mystery. But it is the awe itself, our metacognitive awareness of powerful
experiences, that is terrifying and fascinating, tremendum et fascinans. By co-creating the
sacred, this reflexive feature of consciousness, perhaps, is the mysterium. It may also be a
longing for Csordas’ “sacred self” and a re-enchantment of experience that motivates
self-sacralization. Writing on the uses of the “miraculous,” Graham Twelftree suggests
the appeal of self-sacralization:
[F]or those in Western civilizations who are detached from an interpretative
community and from spiritual attainment, and for whom the windows of
transcendence have been closed, the perception of a miracle…is relocated in the
theatre of the questing self. The miracle becomes a sign of the God within us all.
‘Where classical miracle stories inspired fear and awe, inducing worship of God
and admiration of the saint, modern miracles tend to inspire admiration of the
divinity that is the self.’537
If Lucius is to become free he must, from the Isiac point of view, serve the
goddess. From the Platonic point of view, though, he must cultivate his daemon, which
resides in the inner most part of his self. Chosen subjection to Isis restores Lucius to his
human form, curing him of ill-starred curiosity. But, the cultus of self, and the
imaginative transformation of identity it entails, raises him to the level of a goddess…or
at least a daemon. Late Antique readers schooled in philosophy might very well have
observed the Platonic soteriology in Apuleius’s ribald tale.538
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Graham H. Twelftree, The Cambridge companion to miracles (Cambridge: Cambridge
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Metamorphoses and De deo de Socrates were in circulation during Apuleius’s lifetime
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CONCLUSION:
THE WAY IN IS THE WAY OUT
This dissertation has been about reading, imagination, and personal divinity in
late antiquity. It asked: How did Late Antique readers become divine? From GraecoRoman wisdom and ritual texts to early Christian theology, late antique literature
abounded with discourses on personal divinity, the idea that a human could become
“divine,” a “god.” Using a selection of Neoplatonic and Hermetic texts that Augustine of
Hippo contends with in Books 8-10 of City of God, I have demonstrated how ancient and
modern theories of imagination and reading help modern people understand the
construction of personal divinity for Late Antique readers. Although Augustine accused
the Neoplatonists, Hermetists, and theurgists of “worshipping demons,” “animating
statues,” and “making gods,” I have shown that they were more concerned with getting to
know their indwelling mind they called the daimon/daemon, they were more concerned
with using cultic rite—the theurgic arts—to “bring the gods to earth” (that is, to make the
invisible, visible), and they sought to animate their bodies like living sacred statues by
becoming gods themselves, embodied, ensouled. They believed that knowledge of the
self’s true nature resulted in personal divinity—expressed by this inscription from the
Ṣābian Temple of Ḥarrān: “He who knows himself becomes a god.”539
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Henry Corbin, Temple and Contemplation (London; New York: KPI in association
with Islamic Publications, London, 1986), 134. After Justinian I closed the academy at
Athens in 529, Damascius, Simplicius, and other Neoplatonic philosophers seem to have
fled to the Persian court of Chosroes in 531 (recorded in Agathias 2.30.5 – 2.31.4), and
perhaps also (as Michel Tardieu has argued) to the Ṣābians in Ḥarrān (northern
Mesopotamia). Corbin recalls the early Islamic historian and geography Al Mas‘ūdī’s
reading of the following temple inscription, “Platonic in tone,” on the great Temple of
Ḥarrān in 332 AH (944 CE): Man ‘arafa nafsahu ta’allaha (“He who knows himself is
deified”). The inscription recorded in Masʻūdī, trans., C. Barbier de Meynard et al., 64 –
65. Given the influence of Neoplatonism on Islamic philosophy, much is made of this
Neoplatonist flight. See also Watts, Edward Jay. “Where to live the philosophical life in
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In this dissertation, I am interested in the imaginations of late antique writers,
readers, and hearers for whom personal divinity was seen as an option on their horizons. I
have taken “seriously those elements in the ancient worldview that seem most alien to
moderns as a way to explain how ancient worldmaking worked.”540 And, like Averil
Cameron, I use my own imagination to inquire into the imagination of my subjects.541
This dissertation is, therefore, an “experiment in the sympathetic imagination of the
imaginations of other people.”542
In my project, I add to the social-functionalist understanding of personal divinity
by inquiring more deeply into areas of personal meaning and individual experience. By
attempting to understand the experience of such individuals as “ideal readers,” I have
hoped to offer a corrective for the excesses of a social-functional approach that has
privileged the social aggregate at the expense of the person. As much as they, as people,
may have been socially constructed and historically contingent, that is, shaped by their
environments and their pasts, they were more than their conditioning, just as much as we
are.543 It may take hard work to get to that “more,” to sort through what is personal and

the sixth century? Damascius, Simplicius and the return from Persia,” Greek, Roman,
And Byzantine Studies no. 3 (2005); David Pingree, “The Ṣābians of Ḥarrān and the
Classical Tradition,” International Journal Of The Classical Tradition no. 1 (2002).
540

Catherine M. Chin and Moulie Vidas (eds.), Late Ancient Knowing: Explorations in
Intellectual History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 2.
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“History and the individuality of the historian,” 76-77.
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Chin and Vidas, Late Ancient Knowing, 4.
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While I remain attentive to the shaping influence of social and cultural structures and
discourse, to the layers of presentation, representation, and reception and, indeed, to the
personal positionality that textures my historical storytelling, I seek to avoid the infinite
regress of “discursive turtles always already all the way down,” obliterating the agency of
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what is social, which is why catharsis (purification) was so important to the Platonici and
the theurgici. They believed the divine part of themselves didn’t have to do with their
“situatedness.” So, as noted above, Plotinus advised us to always work on our “inner
statue” chipping away at the human constructions; Iamblichus saw the purification
necessary for self-divinization as a “restoration of one’s own essence.”
Gregory Shaw laments that scholars today do not believe in ancient wisdom
“although we are highly skilled at describing how ancient philosophers and theologians
believed in gods, wisdom, and the divine life.”544 Indeed, it has become commonplace

the individual who has the imaginative power to go beyond the brutishness of the
historico-socio-cultural present. I stray beyond the Durkheimian legacy that posits “a
social realm which was subject simply to social forces and hence home purely to social
facts, caused individual consciousness to be seen as irrelevant, irretrievable or nonexistent.” And, I challenge the conflation of individualism and individuality that portrays
the embodied cognition of individuals, “perceiving, interpreting, intentioning, creat[ing],
imagin[ing]—in a word, conscious” as somehow a “Western” socio-cultural fiction.
Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts
(London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 66. To qualify Joan Scott’s dictum—“It is not
individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience,”
Martin Jay suggests that we work with “experience” as “a nodal point of the intersection
between public language and private subjectivity, between expressible commonalities and
the ineffability of the individual interior.” “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry
17, no. 4 Summer (1991): 779; Songs of Experience: Modern American and European
Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 6 – 7.
In this dissertation, I have hoped do something more nuanced, which is to look at
individual agency, in Kathleen Canning words, as “a site of mediation between
discourses and experience [which] serves not only to dislodge the deterministic view in
which discourse always seems to construct experience, but also to dispel the notion that
discourses are shaped by everything but the experiences of the people texts claim to
represent.” “Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and
Experience,” Signs 19 (1994): 378. Frances Flannery reminds us: “[T]he sacred texts we
study often seem to arise precisely as a result of some transformative moment in the life
of an ancient author or community.” Experientia, Volume 1: Inquiry into Religious
Experience in Early Judaism and Early Christianity (Atlanta: Society of Biblical
Literature, 2008), 10.
544

See full passage here: “It may be helpful to begin by pointing out that scholars today
do not believe in ancient wisdom. To be more direct, we do not believe in wisdom at all.
We know that Neoplatonists believed that wisdom allowed them to become divine and
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now to think that “becoming divine” could only be a kind of self-deception. But,
description needs verstehen—understanding, if it is to explain anything at all. Our
sources should be read with compassion for a worldview—and experience—of the
individual writers and their readers, on their own terms. Personal divinity was not wishful
thinking for late antique peoples. It was actively and creatively imagined and what was
imagined was experienced.
Reading texts about personal divinity was performative. The activity of reading,
and imagining what was read, constituted an implicit “spiritual exercise” or imaginative
technology of self-transformation. Sara Ahbel-Rappe sees the ideal reader as taking part
in a theurgic ritual:
Absorbed in the world of the text, one is to leave behind the world of natural
objects and ordinary thoughts. What takes their place is no less than an entire
tradition, one purporting to redescribes the universe, locating the soul in the center
of an unfolding cosmology that is enacting precisely through the soul’s ascent, or
recitation, we might say of its cosmic liturgy. As a recipient of the text, the reader
is located both historically as a link in the chain of transmission and ahistorically
as a part of the world evoked through this transmission.545
Absorbed in the world of the text, the reader embodies the text, carrying an image of a
newly discovered world, an imago mundi, that she projects, in Henry Corbin’s words,
onto “a more or less coherent universe, which becomes the stage on which her destiny is

reveal the gods in their very bodies, but we do not believe that anymore. Today we do not
believe in wisdom, and we do not believe in gods—in or out of our bodies—but we are
highly skilled at describing how ancient philosophers and theologians believed in gods,
wisdom, and the divine life. However, rather than assume our lack of understanding in
these matters, we assume theirs. Our reasoning works as follows: since we know that
there is no wisdom in the deep and deifying sense described by the Platonists, we
conclude that, when they extolled the virtues of wisdom, they were involved in
sophisticated forms of self-deception.” “The Neoplatonic Transmission of Ancient
Wisdom,” in Religious Competition in the Greco-Roman World, ed. Nathaniel
DesRosiers (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 107 – 108.
545

Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 172-173.
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played out.”546 For Augustine’s Platonici and theurgici, active imagination was soulmaking and imagination was the soul itself.
These imaginative engagements with texts about divinity, cultivated a heightened
self-reflexivity and an experience of “the sublime.” The Neoplatonic, Hermetic, and
theurgic writers were trained in rhetoric, they were educated to use language to affect
their readers’ minds and bodies. Using vivid descriptions, transporting images, and
disorienting thought exercises as part of an initiatory teaching on the nature of the self
and the divine, the texts are designed in content and style to shock, to rouse a sense of
self-reflexive awe, to provide an experience of “the sublime”—all to effect, in Greg
Shaw’s words, “an ecstatic removal from one’s habitual self-consciousness.”547
For the soul to become divine it needed to expand beyond the body but it can only
do so by, paradoxically, turning inward. The boundaries of the Neoplatonic and Hermetic
soul-self are no less than “those of the intelligible cosmos”—intelligible because they are
inside.548 To venture past (or deeper within) those boundaries, with a mind embodied,
was to enter a state of awe: “mad, drunken, love.”549 It was “to become a god”
(theothenai; Corpus Hermeticum 1.26). The moment when “the apprehension that soul is
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Angela Voss, “Becoming an Angel: The Mundus Imaginalus of Henry Corbin & the
Platonic Path of Self-Knowledge,” in Alchemical Traditions: From Antiquity to the
Avant-Garde, ed. Aaron Cheak (Melbourne, Australia: Numen Books, 2013). Quoting
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not other than the intellect” 550 is, in Plotinus’ words, when one becomes “truly
intelligible, both knower and known, self-apprehended and not dependent on another in
order to see” (Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.8.40-42).551 This moment is “thought thinking itself”
(Aristotle, Metaphysica 1074b, 34-5), the activity of the divine, an ecstatic awareness of
awareness, the moment of self-realized divinity.552
Texts that entertain questions about consciousness and the divine are written and
read by living human bodies. “Invisible, intelligent, immortal, powerful,” are the terms
used to define divinity in the Neoplatonic and Hermetic contexts and, as we have learned,
they are the terms that equally refer to the reflexive feature of consciousness we call
“mind,” what the Augustine’s Platonici called “soul.” If the soul was deathless and
divine, it could only claim this knowledge as a mortal body. Gabriella Carone makes a
crucial point here:
Even when the self appears as a ‘floating ego’ that can expand its potentialities
from the soul’s dispersion in the bodily realm of becoming towards, ultimately,
further unification and identification with the hypostasis Intellect [nous] and
finally the One, Plotinus still seems interested in securing the preservation of the
self’s empirical identity even at superior, non-empirical levels. The interest in
keeping that identity would be to guarantee that we can recover our historical
personality when we descend from the higher levels and come back to ordinary
life, something that seems inevitable given our bodily condition…It is important
that I can call and recall that experience as mine, and as distinct from that of
another.553
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Ahbel-Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 237.
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Armstrong, trans. “λάμπον ὁμοῦ καὶ λαμπόμενον, τὸ ἀληθῶς νοητόν, καὶ νοοῦν καὶ
νοούμενον, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὁρώμενον καὶ οὐ δεόμενον ἄλλου.”
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Tredennick, trans. “ἡ νόεσις νοήσεως νόησις.” The self is not only preserved, it is
increased. See Plotinus, Ennead 6.5.12.
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Gabriela Roxana Carone, “Mysticism and Individuality: A Plotinian Paradox” in The
Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism, ed. John J. Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University
Press, 1997), 177 – 178. See Plotinus, Ennead 5.3.17, 26 – 28: “As long as one is in
contact, it is altogether neither possible, nor is there time, for the one who has had the
contact, to speak; it is only afterwards that one can reflect upon it” (Carone, trans.). (ἀλλ᾿
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Turning the attention of the reader inward toward features of her consciousness,
such as “the mind’s eye” and the “entity that makes visibility,”554 Sara Ahbel-Rappe
observes how the texts “[point] the reader toward a conception of interiority in which the
experience of imaginative production” sets apart the “the imagination as the object.”555
This object, as Synesius concluded above, was the “soul.” An inner world of sublime
self-reflexivity, ecstatic awareness of awareness—perhaps is not so far removed from
Aristotle’s god—“thought thinking itself,” or better, “imagination imagining itself.” This
inner world becomes the site of the mysterium, tremendum, et fascinans that Rudolf Otto
ascribes to the “Wholly Other.” It is not “Wholly Other.” It is shockingly familiar. It is
our own experience of experience. Otto’s “god” is heightened self-reflexivity writ large.
Roman historian and philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood explains:
The experience of sublimity contains an element of illusion…. The power which
is sublimity appears in that experience as belonging to an object which compels
us in spite of ourselves to admire it; the object seems to be active, we to be
passive. But this is not really the case. The power which we attribute to the object
is really our own; it is our own aesthetic activity. The shock of sublimity is the
shock of an uprush of imaginative energy within ourselves; and the illusion
consists in the fact that we do not feel this energy as our own. … We are
worshipping an idol whose divine attributes are only the magnified shadow of our
own powers.556
The shock of the sublime and the subsequent awakening to our co-creative role in
manifesting divinity is what the theurgists referred to as waking the “innate gnôsis of the
ἀρκεῖ κἂν νοερῶς ἐφάψασθαι· ἐφαψάμενον δέ, ὅτε ἐφάπτεται, πάντη μηδὲν μήτε δύνασθαι
μήτε σχολὴν ἄγειν λέγειν).
554
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R.G. Collingwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (London: Oxford University Press,
1925), 36.
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gods [that] co-exists with our very nature” (Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 1.3.10-8.1).557
Jeffrey Kripal offers another way to understand this deep-seated knowledge that
pre-exists discursive thought, this “innate gnôsis” identified by Iamblichus. Kripal writes:
“[T]he sacred and the psyche, are fundamentally related, for whatever the sacred is or is
not, it is intimately tied to the deepest structures of the human psyche…[W]e are the
sense of the sacred…the sacred and the human are two sides of the same coin.”558
Waking up—as embodied, sentient creatures—we find the divine is always already
embodied, intimately a part of our experience of the world in moments of awe. The
divinity of the “wholly other” referred to above is terrifying not because of its
“otherness” but because it is intimately familiar to us, drawing our attention to the
strangeness of the fact of our existence. It dwells in the secret places of the heart (intra
pectoris mei secreta) like Apuleius’ daemon, Isis. It is theos the mind’s eye of Hermes.
Sometimes, as Friedrich Nietzsche and others have pointed out, when you stare
long enough into the abyss at the limit of your imagination, it stares back. Why? Why
does it stare back? Perhaps because the abyss is sleeping and your staring awakens it.
Perhaps because the abyss is a mirror, you see yourself awakening. But, perhaps, as
Jeffrey Kripal suggests, the abyss is a two-way mirror: there is something you imagine on
the other side that both is and is not you, it is more than you, and its “more-ness” calls to
you. Out of Damascius’ “unknowable darkness,” it calls to you to become more. It
desires you as you, it. And, it must become human to be known at all. It is not so much
557
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Quoted in Shaw, “Living Light,” 63.
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that theurgists wanted immortality (Iamblichus saw that as a by-product of theurgy), they
wanted to divinize matter, or, more properly, to recognize the innate divinity of
embodiment; not to ascend, but to expand into greater wholeness, paradoxically, by
becoming mortal gods.
Not long before the Emperor Justinian I closed the School of Athens in 529 CE,
scholarch Damascius records his teacher’s caution that while “the practice of theurgy is
divine…those who are destined to be gods must first become human…” (Vita Isidori
150).559 What did it mean to Isidore that one must first become human in order to become
divine? Isidore’s admonition was intended to “wake” the reader to the fullness of a
human bodily experience that is capable of divine apprehension and expression here and
now and so fulfill the “divine work” of bringing together invisible heaven and visible
earth as an inner, innate, embodied gnosis, acting in the world: “Ecstasy transforms
theurgists into gods, yet because theurgists are human, the gods become human.”560
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates seems to berate Glaucon for his slow take: “Haven’t
you realized that our soul is immortal and never destroyed?” To which Glaucon replies:
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Athanassiadi, trans. “Εὶ δὲ θειότερον χρῆμα, ὡς σὺ φὴς ὧ Ἡγία, ἔλεγε πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ
Ἰσίδωρος, ἡ ἱερατιχὴ πραγματεία, φημὶ μὲν τοῦτο χὰγώ· ὰλλα πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι
τοὺς ἐσομένους θεοὺς δεῖ.” Isidore is responding to Hegias, one of the competitors for the
Neoplatonic scholarchy in Athens. Richard Lim has drawn our attention to the way in
which late antique philosopher were “deeply implicated in the rich texture of mundane
social interactions and the spirit of competitive strife, or agon, that permeated the
Graeco-Roman culture.” Papyrus Oxyrhynchus (frag. 52.3659.i.22 – 44) describes the
quarreling of philosophers as being louder than “raving lunatics”! (Lim, Disputations,
31). “Becoming human” may have also been intended as a derogatory remark directed at
Hegias which would have been in keeping with the often adversarial tone in the various
“philosophical histories” composed by scholarchs and loyal students.
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“No, by god, I haven’t. Are you really in a position to assert that?” (10.608d).561
Sympathetic to Glaucon’s point (about Socrates’ current embodied state), historian Garth
Fowden wonders how the Platonici and the theurgici might have appeared to onlookers
in late antiquity: “[The theurgist] was important because he embodied, at a particular
point in time and space, the fundamental unity of the divine and human worlds that
endowed the whole of creation and history with meaning. And in his personal experience
of such theioi andres562 the late antique pagan could feel that he had found at last the true
meaning of those prophetic lines from the Odyssey quoted by Eunapius [Vita
Sophistarum 6, 7.7]: ‘And the gods, in the likeness of strangers from far countries/put on
all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities’ (Homer, Odyssey 17.485-6)”.563
Plotinus, whose immortal eye caught these lines from Homer as well, could not have
agreed more:
For in this way the other gods also when many are present often appear to one,
because that one alone is able to see them. But these are the gods who “in many
forms travel round our cities” but to that god the cities turn, and all the earth and
all the sky, who everywhere abides by himself and in himself and has from
himself being and the things which really are down to soul and life depending on
him and moving to an unbounded unity by his sizeless unboundedness (Ennead
6.5.12)564
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I have hoped that this perspective on the creative role of imagination will add a
layer of complexity to how scholars and amateurs read texts about personal divinity
yielding greater compassion for how ancient peoples may have understood themselves
and their worlds. Furthermore, I have attempted to provoke modern readers to re-imagine
a world that values many ways of knowing and many sources of knowledge. Greg
Anderson suggests that “a modern academic discipline that takes seriously the
ontological heterogeneities of human experience would hopefully help nurture greater
sensitivity to the alterities of lifeworlds that have yet to be fully subsumed by Western
modernity. And in so doing, such a discipline just might encourage us to think more
critically about the ontological commitments of that same modernity, perhaps even help
us to imagine less exploitative, more equitable, more sustainable lifeworlds of the
future.”565 Recognizing ontological diversity in the past and the present is a necessary
step, often unexplored, for creating social spaces that are truly diverse and inclusive. I
have tried to consider a selection of what the ancients considered “wisdom” as such and
so conversed with the “mighty dead.”566 I view the pursuit of personal divinity expressed
in these texts similarly to how Peter Brown approached late antique asceticism, as “a
heroic and sustained attempt, on the part of thinkers of widely different background and
temper of mind, to map out the horizons of human freedom.”567 I have taken the
philosophers and the historians I have engaged with seriously. For ancient philosophers,
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Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early
Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 442.
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philosophy was a “way of life” whose purpose was transformation of the self.568 This
could equally be said of historians like R.G. Collingwood, (as well as Dilthey and Croce
before him). Writing history is a transformative practice that leads to self-knowledge in
the present.
Espousing a strange blend of Idealism and Historicism, Collingwood, not so
unlike the Platonici, was interested in the peculiarities of self-reflexivity, awareness of
awareness, thought thinking about itself. He writes:
The peculiarity of thought, then, is that it is not mere consciousness but selfconsciousness. The self, as merely conscious, is a flow of consciousness, a series
of immediate sensations and feelings; but as merely conscious it is not aware of
itself as such a flow; it is ignorant of its own continuity through the succession of
experience. The activity of becoming aware of the continuity is what is called
thinking.569
Historical research is intimate for Collingwood. When reading an account of an event, we
do not make the “author’s perspective our own” but we form our own perspective by
“getting in touch with that of the author.”570 History as a philosophical practice and
exercise in the ancient sense is a transformative process and “not merely a process of
becoming, but a process of self-creation.”571 It is “a specialized form of human
insight.”572 In Collingwood’s historical method, we become the object of our knowing
and in doing so we come to know ourselves…which has a distinctively Neoplatonic ring
to it, doesn’t it?
In the ancient world, philosophers were initiates (mustos). See Hadot, Spiritual
Exercises,1995; Kingsley, “Esoteric Tradition,” 1998.
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175

It is doubtful that Collingwood would ever say that “self-knowledge leads to
personal divinity” the way the Platonici did or at least in those terms. Perhaps he gets as
close to it as he would when he describes how both artists and scientists perceive the
objects of their imaginations as “nature.” For both artists and scientists perceiving the
natural world, “the cognitive activity feels its object to be independent of it and set over
against it as a limit to its own freedom.”573 The limit to its own freedom is a sense of
finitude but, Collingwood continues, “a mind that was wholly finite could not be aware
that it was finite; where finitude is known it is transcended.”574An embodied, imagined
divinity of the person seems like the “lived transcendence” Collingwood suggests here,
perhaps not so far from Augustine’s Platonici and theurgici after all.575
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Collingwood, Outlines, 50. Beyond the ability of the artist and the scientist to ask,
Collingwood’s philosopher wonders, “whether this feeling [of independence and limit] is
not in some sense an illusion, and whether the object may not in reality be in some sense
constituted by the very act which apprehends it.” Cf. Miller, Corporeal Imagination, 179
– 181.
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Collingwood, Outlines, 51.
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Collingwood was influenced by the German Idealist Hegel whose engagement with
Renaissance Hermeticism is well-known. See Connelly, J. “The Hesitant Hegelian:
Collingwood, Hegel, and Inter-War Oxford.” Bulletin – Hegel Society of Great Britain
51/52 (2005): 57-73. On Hegel’s Hermeticism see Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and
the hermetic tradition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Magee introduces his
book with the following quotation from Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences (my adaptation): “Theos is theos only so far as it knows itself. Its selfknowledge is, further, self-consciousness in the human and the human’s knowledge of
theos, which proceeds to the human’s self-knowledge in theos.” Magee comments: “This
Hermetic doctrine of the ‘circular’ relationship between God (sic) and creation and the
necessity of man for the completion of God is utterly original. It is not to be found in
earlier philosophy. But it recurs again and again in the thought of the Hermeticists, and it
is the chief doctrinal identity between Hermeticism and Hegelian thought.” Magee,
Hegel, 1, 10. One can see hints of this aspect of Hegel in Collingwood in his unpublished
lecture, “Realism and Idealism” (1935): “The only answer which seems to me to be
admissible for a sound metaphysic would be, that all these kinds of unity are to be found
in the real world, and that its ultimate unity will be none of them to the exclusion of the
others, but will be a unity of them all, a unity of kinds of unity. Some of them are
material unities, some mental, some mathematical, some logical; consequently the
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POETIC POSTLUDE
Rant
You cannot write a single line w/out a cosmology
a cosmogony
laid out, before all eyes
there is no part of yourself you can separate out
saying, this is memory, this is sensation
this is the work I care about, this is how I
make a living
it is whole, it is a whole, it always was whole
you do not “make” it so
there is nothing to integrate, you are a presence
you are an appendage of the work, the work stems from
hangs from the heaven you create
every man / every woman carries a firmament inside
& the stars in it are not the stars in the sky
w/out imagination there is no memory
w/out imagination there is no sensation
w/out imagination there is no will, desire
history is a living weapon in yr hand
& you have imagined it, it is thus that you
“find out for yourself”
history is the dream of what can be, it is
the relation between things in a continuum

ultimate unity of the world will be a unity of being, within which there are these and
doubtless other orders of being, each with a peculiar type of unity of its own, found there
and nowhere else. And this answer is certainly in the spirit of objective idealism; it is
hinted at more than once in passages of Plato, and it is the guiding thread of the chief
modern attempt at an objective idealism, the philosophy of Hegel.” Quoted in Connelly,
“Hesitant Hegelian,” 72. Gary Browning acknowledges that Hegel’s influence is
complicated and ambiguous, especially in regards to Hegel’s unitive Absolutism. We see
this clearly in The New Leviathan where Hegel is portrayed as obstructing “liberal
civilization”: “In Prolegomena to Logic (1920), [Collingwood] suggests, ‘…because
Hegel did not shake himself free from his Spinozistic and Schellingian training he tended
to fall back, whenever he was not in his happiest mood into just this (monistic) view of
the concept [“unity of thought”] and his followers have erected the whole into a kind of
fetish.’” (Browning, Rethinking, 182; Collingwood, Prolegomena, 10). But, Collingwood
is much more positive about Hegel in the unpublished works as seen above, probably,
Browning argues, because his British readers were patently unreceptive to German and
Italian idealism during the interwar period.
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of imagination
what you find out for yourself is what you select
out of an infinite sea of possibility
no one can inhabit yr world
yet it is not lonely,
the ground of imagination is fearlessness
discourse is video tape of a movie of a shadow play
but the puppets are in yr hand
your counters in a multidimensional chess
which is divination
& strategy
the war that matters is the war against the imagination
all other wars are subsumed in it.
the ultimate famine is the starvation
of the imagination
it is death to be sure, but the undead
seek to inhabit someone else’s world
the ultimate claustrophobia is the syllogism
the ultimate claustrophobia is “it all adds up”
nothing adds up & nothing stands in for
anything else
THE ONLY WAR THAT MATTERS IS THE WAR AGAINST
THE IMAGINATION
THE ONLY WAR THAT MATTERS IS THE WAR AGAINST
THE IMAGINATION
THE ONLY WAR THAT MATTERS IS THE WAR AGAINST
THE IMAGINATION
ALL OTHER WARS ARE SUBSUMED IN IT
There is no way out of a spiritual battle
There is no way you can avoid taking sides
There is no way you can not have a poetics
no matter what you do: plumber, baker, teacher
you do it in the consciousness of making
or not making yr world
you have a poetics: you step into the world
like a suit of readymade clothes
or you etch in light
your firmament spills into the shape of your room
the shape of the poem, of yr body, of yr loves
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A woman’s life / a man’s life is an allegory
Dig it
There is no way out of the spiritual battle
the war is the war against the imagination
you can’t sign up as a conscientious objector
the war of the worlds hangs here, right now, in the balance
it is a war for this world, to keep it
a vale of soul-making
the taste in all our mouths is the taste of power
and it is bitter as death
bring yr self home to yrself, enter the garden
the guy at the gate w/ the flaming sword is yrself
the war is the war for the human imagination
and no one can fight it but you/ & no one can fight it for you
The imagination is not only holy, it is precise
it is not only fierce, it is practical
men die everyday for the lack of it,
it is vast & elegant
intellectus means “light of the mind”
it is not discourse it is not even language
the inner sun
the polis is constellated around the sun
the fire is central
--

Diane Di Prima (1985)576
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Pieces of a Song: Selected Poems (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1990), 159 –
161.
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APPENDIX A
AUGUSTINE THE READER
It is worth taking a brief moment to discuss what we know about Augustine’s
reading habits generally and in regard to the writers he cites in Books 8 - 10.
Augustine’s use of classical references throughout City of God is striking. Gillian
Clark, captures the force of this use:
Augustine was out to show that he shared the classical deduction and the
cultural referents of his opponents. He too could write the Latin of five
centuries ago that was the hallmark of the educated man. City of God is his
most consciously and consistently Ciceronian work, both in content and in
style. Latin-speaking schoolboys worked through Terence and Sallust and
Virgil as well as Cicero, and there they all are, reinforced by Livy for the
legends of the early republic and Varro for its religion.577
Harald Hagendahl allows for the possibility, though, that rather than being intimately
familiar with many of the classical authors he cites, as he appears to be, Augustine’s
knowledge was gathered from secondary sources such as books, commentaries, or even
schoolbooks.578 Nonetheless, especially in the case of City of God, Hagendahl argues that
Augustine “prepared himself for his magnum opus by extensive study of profane authors
and had them at hand during the course of his work,” a position echoed by Marrrou and
O’Meara.579 Augustine seemed to be proud of his literary prowess, especially when
addressing “pagans” as he does in City of God. In one letter, he seems flattered by Darius
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Gillian Clark, “City of Books: Augustine and the World as Text,” in The Early
Christian Book, eds. William E. Klingshirn, and Linda Safran (Catholic University of
America Press, 2008), 126.
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Harald Hagendahl, Augustine and the Latin Classics (Göteborg: Universitet, 1967),
690.
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Hagendahl, Latin Classics, 708-709. Cf. Henri Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin
de la culture antique (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1983),129; John Joseph O'Meara, The Young
Augustine: An Introduction to the Confessions of St. Augustine. London; New York:
Longman, 1980), 94.
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who praises the “immortal fruits” of his wisdom (Augustine, epistula 230). In another
letter written during the Vandal invasion of North Africa in 429, Augustine composes a
homily on praise (epistula 231) seeming to delight in citing Persius, Cicero, Plutarch,
Ennius, and Horace before finally turning to the expected biblical references.580
In addition to his use of biblical citations, City of God displays a wide variety of
literary sources including Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Christian writers. Among the Latin
writers, Varro, Cicero, Sallust, and Livy figure prominently, offering examples of
tragedies that befell Rome under the watch of pagan cult as well as the unseemly
behavior of their gods. His knowledge and citations of the Greek philosophers would
have been from Latin translations. His access to the philosophies of Plotinus, Porphyry,
and Iamblichus are believed to have been through the lost translations by Latin ChristoPlatonist Marius Victorinus.581 Of Apuleius, we know that Augustine read De deo
Socrates, Apologia, at least parts of De Mundo, and that he had some familiarity with
Metamorphoses.582 James J. O’Donnell speculates that Augustine came into possession of
a codex containing The god of Socrates and the Latin Asclepius in 412/3, possibly
through Volusianus or, seeing how popular it was in intellectual circles in Hippo, he may
have sought it out himself in order to refute it preemptively.583 He does not seem to have

580
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(1980): 149.
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been aware of the Greek Hermetic works or other related Hermetic literature such as what
is now referred to as the Papyri Graecae Magicae, a collection of rituals in Greek (and
demotic Egyptian) discussed in chapter 4. While he admits to having read only a small
amount of Plotinus,584 he read Porphyry’s now lost The Ascent of the Soul (De Regressu
Animae) and his Letter to Anebo (Epistula ad Anebonem) where Augustine may have
learned of Iamblichus’ philosophy.
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O’Daly, Guide, 258. See Augustine’s De Beata Vita 1.4 and Contra Academicos 2.2.5.
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APPENDIX B
AGAINST THE PAGANS
In City of God, Augustine objects to the idea—articulated by Apuleius in The god
of Socrates—that daemones (or to him, “demons”) act as intermediaries between humans
and the gods, serving a salvific function. Augustine has a clear alternative to Platonic
daemones in mind as the title of Book 9.15 indicates: “On the Mediator between God and
man, the man Christ Jesus.” Underlying his argument for “Christ as Mediator” is a more
general concern with a traditional Platonic philosophical problem of the relationship
between the sensible and the intelligible realms—the outer and inner realms respectively.
Augustine’s argument about the difference between Apuleius’s “daemonic
mediators” and “Christ as mediator” is complicated as the two models share certain
elements. Augustine’s Neoplatonic pedigree shows up when he finds imaginative
common ground with his intellectual forbearers. For example, he acknowledges that both
non-Christian gods and Christian angels could be “visible and…shining bright [like the
sun or moon]…or…invisible and mere objects of…thought.” (Augustine, De civitate Dei
10.27).585 Regarding the nature and existence of the gods of traditional Roman state cult,
Augustine writes in Book 9: “If the Platonists prefer to call the angels gods rather than
demons and to include them among those whom their founder and master Plato describes
as gods created by the supreme god (summo deo), let them say what they please, for we
must not engage in labored argument with them over words” (9.23).586 The bishop
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Wiesen, trans. “sive visibiles, quos conspicuos lucere cernebat, solem ac lunam et
cetera ibidem lumina, siue inuisibiles, quos putabat.”
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Wiesen, trans. “Hos si Platonici malunt deos quam daemones dicere eisque
adnumerare, quos a summo Deo conditos deos scribit eorum auctor et magister Plato:
dicant quod uolunt; non enim cum eis de uerborum controuersia laborandum est.”

183

acknowledges virtually “no quarrel between them [the Platonists] and us on that score”
(9.23) despite the labored arguments that make up the City of God.587
The daemones, although immortal like the gods of the Greek philosophers, were a
class of beings conceived of as being “lower” than the gods—existing in the air. And,
being closer to the earth, they were able to interact more directly with humans than the
gods were. They were also, according to Apuleius, subject to passions, and, while
immortal, they were miserable because of their passions. Like the Platonists, Augustine
maintains that “true” divinity is not passable or capable of suffering. Humans, who are
neither immortal nor exempt from suffering, have a soul, the part of their being
understood as capable of experiencing personal divinity. Therefore, Augustine argues:
“We need the sort of mediator who is linked to us in our lowest state by bodily mortality
yet is…immortal…by spirit…” (9.17).588 Although Augustine takes issue with
Apuleius’s demonology, he agrees with the general point: “In the scale of nature, angels
do occupy, metaphysically, a middle position between God and humans, and demons are
simply a species of angels, being less powerful because less wise” (21.6).589
The figure of the “Mediator” bears a startling resemblance to Plotinus’s idea of
the soul (psyche). Plotinus understood the soul itself an “intermediary logos”590 in much
the same way that Augustine understood the intermediary function of Christ as Logos—
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the “Word made flesh” (John 1:14). This similarity is not a coincidence. Throughout
Books 8 - 10, Augustine refers to Platonism as the philosophy that came closest to the
“true” philosophy of Christianity. Although he lights into Apuleius and Porphyry with a
vengeance, Plotinus seems to have earned his respect: “Plotinus is certainly praised as
surpassing, in the period just preceding our own recollections, the rest of Plato’s
followers in his understanding of the master” (9.10).591
Augustine then turns his attention from Apuleius’s demonology to a “different
opinion of the demons [that] was adopted and expressed in his writings by the Egyptian
Hermes, who is called Trismegistus” (8.23).592 Drawing from Latin Asclepius 38,
Augustine describes the “telestic art”593 of the Hermetist: “To unite, therefore these
invisible spirits to visible objects of bodily substance by some strange technique, so that
the result is something like animated bodies, idols dedicated and subject to these spirits,
this, Hermes says, is ‘making gods,’ (deos facere) and this great and miraculous power,
he adds, of making gods has been given to men” (8.23).594 Augustine fails to see how for
the theurgists, the telestic art was equally concerned with attaining personal divinity for
the one making the god (a point discussed in chapters 4 and 5). Instead, Augustine
refutes:
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Such gods then, the gods worshipped by such men and by such men artfully
fabricated, gods that are in fact demons bound by the chains of their desires
through some strange technique to idols, when they were described by Hermes as
gods made by men, were nevertheless not endowed by him, as they were by the
Platonist Apuleius (with whom we have already dealt adequately and show how
illogical and absurd are his opinions), with the office of being interpreters and
intercessors between gods made by God and men who God also made, carrying
prayers to heaven and fetching back gifts as answers to prayers. For it is
extremely foolish to suppose that gods made by men have more influence with
gods made by God than have men themselves, who were also made by the same
God (8.24).595
Augustine sees what he believes to be Hermes’ admission of the error of
“paganism” in the Latin Asclepius based on his reading of two sections, the first, a
mistranslation of the Greek:596 “It was this grave error and unbelief on the part of men
who did not pay due attention to worship and divine religion, namely the art whereby
man could make gods, that the sage deplores…” (8.24).597 The second section is an
apocalyptic vision Hermes foretells for Egypt:
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Wiesen, trans. “Deos ergo tales, talium deos, arte factos a talibus,1 id est idolis
daemones per artem nescio quam cupiditatum suarum vinculis inligatos cum appellaret
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“Augustine understands this work to say that this making of gods is a consequence of
human unbelief and religious degeneration, but he bases this interpretation on a causal
reading of ‘quoniam’ in Asclep. 37, a statement that Augustine finds puzzling in the
context of the treatise’s demonology, and for which he must find an ingenious
explanation (Hermes is inspired by an evil spirit 8.24).” O’Daly, Guide, 117, n. 26; See
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We must certainly take note how this Egyptian, pained to think that the time
would arrive when abolition would come in Egypt of all that worship which by
his own admission was set up by men who were gravely in error, unbelievers and
indifferent to the observance of divinae religionis, said among other things: ‘Then
this land, this holy seat of shrines and temples, will be covered with sepulchers
and with dead men…(8.26).598
Augustine understands the vision of Egypt’s shrines and temples “covered with
sepulchers and with dead men” to be a foretelling of a victorious Christian martyr cult.
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APPENDIX C
THE ALTAR OF VICTORY REVISITED
In The Last Pagans of Rome, Alan Cameron ably dismantles the myth of a unified
non-Christian resistance to Christianity, at least among the Roman senatorial elite,
famously encapsulated in the story of Symmachus and the Altar of Victory (as well as the
Battle of Frigidus and elsewhere).599 Cameron reads the reaction of non-Christians to 410
as a matter of cultural difference, de-emphasizing the possibility of an ideological
showdown between “true-believers” and demonstrates how, in fact, it was the Roman
Christians who insured Rome’s afterlife in the form of “Classical” heritage. Yet Peter
Brown observes that:
Cameron’s account of the end of paganism finds singularly little place for
resentment, for regret, still less for anger at the success of so much blasphemy
against the gods and continued, unspoken fear of their vengeance. Evidence for
such feelings exists for the Eastern Roman Empire. But Cameron rules this
evidence out of court, as being limited to small circles of alienated intellectuals.600
Indeed, by bringing Eastern sources (Damascius, Zacharias) to our attention, Edward
Watts has brought that resentment, regret, and anger to life in his studies on the
academies of Athens and Alexandria and the struggle of their scholarchs, rhetors, and
philosophers against steadily diminishing means and social intolerance.601 Watts cautions
us that while Roman state cult died, it is difficult to pin down the exact circumstances:
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“Depending upon the regions, sources, and languages scholars choose to privilege,
Roman[s] … can be seen as violently resisting Christianity’s expansion or as passively
standing aside while Christians dismantled traditional [cultic] institutions.”602
The Altar of Victory controversy was more of a symbolic episode whose effect
was felt in the defunding of Rome’s traditional state cult by Gratian in 382. Cameron’s
focus on the senatorial elite ignores the vast majority that saw traditional cult persist for
far longer.603 This dissertation attends to the literary sources that nourished the
persistence of ancient ideas. The non-Christian discourses and practices intended to
cultivate personal divinity, even while under the influence at times of similar Christian
ideas, is a site for the persistence of Classical heritage and ancient thought. Alan
Cameron concedes:
So many of the activities, artifacts, and enthusiasms that have been identified as
hallmarks of an elaborate, concerted campaign to combat Christianity turn out to
have been central elements in the life of cultivated Christians. This is the one area
in which “paganism” (defined as the Roman tradition, Rome’s glorious past)
continued to exercise real power and influence on men’s minds. Despite the best
attempts of Augustine and other rigorists, the Roman literary tradition played a
vital and continuing role in shaping the thought-world of Christians, both at the
time and in the centuries to come.604
One can’t help but wonder if Cameron’s lengthy objection to the persistence of
traditional pre-Christian thinkers and practitioners up until this concession might have
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something to do with his preference, although common, for referring to them with the
polemical term of Christian origin, “pagan.”605

Anthony Kaldellis complains that Alan Cameron offers little about the “last pagans”:
“One learns nothing…about their gods or reasons for not converting to Christianity. The
book assimilates them to the generic social background, which is defined in Christian
terms. Christian groups and discourses are generally given priority and treated as
normative with strikingly more interest and close engagement. And authors who seem to
want to deviate from the fold of the Church are marched right back in and disciplined by
the label ‘unconventional Christians,’ what that means. The sixth century, for example,
has been homogenized into a ‘monolithically’ Christian society far beyond even the
dreams of Justinian.” “Late Antiquity Dissolves,” Marginalia Review of Books, 16
September, 2015: http://marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/late-antiquity-and-the-newhumanities-an-open-forum/
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APPENDIX D
THE WORLD OF LATE ANTIQUITY
An interdisciplinary and international field, late antique studies gathers late
Roman historians, Byzantinists, early medievalists, Islamicists, classical archaeologists,
patristic and religious studies scholars whose diverse approaches include social
anthropology, archaeology, and cultural/literary theory. Just as disciplinary boundaries
are crossed, so are temporal and geographic lines. While there continues to be debate
surrounding its periodization,606 Brown is famous for the provocation: “Late
antiquity…it’s later than you think!” The geographic scope, while centered in the
Mediterranean world, now reaches well beyond any of the Empire’s political boundaries
as historians of late antiquity seem have found the ancient analog to globalization,
indicating a shift in focus from centralizing power to a diverse periphery. Local and
regional studies predominate as does a concern for representations and interpenetrating
social networks.607 In The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity (2012), Scott Johnson
portrays Irish monks (in a very spätere Spätantike) commenting on Priscian’s Institutions
grammaticae in one corner of the late antique world while a bilingual stele in Chinese
and Syriac is erected in the Tang capital to commemorate 150 years of Christian presence
in China.608 Gibbon’s “fallen” empire seems rather more to have spread, diffused, and
relocated (Ward-Perkins’ “vanishing drain pipes” aside). The Byzantines, as we call
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them, called themselves Rhomaioi after all. Henri Pirenne may have been the first to
challenge Gibbon in his 1939 Mahomet et Charlemagne609 but Brown takes a modified
“global turn” himself, arguing against dramatic rupture in favor of continuity by focusing
on trade routes and regional identities that persisted despite the various sackings from
North and East. Building upon the previous generation of scholarship on the late Roman
world—notably in Michael Rostovtzeff, Ronald Syme, A.H.M. Jones, H.I. Marrou, and,
his teacher, Arnaldo Momigliano, Brown steers the conversation toward cultural and
ideological history under the influence of Mary Douglas’s social anthropology.610
Gibbon’s emphasis on institutional history has been replaced by a concern for social,
cultural, and intellectual trends. Documentary sources are liberally complemented by
material culture. New archaeological discoveries challenge the triumphalism of our
Christian sources, highlighting a concern for traditional Graeco-Roman culture amidst a
growing Christian state. Archaeological studies present regional vitality and affluence
that discards any notion of a “Dark Age.” While the persistence of tradition is clear, the
other side to the reassessment of Christian “triumphalism” is the recognition that
traditional thought and practice also changed—notably, in the new brand of apologia of
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the philosophers—and in some cases waned without intervention from marauding monks,
disagreeable bishops, or zealous emperors, as in the temple complexes of Upper Egypt.
The last twenty years have seen a number of guides, companions, and
historiographical overviews that indicate a discipline come of age. Bowersock, Brown
and Grabar’s 1999 Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World uses a “long late
antiquity” from 250 to 800 CE.611 The Guide crosses temporal and spatial boundaries
erected by nineteenth-century Classicists and provides a remedy for “too many bishops
and not enough villages.” Garnsey and Humfress’s edited a collection in The Evolution of
the Late Antique World (2001) provides a reductus of the “Jones Report” in its concern
with institutional history.612 In 2004, a similar work edited by Swain and Edwards,
Approaching Late Antiquity focuses on the period between 200-400 CE, drawing from
recent archaeology of political-economy with particular attention to “top-down” effects
of law, military organization, and Imperial reform on society.613 The Past Before Us
(2004), edited by Carole Straw and Richard Lim, provides an excellent overview of the
historiography of late antiquity since the time of Gibbon.614
Recent trends in the direction of scholarship stand out: the change in focus from
center to periphery, the influence of the “linguistic turn” with its infusion of literary
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theory and self-critical awareness of the personal and the present upon historiography,
and the marshalling of multi-disciplinary approaches. The notion of Rome’s fall into
decadence is challenged, as is the insistence on abrupt historical breaks. Continuities and
remains are recognized in context. Religious Studies scholars seek the material and social
historians look to the force of ideas.
The “challenge” for the future seems to be striking a balance between close
critical readings “against the grain” with the realpolitik of the longue durée freed from its
nineteenth century presentism. The impact of social history and material culture studies
paints a more complex and interconnected late antique world revealing unexpected
continuities and surprising contradictions. Rousseau’s A Companion to Late Antiquity
(2009) is self-consciously historiographical and, in keeping with The Past Before Us, is
much more reflexive than the other compendia preceding it.615 Companion, like Guide
includes more families and monasticism and less army and slavery. The use of
Foucauldian and literary theory is here taken for granted and well-demonstrated: agency,
performance, and textual communities populate its pages. Law becomes a prism into a
society rather than its structural determinant.

Brown’s Influence
In The Cult of Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (1981), Peter
Brown chronicles the rise and function of the cult of saints in early Western European
Christianity.616 Using social anthropology and a wide array of primary sources to
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resurrect a “history from below,” Brown surveys a variety of human experiences with
tombs, shrines, relics, and pilgrimages. He pays particular attention to the idea that the
bodies of saints provided a locus where heaven is joined with earth, setting the stage for
significant further work by others on the body, materiality, and the senses in late antique
religion such as Susan Ashbrook Harvey’s Scenting Salvation: Ancient Christianity and
the Olfactory Imagination (2006), Georgia Frank’s The Memory of the Eyes: Pilgrims to
Living Saints in Christian Late Antiquity (2008) and Patricia Cox Miller’s The Corporeal
Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient Christianity (2009).617 Brown asserts
that the cult was not an upsurge of popular superstition as Hume and Gibbon would have
it but rather an imaginative shift that reflected changing social relations in Roman
society. Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity (1982), a collection of essays, lectures,
and reviews that covers much of Brown’s work in the 1970’s while teaching at Oxford
and the University of London, was published roughly a decade after Religion and Society
in the Age of Augustine (1972).618 Brown asks not, “Why did late antique people believe
in the supernatural?” but rather, “What did they get out of believing so?” As a historian
of Christianity, Brown stresses the need for “imaginative models” that help the historian
enter into the thought-worlds and the pressing concerns of late antique men and women.
However, an imaginative model is also a theoretical framework and one that, in part, he
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owes to Mary Douglas. Included among the thirteen articles is the influential “The Rise
and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity” (1971) which launched an inquiry into
the social organization of sanctity and demystification of power that continues today.619
The social-functionalist argument in “Holy Man” is revisited throughout a volume that
ranges widely from Pirenne to Gregory of Tours, Theodoret to Libanius, and the Book of
Kells to the early medieval ordeals. A careful study of the construction of the holy in late
antiquity and its loci--especially in the holy person, relic, and icon—as well as, more
generally, the functional interaction between humans and the supernatural, weaves the
essays together. For Late Antique society, Brown argues that the “idea of the holy” was
an embodied field for the projection and mediation of individual concerns and therefore a
matrix for social cohesion and arbitration. Brown’s The Body and Society (1988)
examines how the ideology, practice, and institutionalization of sexual renunciation
developed over time and place in early Christianity.620 Citing nearly every major early
Christian source (as well as selected contemporary medical and philosophical texts from
the likes of Galen and Porphyry), Brown reads the body of late antique Christianity,
amassing social prescriptions for marriage, family, and sexuality from St. Paul to St.
Augustine in both the Eastern and Western Empires. His familiar social anthropology is
replaced to some extent by a social psychology (or archaeology?) coming out of Brown’s
interaction with Foucault (and Hadot and Veyne before him). Brown reads the
multifarious body as political site, social construct, spiritual exercise, and path of
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resistance. In most of his case studies, gender performance and the social regulation of
bodies are front and center. In considering questions of what it means to be a person in a
society, he examines the options people had in private and social life, that is, the
opportunities for (and limits of) freedom, a concern that I share in my research on
personal divinity. When imaginative maps get redrawn, power gets relocated. What may
have seemed like an option for freedom on the ground, soon became a disciplinary
institution of great consequence, wealth, and power, not the least of which was to cast an
enduring shadow over the psyche of the West in the form of sexual shame. In Power and
Persuasion in Late Antiquity (1992), Brown describes the transformation of paideia from
its classical nexus to a new Christian imperial context.621 A new language of power
(triumphal representations) and a new style of urban leadership emerges as the bishopric
superseded the pagan aristocracy’s role in civic euergetism and the philosophers’
conciliar parrhesia while gaining the support of the poor (whom they could now
discipline). Brown also asserts that the pagan elite continued to function under an
“ideology of silence.” Claudia Rapp’s Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of
Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition (2005) follows up on Brown’s thesis and
further complicates the complex construction of episcopal authority.622

Contra Brown
Unsurprisingly, the success of the Brown’s influence has elicited a response,
exemplified concisely in Andrea Giardina’s characterization of the field as “an explosion
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of late antiquity” and in Bryan Ward-Perkins’ provocative The Fall of Rome and the End
of Civilization (2005).623 Ward-Perkins reacts to the preponderance of Eastern focused
correctives of late with some “positivist” Western material culture analysis of his own.
He bases much of his argument on the availability of high-quality “comfort” goods such
as pottery, roof tiles, and coins. It is tempting to fault him for being "too Marx and not
enough Weber" except that it is hard to argue with his common-sense portrayal of the
devastating effects of war. He questions the Brownian re-characterization of “decline”
and “crisis” as “transition” and “transformation,” and refutes the more recent attempts to
recast violent invasion as “accommodation.” By way of offering an explanation for these
reassessments, Ward-Perkins suggests that post-WWII political developments have
impacted historiography. Ultimately prioritizing the material base as a cultural matrix, he
suggests that while 800 may work for the East, the West and the Aegean experienced
significant material “simplifications” by 400 and 600, respectively.

Late Ancient or Early Christian?
In his essay, “Christianity and the Decline of the Roman Empire” (1963), Arnaldo
Momigliano suggests that any interpretation of the decline of the Roman empire must
take into account the triumph of imperial Christianity.624 However, he adds, it will not be
a “simple return” to Gibbon. The question of “survival” needs to be understood in
relation to two developments—the relative decline of the city in the Western empire and
the rise of the Christian state. For social and cultural historians of late antiquity, at least,
623

Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006).
624

Arnaldo Momigliano, Christianity and the Decline of the Roman Empire (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1963).

198

the notion of transformation has, by and large, replaced that of survival through a study
of Rome’s periphery and a consideration of hybridity and fluid identity as historical
processes. What the periphery looks like and how these processes play out in the East and
the West are both similar and different as we shall see later in this essay. Nonetheless, the
notion of “survival” and its necessary corollary—Christianization or, perhaps,
imperialization—has been the central problem of late antique studies since its inception
in the 70s with the arrival of Peter Brown’s The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750
(1971).625 Nevertheless, the question of how Rome adopted imperial Christian ideology
and which aspects of traditional culture survived the Christianization of Rome is not so
far from Gibbon as one might think.
It was Peter Brown’s reassessment of the thesis advanced in Edward Gibbon’s
masterwork The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (ed. J. Bury, 1902)
that launched the field of late antique studies.626 Eschewing Gibbon’s characterization of
Christianity as a superstitious usurper, Brown made the case for the transformation of
classical heritage in Christian times. Brown’s work has established late antiquity as a
complex and dynamic historical period for academic study. He has paired persistent
probing of source material with multiple imaginative and theoretical models—in an
almost “disciplinary iconoclasm” that includes social and literary theory, anthropology,
psychology and hagiography. New models have given rise to new questions with which
to interrogate old problems. Central to his contribution is an insistence upon linking “the
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social and the spiritual revolutions of the late antique period” without reducing their
relationship to a unilinear cause and effect.

Christianization
The master narrative of Christianization, following the triumphalism of the
Church Fathers, is as follows. After Constantine’s Edict of Toleration in 313, emperors
became increasingly intolerant of traditional religion, outlawing animal sacrifice and
even the burning of incense in the home. Encouraged by edicts and bishops, monks began
destroying cult images and temples. Non-Christian resistance was generally ineffective as
the Altar of Victory was removed from the Senate. Holy men attracted followers because
of their athletic asceticism and miraculous healing. Emperor Julian’s revival failed in the
fourth century. In the fifth century, a declining tradition cult and rising Christianity saw
more destruction of temples and more building of churches. Finally, Emperor Justinian
closes the Academy at Athens (529), and enforced baptism of non-Christians ensues.
Regardless of whether or not one accepts this fairly reasonable oversimplification, it still
doesn’t explain why people were attracted to Christianity.
The problem of christianization remains central to the field although the problem
itself is understood in different ways. On the question of conversion and the appeal of
Christianity, A.D. Nock’s Conversion: The Old and New in Religion from Alexander the
Great to Augustine of Hippo (1933) remains the standard.627 In her essay, “Paganism and
Christianization” (2012), Jaclyn Maxwell gathers a number of theories about the
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attraction of Christianity.628 MacMullen, she writes, points to the effectiveness of
imperial ideology, the appeal of holy people, healing, and exorcism; Jones, to a sense of
expediency among the upwardly mobile after the crisis of third century; Salzman, to an
aristocracy that reformed Christianity to it aims; Fowden, to the increased mobility in the
empire and the need for Zugehörigkeit; Frankfurter, to the charisma of leaders and the
fact that abandoning former beliefs was not, in practice, required. Ramsay MacMullen’s
1984 Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-400) (1984) challenges uncritical
reception of patristic representations of the “triumph” of Christianity.629 MacMullen
argues that in order to understand the dynamic of Christianization in the Roman empire
between 100-400, we must first understand the preexisting state of non-Christian
ideological commitments. While the diverse cultic traditions of the Graeco-Roman world
were non-exclusive, the exclusiveness of imperial Christian ideology forced adherents
(not converts in the Nockian sense) to make a choice. An interest in the miraculous, a
desire for spiritual and social benefits of adhesion, and a fear of physical pain (heavenly
or imperially sanctioned), combined with the subsequent demonization of non-Christian
cultic practices, enabled Christianity to gradually supersede traditional beliefs and
practices.
Citing the persistence of traditional cultic practices and beliefs into early modern
and modern societies as evidence for the relative “triumph” of Christianity, Pierre Chuvin
argues in A Chronicle of the Last Pagans (1990) that christianization between 300-600
was, in fact, possible due to the non-Christian elites’ loss of power, public policies of
628
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exclusion that encouraged their assimilation, and finally, under Justinian, threats of
physical elimination.630 For Chuvin, the process was gradual and complex, displaying
contradictory evidence between official representations and legal proscriptions, on the
one hand, and local material and epigraphic sources, on the other. He traces the retreat of
non-imperial ideologies from a popular and public forum to the more private and
philosophical spheres.
Gillian Clark wonders if Roman institutions might have had more of an impact on
Christianity than previously considered. In Christianity and Roman Society (2004),
Clark’s argument that Roman society transformed Christianity relies on the premise that
traditional society embraced the emerging textual and ethical communities out of political
expediency rather than from commitment to ideology.631 Her discussion of the difference
between philosophical and Christian “selves” is especially interesting but she emphasizes
political and economic impacts over such ideological developments. The innovative role
of martyrs, saints, and bishops is well documented yet those social innovations are
trumped, in her view, by the alliance between imperial and episcopal power.
Hal Drake analyzes the “Constantinian Revolution” in terms of realpolitik. In
Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (2000), he refutes the inherent
intolerance many scholars have attributed to Christianity, choosing to focus on the
politics of power rather than theology.632 His portrait of a pragmatic Constantine who
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used the rising bishops as administrative adjuncts, while seeking to build a stable
ideological consensus between pagans and Christians through an “inclusive
monotheism,” is original and draws from current day scholarship on American power
politics.
Michele Salzman mines A.H.M. Jones’ The Prosopography of the Later Roman
Empire (1971) for data regarding ideological and career identity shifts within the
Senatorial class in The Making of a Christian Aristocracy: Social and Religious Change
in the Western Roman Empire (2002).633 She argues that the senatorial aristocracy, more
than the imperial court, influenced the transformation of the Roman Empire from pagan
to Christian identification. Once self-identification as a Christian, she maintains, ceased
to disrupt personal, familial, and social networks, conversion became a matter of selfinterest. It was in this climate that Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine “transformed” their
Classical paideia for Christianity.
Recent archaeological studies have had a significant impact on our understanding
of Christianization. In “The Fate of Rural Temples in Late Antiquity,” a contribution to
Bowden, Levan, and Machado’s Recent Research on the Late Antique Countryside
(2004), Beatrice Caseau charts conflicting ideology evidenced by the destruction of
traditional temples (as well as the persistent attraction to these sites) in the countryside of
the late Roman Empire up to the sixth century.634 Outside of the cities, the suburban,
rural, and “uncultivated” zones contained both elaborate temple structures and more
633
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informally defined sacred landscapes or sanctuaries. Surveys of cultic sites indicate ebbs
and flows in use that correlate to settlement patterns and economics, as much as
ideological shifts. In one example, she points to the villa of St- Aubin-sur-Mer in
Normandy which was built on top of a Celtic fanum from the second century later to be
toppled in the fourth century by a Roman shrine. She concludes that the enforced
“privatization” of tradition cultic practice (i.e. moving from public to private spaces)
resulted in the loss of temple traditions. In “The Fate of Pagan Cult Places in Palestine,”
from Lapin’s edited Religious and Ethnic Communities in Late Roman Palestine (1998),
Tsafrir notes that while expressions of traditional cult (statues of gods and heroes,
mosaics with imagery from Graeco-Roman mythology) survived into the sixth century,
there is no evidence of temples or temple sacrifice after the end of the fourth century in
Palestine, at any rate.635 Tsafrir reads Epiphanius against Ammianus Marcellinus to
confirm that violent destruction of pagan temples was slower than apologists generally
indicate. Relying heavily on the work of epigrapher, Louis Robert, and with an interest in
Greek polis-cult, Robin Lane Fox argues for the vitality of ethnic “polytheisms” in the
late empire in Pagans and Christians (1986).636

The Greek East
In Hellenism in Late Antiquity (1990), Glen Bowersock, in much the same vein as
Baynes’ Hellenistic Civilization and East Rome (1946), challenges the view of Hellenism
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as Hellenizing; that is, a forceful overlay of Greek cultural forms and values.637 Drawing
on a range of philological, literary, archaeological, and visual evidence—especially the
mosaics from Paphos, Cyprus—he argues that Hellenism was not imperialistic. Greek
culture enriched and influenced through contact, to be sure, but also provided a vehicle
for local cultural expression and preservation. Much of Bowersock’s discussion of
Hellenism involves the survival of tradition culture in late antiquity despite patristic
claims of triumph. He uses Syrian and Egyptian examples to reassess Momigliano’s Alien
Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (1975).638 For example, when John of Ephesus
comments on the thousands of non-Christians in the mountains near the Maeander
Valley, Bowersock reminds us of valley cult practices described in sixth-century B.C.E
inscriptions that continued to be depicted on local coins into the sixth century C.E.
According to Damascius, these practices were also known to fifth and sixth-century
Alexandrian Neoplatonists.
In Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews, and Christians in Antioch
(2007), Isabella Sandwell uses the sermons of John Chrysostom and the letters of
Libanius to complicate identity in late antiquity and offers a new approach to thinking
about Christianization.639 Relying on the social anthropology of Frederik Barth and T.H.
Eriksen, she makes the case for multiple fluid social identities and allegiances. While
John Chrysostom is unambiguous about what differentiates Christians from Greeks or
637

G.W. Bowersock, Hellenism in Late Antiquity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1990); Norman Hepburn Baynes, The Hellenistic Civilization and East Rome
(London: G. Cumberlege [printed by J. Johnson], 1946).
638

Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975).
639

Isabella Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews, and Christians
in Antioch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

205

Jews, the writings of Libanius suggest a range of degree in ideological identification and
practice.
In “The Student Self in Late Antiquity” (2005), Edward Watts examines how
traditional classical education for elites—paideia—blurred the boundaries between
classical, Christian, and Jewish identities as a normalizing strategy in Egypt.640 In his City
and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria (2006), a cultural history of paideia in
it social, political, and economic context, Watts comments on the relationship between
Bishop Synesius and Philosopher Libanius to show the collegiality that exists between
classical and Christian intellectuals who shared paideia.641 In Riot in Alexandria:
Tradition and Group Dynamics in Late Antique Pagan and Christian Communities
(2010), Watts traces the resilience of Graeco-Roman heritage and the way in which nonChristian and Christian intellectual groups reconfigured this heritage in postConstantinian Alexandria.642 Drawing from Neoplatonist Philosopher Damascius’ Vita
Isidori and Bishop Zacharias Scholasticus’s Vita Severi, he argues that both groups had
long histories of preserving and communicating their collective pasts. Prior to the fourth
century, internecine Christian disputes occupied more Christian attention more than
philosophically-centered teachings (see also Richard Lim’s “Christian Triumph and
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Controversy,” 1999).643 With the rise of monastic communities as a model for Christian
instruction, upper class Christians were now “cut off” from the intellectual training
provided by the traditional classical philosophical schools. In this new climate, Christian
pedagogues used Athanasius’ Vita Antonii as an interpretatio Christiana on classical
paideia. However, Christians in Alexandria continued to be interested in traditional
classical paideia. Rather than thinking in terms of Christianization, he understands the
social and cultural change in Alexandria as contingent upon “personal connections and
individual interactions.”

The Latin West
The Greek East has sometimes been the evidential “linchpin” for both the survival
classical culture and its transformation. However, a similar hybridity is evident among
Western intellectuals in nascent late antique successor states albeit without the force of
imperial Byzantium. In The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D.
200-1000 (2003), Peter Brown makes amends to the lacuna of the West in The World of
Late Antiquity.644 It was Marrou’s Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (1949)
that had planted the notion of the vitality of the Western Empire in the fourth and early
fifth centuries.645 Nonetheless, it was, perhaps, an under-appreciation for the “barbarian
frontier” in The World of Late Antiquity (which has since been corrected by Peter
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Heather, Walter Goffart, Wolf Liebeschuetz, and Ian Wood) that led him to revisit the
localization of Christianity in emerging “micro-Christendoms” in Europe (and beyond) in
The Rise of Western Christendom. He recalls Theodoric’s comment that a rich Goth
imitates a Roman while only a poor Roman imitates a Goth. In “Conversion and
Christianization in Late Antiquity: The Case of Augustine” (2004), Brown uses the
recently published “Dolbeau sermons” of Augustine to complicate our notion of
christianization in the West.646 We see the bishop on the ground contending with the
superstitio of nominal “Christians” who still consulted astrologers and diviners.
Christianization did not amount to conversion in any Nockian sense. As Averil Cameron
points out in “Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory After Foucault” (1986) it
was not as if people simply adopted a new “religion,” changed their whole view of the
world and way of living from some “reorientation of the soul.”647 Rather, it was slow
changes in the society that allowed the possibility for Christianity to “adhere” itself to
society. Alan Cameron in The Last Pagans of Rome (2011) persuasively argues against
the picture of elite Roman pagans acting in resistance to christianization as symbolized in
Symacchus’s famous Altar of Victory and the Battle of the Frigidus.648 That said, his
argument works best when confined to the West. In The End of Ancient Christianity
(1990), Robert Markus considers the “Christianities” of the West in North Africa, Gaul,
and Italy under that assumption that the boundary between Christianity and other spheres
646
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of activity is not fixed nor are Christianity’s constituent beliefs and practices universal.
He advances the notion of “de-secularization” to describe how Christianity appropriated
previously non-religious spheres of activity into its scope.649 More concerned with
attitudes about classical cultural elements that continued to be part of the life and mind of
late antique peoples, Markus points to the Gallo-Roman poetry of Ausonius which
displays an easy blend of motifs from classical culture and Christian ideology. While he
and his pupil Paulinus shared the imaginative landscape of paideia, Paulinus eventually
renounced his wealth and status to follow “authentic” Christianity through ascetic
practice, a choice Ausonius, like so many other late Roman Christians, found simply
unnecessary. They each drew the “map” of what constituted Christianity differently.
In “Christianization, Secularization, and the Transformation of Public Life”
(2009), Richard Lim looks at Markus’ process in reverse. In a society where notions of
the sacred infused all spheres of activity, it was not until early Christianity becomes a
threat to classical culture that certain select practices, like participating in sacrifices and
imperial cult, became “religious” while other practices rooted in traditional culture
avoided that categorization.650 Lim argues that one of the ways Christianity reshaped
Graeco-Roman culture and society was through the construction of the sphere of the
saeculum. Public spectacles such as the munera and ludi, though demonized by some,
were relegated to the saeculum which became an “autonomous discursive space” for
classical culture where it was protected from Christianization, yet transformed in its
accommodation. The ludi and munera were desacralized and then secularized. In
649
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Barton’s view, this “secularization” might be seen as an alternative, unauthorized (in the
minds of the normative Church Fathers, at any rate) sacralization. Lim cites Stark and
Bainbridge's study of the cycle of desacralization and resacralization in modernity, a
work inspired by Weber's notion of disenchantment as a feature of modernity.651 In
Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianization of the Roman World (1995),
Brown attempts to highlight the cultural and ideological bricolage between traditional
and Christian thought and practice that, especially in the Western limes, constituted a
”Middle Ground.”652 Brown cautions against privileging the Christian Church as the
“principal agent in the diffusion of a more adaptable form of classical culture.”
Understanding Christianization as a Geertzian “cultural system” that included vibrant and
conservative non-religious institutions and traditions while considering how hybridity
and fluid identities functioned, particularly in the periphery, moves us forward in
identifying the nuances of contested sacralizations and secularizations. Taking such a
view offers an apotropaic against reverting to a dichotomous “survival versus triumph”
model of social change in late antiquity. Nevertheless, it is heartening, I think, for those
of us who, when stumbling upon a celebration of kalendae ianuarii, might find some
comfort in “continuity over time” once in a while.
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